



建白答問類

日本書

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Memo. No. 42.

Introductory.

I propose to discuss here the question of the island of Saghalien in its connection with other questions of both internal and external policy.

This island has been for Japan the source of great embarrassment, not only on account of national susceptibilities and British jealousies which its cession to Russia would doubtless wound and awake, but also because of the complications with the latter power which its retention in her own hands would lead to. In this predicament, Japan has resorted to half measures,

whereby, instead of extricating herself from her difficulties, she has but increased the apprehensions it was so necessary to quiet and the anxieties it was so important to allay; and the longer she perseveres in these tactics the more difficult will her position become.

In dealing with the Saghalien question, Japan cannot expect ever to be able to satisfy every one; for the interests which it involves have nothing in common. By ceding Saghalien to Russia, she interferes with England's traditional policy in the East, which is adverse to the expansion of the maritime power of any nation; while by retaining the island in her own hands, she alienates a powerful neighbor (Russia) whose friendship, in view of the complications likely to arise, soon or late, in Asia, it may be to her interest to cultivate, and possibly

neglects the opportunity of getting a handsome sum of money which Russia might feel inclined to offer as the price for the abandonment of her rights over a place which has long ceased to be of any value to her, and which it is so important to Russia to acquire. <sup>(a)</sup>

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(a). - In 1870, a series of communications passed between Mr. De Soub, U. S. Minister to Japan, the Department of State at Washington and the U. S. Minister at St. Petersburg, in consequence of a request made by the government of Japan that, in accordance with the 2<sup>nd</sup> article of the Treaty of Uedo [July 29<sup>th</sup>, 1858], the President should act as a mediator in the case of Saghalien. The result of the correspondence was that Russia emphatically refused the intercession of the United States, but expressed a strong desire that that government should ascertain upon what terms Japan would consent to part with Saghalien, and indicated a disposition to offer "material compensation". Some persons have reasons to suppose that the substance of this communication was not fully revealed to the Japanese government, but I have been informed that the documents recording it are on file in the U. S. Legation, and begin with No. 85 of 1870.

Why the Place should be ceded to Russia.

The first mission sent to Russia regarding the bay of Aniva left Japan for St. Petersburg in 1862, with Takeouchi Shimotsuke no kami and Matsudaira Iwami no kami at its head. The concessions which they were instructed to obtain were: First, that the fiftieth parallel of latitude should be accepted by Russia as the boundary between the two countries, as it was taken by them to mark the division between the tribes called Aino and Suelenkur; and second, that each portion of the island should be governed by the officers of the respective nation part of whose domain it should form under the plan proposed. But the Russians rejected it.

these propositions under the pretext that there were no Ainos to be found north of the fortieth parallel of latitude, and that there was nothing in the island to guide them in laying down a proper boundary; and they further insisted on leaving matters as they were for the time being, permitting the subjects of both nations to occupy the island in common as had been provisionally determined by the treaty previously concluded at Shimoda. Although Takenoichi and his colleagues perceived from the evasive nature of the Russian arguments that the design of the latter was to ultimately seize the whole island<sup>(a)</sup>, they

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(a). They do not now disguise their intentions, at least so I am informed by the French minister, who has been corresponding with his government on the subject. They say that if Russia does not seize upon the island, England will.

were unable to refute them because, strange to say, of an insufficient knowledge of the circumstances of the place, and therefore the discussion was adjourned until such time as it could be renewed on the basis of an examination of the localities; and the envoys returned to Japan.

At the time of their arrival there circumstances were such that the government was unable to send a second mission to St Petersburg as soon as it desired; and the Russians took advantage of this long interval to form extensive settlements in Saghalien<sup>(a)</sup>. At last, in 1867, Hoide Yamato no Kanin and Ichikawa Kawa-

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(a). During the interval the Japanese government sought the good offices of Mr. Pruyn, U.S. Minister, who, with the consent of Mr. Seward, U.S. Secretary of State, acted as a medium of communication between Japan and Russia, but without important results.

