

Memo. No 33.

When, in April last, the news of the intention of Japan to send a mission to Aboriginal Formosa first reached Peking, the Tsinqui Samen and the Provincial authorities at Foo-chow were confident that the English and the American ministers would be able to prevent its departure. The consequence was that neither the Central nor the provincial governments made any preparations to watch the operations of the Japanese forces as they would approach the Chinese settlements that bordered on the Bontau country. One of their