Chino Kamin were dispatched to Russia. But it was too late to repair the damage resulting from the neglect of the past five years. The Russians, strong in the right which they derived from actual possession, insisted upon keeping what they had already occupied under the convention of 1862, and proposed that the remaining portion of the island should thereafter be colonized and occupied jointly by the subjects of both nations. Koidé and his colleagues consulted together, saying: "Though we have exhausted all possible arguments, the fact remains that their colonies extend south of the fiftieth parallel. It is our fault for putting the negotiations off so long;" and the treaty was concluded upon the basis proposed by Russia. (1867). [See Kinsei Shiroiaku, from 1853 to 1859. Volume 1.]

This treaty was a sad mistake; for it was the means, not only of legalizing the past encroachments of Russia, against which the commission had been instructed to protest, but also, considering the greater facilities which that power possessed for colonizing such a region, of securing to her the opportunity of occupying, without possible opposition on the part of Japan, more in the future, and even eventually absorbing the whole island, a possibility which the ambassadors had been expected to avert.

As matters now stand, Russia, in crowding her population on the island, can be said to be but simply deriving a legal benefit from an agreement, freely concluded, which has thrown into her hands a station the advantages of which she cannot ignore; and she

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can no more be forced into her co-occupant's inactivity, than the latter can be compelled to emulate her in her industry and enterprise, unless it should be for the fulfilment of certain obligations which, under the contract of joint occupation, are tacitly understood to be incumbent upon both parties - for instance, the proper administration and care of the place, that its possession to its joint owners may be secured against invasion or conquest by a common enemy, a burden which cannot be too seriously considered by Japan before it is irrevocably accepted.

Again, although the people of both countries have settled in the island and have equal rights there, the Japanese are in such minority that, in the thousand municipal and other

arrangements such as are generally adopted by the inhabitants of the same place outside of the action of the central governments, they have hardly a voice; and the Russians, by too often assuming the airs of masters, are apt to wound the susceptibilities of their co-residents, who, in turn, knowing that they also are at home and ought to have a voice in the councils, seldom fail to betray their feelings. Hence irrepressible conflicts and difficulties of all sorts between the co-occupants which the local authorities are not always able to satisfactorily adjust, and injustices which cannot end otherwise than in generating such a hatred in the breasts of the weaker for the stronger as will soon render a life in common a matter of impossibility, and of such a position neither government

could be expected to long remain in different spectators.

When two persons, bound to each other by business ties, from some cause or other come to lose confidence in each other and quarrel, if the cause of difference is one that cannot be removed and they are really anxious to preserve their friendship, it only remains for them to divide their interests. It is plain that Russia and Japan have come to this point in the Saghalien matter, and unless the cause of discord be removed, no one can foretell what the relations between them will be in the future. It is very likely that, in twenty or thirty years from now, Japan will be able to cope with her giant neighbor, but no one would be so blind as to say that she now is - and a rupture

between the two countries at this present day could only result in the loss of Saghalien to Japan and her humiliation before the whole world.

Such is the situation. It would be suicidal for Japan to ignore it. The cession, made under the best possible terms, is no longer a matter of election, but has become one of political necessity; and no time should be lost in effecting it. Any delay must be fatal to Japan. For, in presence of the steady progress made by Russia in populating the place and the corresponding loss of ground which Japan suffers thereby, if matters are allowed to remain much longer in statu quo, the time is not far distant when Japan will have nothing to cede and therefore nothing to receive; and



the blunder committed by the government of the Bakufu in 1862 and 1867 will have become irreparable.

III.

Why National Feeling might be adverse to the cession of Saghalien.

I can easily understand the aversion which Japan has to any Western power gaining a foothold in her immediate vicinity. Being composed of islands, she is already too accessible, and too much exposed to the risk of occupation and conquest in detail by a foreign foe. The number of deep anchorages and ports in the larger islands, although they would serve as a refuge to the Japanese navy, would, at the same time, facilitate the landing of an enemy. Another cause of weakness is that Japan is very mountainous, even more so than any island or peninsula

of Europe, excepting perhaps Greece or Sicily; and these mountains are covered with forests which could be occupied by the enemy, who, from them, could easily keep under fire any national troops that might be sent from one point to another for the defence of the Empire. Of the 7000 square miles that form the area of Japan, the four principle islands - Hondo, Huppon, Kjusiu and Sikkok - have 1170 miles of coast, which makes very nearly one mile of coast to each six miles of superficies. To defend such a great line in the present condition of communications in Japan would be simply impossible. Even if she should succeed protecting the most important positions, viz., Tokio, Osaka, Nagosima and Simonosaki, Japan

would have to divide her forces over several hundred miles of territory; and even then the smaller islands would be isolated from Japan proper as soon as the enemy's fleet would appear in these waters. As to the larger islands, they would be reduced one after the other, and all communications would be interrupted. After the occupation of Simonosaki and a few other places, the unity of defence by concentrating all her available forces at a given point, as England might do on the Thames and Turkey on the Bosphorus, would be impossible to Japan. Her fisheries would be ruined and her rice crops could easily be destroyed by means of judicious excursions into the interior; and, as the Japanese live principally on rice and fish,

and as yet have no sheep and very few cattle, they would soon be reduced to a state of starvation.

Let us now examine which are the nations from which, under these unfavorable circumstances, Japan has the most to fear.

In the way that matters stand at present, China<sup>(a)</sup> and Korea need not be considered; and, being at a distance of twenty days steaming from America and forty five days from Europe, she need hardly apprehend any attack by the military powers

(a). I do not mean by this that the possibility of a change in China should be overlooked. By a transition from her present policy of isolation China might become both strong and aggressive. Now is the time for Japan to prepare for any contingency. If she does so, she will never have anything to fear from Asiatic powers, as the warlike character and great patriotism of her people, if aided by a suitable system of national defence, will always give her the advantage over them in case of aggression on their part.

of either the old or the new world. And besides, the most of those powers, even if they had the means of attacking her, would be deterred from so doing by many causes. For instance, the French are too fond of their own country to go abroad; and this is why their colonies have never proved of any benefit to them, save, perhaps, in a political point of view — as Algeria, in Africa, for example. If they annexed Saigon, it was simply because of the necessity, after the close of the China campaign of 1858, for them to counterpoise British influence in the East, which they expected to accomplish by the possession of a colony there. Now that this object has been attained, they certainly will not look for more. For, if they had had any such design,

they would doubtless have improved the opportunity which a quarrel with the Corea, a few years ago, gave them of annexing that country. As to Germany, she has so far shown no inclination to acquire extensive colonies in the East. She may wish for a maritime station there and, evidently in furtherance of that object, made unusual inquiries regarding Formosa and the Pescadores in 1869 and 1870, while, previous to that time, she had made an effort to gain possession of Chusan. Had she been anxious for territorial aggrandizement in Asia, she would probably have made the cession of Cochin-China a condition of peace with France in 1871, or, after the peace was concluded, negotiated for it, offering to receive it

as an offset to a portion of the war indemnity which France had to pay her. If she did not do this, it was probably because the place was too extensive for her. <sup>(a)</sup>

There is yet Spain, who holds the Philippines; but the days of Charles the Fifth and Philip the Second have passed, and, we may hope, passed forever. The same may be said of Portugal, who has Macao, and of Holland, who holds the archipelago of the South. There remain but

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(a). It is natural to suppose, considering the state of decay in which China is, that Russia is watching her chance to gain possession of another part the instant that vast empire will crumble to pieces. Probably she would prefer that which is bounded by the River Peiho in Pechili, or some other place further South. - But then, in this, she would be only improving an opportunity by which many other powers besides herself are prepared to profit.

Russia and England,

## IV.

Why Russia wants Saghalien.

It has often been stated that Russia's annexations in Siberia, China and Manchuria are sure signs of a wish on her part to extend her power over all Asia; that the establishments she has founded at Pasietta and Nicholasovitch are intended as so many bases from whence to spring towards Japan and conquer her; that her attempts to gain possession of the island of Saghalien are also prosecuted in furtherance of these views; that she has long kept one of her ablest ministers (Mr. de Butzow) at Hakodate for the purpose of watching her chance to seize upon Yesso, whose population, they assert, has been

made ripe for conquest by the exertions of her missionaries, who, for years past are said to have labored to convert the people to the Greek faith; that she keeps a watchful eye on Corea, and will make the conquest of that country the instant she finds it to her interest to do so; and that from thence she will cross over into Japan proper.

Nothing, in my opinion, seems to justify these assertions. Russia has not sufficient forces on the Pacific coast to seriously threaten the independence or the integrity of Japan. The great distance that separates the country of the Amoor from the political centre of the Empire, its small population and the expense of maintaining a

large army and navy there are so many guarantees that Russia, even if she has any design of conquest, will not be able to effect anything against Japan for a great many years to come. Russia is too far from her base of operations - at least four thousand miles - to accomplish anything in that direction, while the Japanese are at home. If she had really been anxious for the further acquisition of territory in Eastern Asia in addition to what she needs in Western Asia to enable her to watch over and keep the English in check in India, she would not have waited until now to prepare for a blow - she would have annexed the Corea which no one thought of defending. There

she would have found ports much better than Pasietta or Nicholasitzk, both for purposes of attack and defence. In seizing upon Japan and holding it after its subjugation against aggressions from without, the conquest of Korea would have been the first step to take.

The true spirit of Russia's policy in the East will become still more apparent when we endeavor to ascertain what it ought to be by a reference to her geographical position as compared with that of both England and Japan. A single glance at the map of the world will show that, notwithstanding the grounds for suspicion which she may have given in dealing with the Saghalien case and in questions of disputed territory with China,

her great object has been to avoid any greater extension of her territory in Northern Asia than she absolutely needed to accomplish her ends. She wanted Siberia in order to connect the naval stations, she desired to secure in Manchuria, with the interior of the Empire, from whence they must derive their supplies and garrisons; and Manchuria she was bound to have that these stations might not be surrounded by a territory settled by a weak population that might have rendered its conquest at some future day as easy to a European power as was that of India to England, thereby causing her position in her naval stations there a most difficult one, if not altogether untenable. It was the naval stations

she was anxious to have, and not the territory. Yet these naval stations, which, I am informed, are as strong as Sebastopol and Cronstadt, are not yet the outlets she needs in the East. With them, she is as powerless there as she is in Europe with her fortresses and navy yards on the Baltic and Black seas, where she is shut in by the strong gates of Skagerack and Kattegat between Norway and Denmark and the Dardanelles between Turkey in Europe and Turkey in Asia. To be released from this situation, she must have a port that is open to the wide ocean and from which she can at any time, in case of need, throw out her fleet against her enemy's possessions and commerce.

In this position, and letting aside the difficulty, if not impossibility, she would have to encounter in controlling the warlike population of Japan after conquering the country, we see that it is to the advantage of Russia not to hold such a cumbersome possession as Japan would prove in her hands, but, instead, to have an independent and powerful nation established there that would be a cover and protection to her naval stations at Pasietta, Nicholavitch and Aniva, and would be bound to her by ties of friendship based upon reciprocal confidence and usefulness. Her object in becoming strong in the East is to be able, sooner or later, to counterbalance the power of England, the only condition she



would make to an identification of interests with Japan would be that the latter should not suffer herself to be placed under British influence; and I doubt not that the instant she perceives a tendency on the part of the Japanese rulers to allow this to be done, she must change her tactics towards this country and, despairing of having her for a friend, may find it to her interest to apply to her the policy which seems to have guided England in her relations with the United States a century ago<sup>(a)</sup> - that is, endeavor to prevent her from becoming a great power and, as such, a too formidable ally to England against herself, by causing her to

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(a). - See page 39 further on.

fall to the status of the European neutral powers, the Netherlands, Belgium, Switzerland and Turkey, a mere mart for England to export her goods to.

England the Power from which  
Japan has the most to dread.

To my mind, England is the  
power from which Japan has the  
most to dread. She possesses Hong Kong,  
a maritime station of the first or-  
der only six days steam from Japan,  
and she has great resources in  
India and Australia which, in case  
of need, she could easily concentrate  
at Hong Kong, which place she would  
use as a base of operations against  
this country. These apprehensions are  
the more grounded that, because of  
the commercial interests which connect  
England and the other powers, it is  
not probable that the latter would  
defend Japan, where they have but

secondary interests. Even the United States would be reluctant to break relations with England, to which country they are so closely bound by trade, the more so that America, being exceedingly sparing, would hesitate to incur the enormous expenses of such a war, for which she could not expect to receive corresponding compensation. To justify an armed intervention in favor of Japan, exceptional circumstances would be wanted, such as a quarrel between the Americans and English brought about at the time the expedition would be preparing against Japan; and in such case, it would be England's interest, not only to avoid a conflict, but to secure Japan's neutrality by postponing the same. France, in her present state,

could not think of bringing succor to Japan; and as for Germany, being without a maritime station in these waters and almost without any navy at home, she could not well take any active interest in the quarrel, however disposed she might otherwise be to protect her friends. And very likely Russia would not move in the matter either, as the time when it might be to her interest to do so has not yet come. <sup>(a)</sup>

Let us now examine the reasons which England may possibly have to interfere in Japanese affairs.

By reason of her machineries and coal mines, England "commands" now the services of 500,000,000 non-

(a) - See page 51, further on.

consuming laborers, capable of a larger amount of work than could have been performed by the whole human race "in the days when the Marquis of Worcester was experimenting on the power of steam and when Charles II sat on the English throne;"<sup>(a)</sup> and as she has not the population within her own limits to consume the enormous amount of manufactures which, under these conditions, she produces every year, she must look to other nations for a market. Should she fail in finding it, her 36,000,000 of people crowded

(a). See *The Unity of Law, etc. etc.* by St. L. Carey. Philadelphia, 1872. In connection with this, Mr. Carey says: "The coal now used in the production of force is estimated as being the equivalent of 300,000,000 of men. Add to this the wind power utilized for the propelling of 5,000,000 tons of shipping; the tractive power obtained by means of the iron rail and the locomotive; the telegraph which annihilates both time and space; the utilization of human force consequent upon the invention of various machinery now in use; and the estimate will certainly be found within the mark

on her small islands, would starve. With a view of protecting them, therefore, she endeavors to prevent exchanges by means of annihilation everywhere of power for producing commodities to be made the subject of exchange."<sup>(a)</sup>  
 Out when Turkey, India, Australia, New Zealand, Canada, Japan, China and

(a). The table hereunder given will show what the population and extent of the territory of the British Empire was in 1860:-

Superficie	Population	Colonies
510,143 kil. car.	37,784,000 habit.	En Asie: la plus grande partie de la presqu'île Hindoustanique, du bassin du Gange, de la côte occidentale du Golfe du Bengale, Ceylon, etc.
Les totalités des possessions Britan- niques en y com- prenant les depen- dances politiques,	compris mediate- ment ou immé- diatement, dans l'Empire Britan- nique, forment une population de 316 millions.	En Afrique: établissements de la Sénégambie et de la Guinée, la colonie du Cap, les îles de Sainte- Hélène, l'Ascension, Maurice, etc.
de 1,550,550 myc.		En Océanie: la Nouvelle Zélande, etc.
		En Amérique: presque tout le continent et les îles depuis le pôle Nord jusqu'à Saint Laurent, jusqu'au pôle boréal, les Bermudes, les Lucayes, la Jamaïque, la plupart des petites Antilles.

[Géographie Physique, Historique et Militaire, par Théophile Lavallée, Professeur de Géographie et de Statistique Militaire à l'école Spéciale Militaire de Saint Cyr. Paris, 1860.]

the United States, amply supplied with coal, will manufacture for themselves, they must become self-sustaining; and their relations with England will be guaranteed, as they now are with other Western countries, on a reciprocal basis established by the necessities of each. And this is what England is anxious to prevent; and, to attain her ends, she has, in her dealings with other nations, resorted to the most desperate expedients. Under the pretext that she was bound to carry the sword of Saint Paul all over the world in defence of what he has called "Christian International Right," we have seen her, without previous declaration of war, taking from Turkey the island of Prine and forcing her Indian opium upon China at the cannon's mouth. (a)

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(a). Regarding opium, it is a curious fact that

Through the Inspector-General of the Foreign Maritime Customs, Mr. Hart, an Irish gentleman, who, with his three hundred foreign assistants, two-thirds of them English and appointed or dismissed at their chief's pleasure, and some of whom receive salaries as high as \$15,000 a year, collects the revenue accruing to China from foreign trade, builds the light-houses, and aids in the administration of foreign affairs, we may say that she has as strong a footing in that country for the establishment of her political influence and the disposal of her articles of manufacture as she has in any of her own colonies.

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its export from India to China is made to balance, almost exactly, the whole governmental expenses of India itself. It has been estimated to be about \$60,000,000 a year. In 1872, it reached exactly Taels, 38,523,115. [See Returns of Trade, etc., Shanghai, 30<sup>th</sup> April, 1873, published by order of the Inspector-General of Customs.]

During the last two centuries, she has effected the conquest of India, Australia and New Zealand. Conscious that, sooner or later, she would find a formidable rival in the United States if she should allow them to become fully developed, she endeavored to ruin them at their foundation fifty years before they attained their full growth, by fomenting dissensions in their midst. This policy has been made known to us by a letter from the prime mover in the scheme<sup>(a)</sup>, a man of great ability and shrewd Governor of Canada, who, in 1809, tried to effect what his

(a). "L'objet de la Grande-Bretagne doit donc être de foment-  
 "er les divisions entre le Nord et le Sud, et d'atteindre les  
 "les restes d'affection que les Français ont inspirés  
 "à ces peuples. Alors rien ne l'empêchera de poursuivre  
 "ses desseins en Europe, sans s'inquiéter du ressentiment  
 "des démocrates américains. Sa supériorité à la mer la mettra en état de  
 "dicter ses volontés aux navigateurs du Nord, et même aux agricul-  
 "teurs du Sud, dont les produits seraient sans valeur si nos forces navales  
 "en empêchaient l'exportation." [See Barbé. Charbon, p. 408.]

countrymen were so near accomplishing in 1861 to 1865, by aiding the secessionists of the South and ~~helping~~ fighting for them for the maintenance of slavery through their privateers on the high seas. He advised Great Britain to sow the seeds of hatred and separation between the North and Southern States and dissipate the remains of the affection which the devotion of France at some previous epoch of their history had inspired among the Americans for that nation. If this could be accomplished, he thought nothing could prevent England, through her superiority at sea, from dictating to the navigators of the North and even to the Southern planters, whose cotton would be valueless should she find it convenient to prevent its exportation; and in such a case they must accept, as definitively settled, the price that their Manchester masters, who

depended upon a regular supply of it to keep their mills going, might be disposed to place upon it. I will show further on how this scheme failed owing to the patriotism of the Americans and the foresight of the great man who was then presiding over the destinies of France.

In her race after gain nothing has been sacred to her. When she wanted to humiliate Russia, she used France, whom she called her "faithful ally;" but the instant these ties became onerous, or ceased to be remunerative, she left her to her fate.<sup>(a)</sup> Only a few months ago she was sending her squadrons to the Gold Coast of Africa, where she had no other excuse to be than the need she was in of the precious metals,

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(a) In 1870, at the time of the breaking out of the Franco-Prussian war,

which the natives were unwilling to barter for her goods; and it was but lately that she annexed the Fiji Islands, after having paved the way for such an issue by her able and successful financial schemes. Even her own children do not obtain better treatment at her hands. That she may find a better market for her manufactures, she yet systematically discourages the practice of the industries and the useful arts in her own colonies. Thousands of the inhabitants of Canada leave their homes every winter and cross over into the United States to find there employment that is wanting in their own native place, notwithstanding the vast natural resources in which Canada abounds, to the development of which, outside of the export of raw material, England is opposed.

The London Times, in several late issues, confessed that, by her obtrusive measures in India, England has stopped certain native industries which, owing to many circumstances, she has found, after a useless attempt, impossible to transplant to London, Liverpool or Manchester, and that a protective tariff must be allowed in order that these industries may revive. Tired of such protection, the colonies of Australia are beginning to entertain ideas of separation from a mother country under which they feel they cannot expect to progress; and the day when they will seriously consider and give effect to these ideas is not, perhaps, so far distant as the majority of people imagine.

What England has done everywhere

else, she is now, I fear, endeavoring to accomplish in Japan. She has tried to throw her net about the latter country by lending her money at high rates of interest; by putting her hands upon the most important strategical railroad lines in the country; by persuading the other foreign representatives, with the sole exception of the American minister, Mr. Bingham, (let it stand forever to his credit) to exact the payment of the Simonsaki Indemnity, and to adopt her system of dealing with Japan by trying, even after all danger of aggression against foreign interests had passed away with the extinction of the feudal system, to give the force of a convention to the terms of



the informal agreement entered into between one of her admirals and the Daimio of Chosiu, with the consent of the British minister, Sir Rutherford Alcock, whereby the building of fortifications at the Simonoseki straits is interdicted, and by maintaining without necessity the garrison at Yokohama, so costly and humiliating to the country, even after France had evidenced her readiness to withdraw her own contingent. All her efforts (which, let us hope, may be frustrated) have been, and are now, centred towards making of the Department of Public Works a mere branch of the Oriental Bank, which, after it had made its last loan to Japan, was naturally anxious to see it again returned to its

vaults in the most profitable manner, in the shape of payments made to its own protégés - railroad contractors, superintendents, engineers, clerks and others, fastened upon Japan by stringent contracts for a long period, and some of whom receive salaries as high as \$36,000 a year, but little of which is spent in Japan, the greater part of it being remitted to England - or to its constituents at home - railroad agents, machinists, gun makers and iron-clad builders. Besides a high interest per annum on the loan, England realizes 30 or 40 per cent on the sale of machineries, which are paid for out of this loan, and 6 or 7 per cent on exchange, commission and so forth, which makes of the operation a

remarkably profitable affair, the rate of interest on the loan from the one country to the other being, under these conditions, not less than 50 per cent of the capital invested.<sup>(a)</sup> Truly the "Weekly Mail" was right when, in 1870, it said without reserve that England is the only power that has interests in Japan; that the pretensions and intrigues of the other powers seem ridiculous to her; that she expends the other countries go to in

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(a). - It is a fact, though perhaps of no special consequence here, that the British people, as a rule, are not aware of the oppressive schemes and intrigues of aggression practised by their government. They see only the results, in prosperity to themselves; but they do not know at what cost of inhumanity and injustice on the part of their rulers their momentary welfare is purchased. Lord Elgin, whose testimony, I suppose, cannot be questioned, wrote to Lady Elgin during his second mission to China: "Can I do anything to prevent England from calling down on herself God's curse for brutalities committed on another feeble Oriental race? or are all my exertions only to result in the extension of the area over which Englishmen are to exhibit how hollow and superficial are both their civilization and their Christianity." [Letters and Journals of Lord Elgin, London, 1877]

keeping representatives at the court of Yedo is child's play, and incurred simply because of their jealousy of England; and that all their efforts will prove harmless, as England is the only power that can guide Japan in the way she has elected to follow! In my mind, such teachings would cost Japan not alone her wealth, but her liberty as well; and if she were really prepared to accept England's tutelage, it would be better to say so at once, that, without passing through the anxiety of a painful waiting, she may resign herself to her fate, lower down her flag and, like India, receive her chains.<sup>(a)</sup>

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(a). - Lord Macaulay says: "The misgovernment of the English (in India) was carried to a point such as seemed hardly compatible with the existence of society. They forced natives to buy dear and sell cheap. They insulted with impunity the tribunals, the police and the authorities of the country. Enormous fortunes were thus rapidly

"accumulated at Calcutta, while 30,000,000 of human beings were reduced to the extremity of wretchedness. They had been accustomed to live under tyranny, but never under tyranny like this. They found the little finger of the Company thicker than Surajah Dowlah's loins. Under their old masters they had at least one resource. When the evil became insupportable, the people rose and pulled down the government. But the British government was not to be shaken off. That government, oppressive as the most oppressive form of barbarian despotism, was strong with all the strength of civilization. It resembled the government of evil genius rather than the government of human tyrants."

## VI.

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## The Remedy.

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In presence of such a danger, the true policy of Japan is to strengthen her government, based upon the traditional principle of Imperial veneration and love, to rally around it all the talent and energy of the country, and to patiently persevere in the work of transformation and unification which she has so courageously undertaken during the past few years. As she progresses in this she will every day become more enlightened and strong, and will gradually bring all the European and American governments to deal with her, on a purely international basis, in an independent and liberal manner; and at last, having attained her highest point

of development, she will be in a position to enforce, if necessary, the respect which is due to her as a member of the sisterhood of nations, and which has so often been denied to her by those who, in the loudest tone, have professed to be her warmest friends. Then not only will Russia cease to be a cause of the slightest anxiety to her, but she may even look to her for aid whenever the use of their combined forces shall become a matter of necessity for the upholding of mutual interests and the extension of a joint influence in Asia where, by reason of their geographical position, they should occupy a place similar to that which the United States, their next neighbor to the Eastward, holds in the American continent.

Combinations of this sort have often been resorted to. Ever since the time

of Louis the Fourteenth it has been the opinion of French politicians that, sooner or later, the emancipation of the British colonies in America would strengthen France and prove a source of weakness to England, by being the means of creating a great maritime power that would rival the latter. It was with this idea that the court of Versailles made up its mind to cede Canada so easily. To cede Canada to England was to free the American colonies of a neighbor that had hitherto compelled them to look to the mother country for aid. It was equivalent to hastening and forcing emancipation. Everyone knows the words of Mr. de Choiseul when rejoicing at the abandonment of the French colonies to the British: "At last we have them!"

Later, when the first consul, tired

of finding England ever in his way, determined to cede Louisiana to the United States, he said: "Should we leave commerce and navigation to the exclusive possession of one nation, the world would soon be subjected to her. For in the hands of this nation, gold would have the power which armies have with others, and she would become irresistible." <sup>(a)</sup> To free the world from the commercial tyranny of England, it is necessary to counterpoise it by means of a maritime power that may one day become her rival. The United States, in this respect, will answer the purpose. The British aspire to absorb all the wealth of the world; I shall be useful to the whole universe if I can prevent them from dictating in America as they

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(a). Barbe Marbois. Histoire de la Louisiane, Paris, 1829, p. 280.

"already dictate in Asia;" <sup>(a)</sup> and the treaty of 1803 was signed, whereby the cession to the United States of the immense territories which were then called Louisiana, and which were bounded by the Mississippi on one side and the Pacific Ocean on the other, was consummated, and the area of the United States doubled.

When signing the treaty, Bonaparte said: "This accession of territory makes firm forever the power of the United States, and I have just given to England a maritime rival that, sooner or later, will lower her pride." <sup>(b)</sup> Mr. Thiers's account of the cession is no less instructive. "I shall not keep" said the first consul to one of his ministers, "a possession which would perhaps embroil me with

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(a). Barbe Marbois. Histoire de la Louisiane, etc. p. 282.

(b). Barbe Marbois. etc. etc. p. 335.

the Americans, or might cause a coldness between us. On the contrary, I will make use of it to attach them to me and set them at variance with the British; and I will treat for the latter enemies who, some day or another, will avenge us if we fail to avenge ourselves. I have made up my mind - I shall give Louisiana to the United States." (March, 1803.)<sup>(a)</sup> In this way the United States, who owed their independence to the long struggle between England and France, became indebted for the completion of their territory, whereby they became vested with supreme influence in America, to the same cause.

Acting under the same influence as France had under the first consul, Russia, a few

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(a). Sixty nine years later, the prediction of Bonaparte was verified, when England was forced to pay to the United States the Alabama indemnity, whereby not only was her pride humbled, but the first punishment she had ever received for her attempts against human freedom and liberty, was inflicted.

years ago, sold her possessions in North America to the United States. In turn, Japan, with the view of giving England a rival in the East, would do well to afford Russia the facilities she desires for the establishment of her maritime power there by ceding to her the bay of Amura.

Some have expressed the fear that, under such an arrangement, after the Russians would attain the zenith of their power in the East, they would become as dangerous to Japan as England now is. I do not believe it. I have shown above that the sole reason why England has kept extending her sway more and more widely is that she needs entrepots and markets for the sale of her manufactures. Now Russia has no such need. She is essentially a military nation; and

it will be centuries before she can  
manufacture enough to supply the  
wants of her own people, much less  
of the world.<sup>(a)</sup> It would be difficult now  
to say what the commercial relations  
of Japan with Russia will be fifty  
years hence; but if my deductions  
regarding the forces which are likely to  
regulate them are correct, and if the  
community of interests, which, I firmly  
believe, now exists between them, remains  
unchanged, it is my conviction that  
no two nations have more reasons to  
be bound together in common prosperity  
and welfare than Japan and Russia.

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(a) - see page 74, note a, for a sketch of Russian  
trade.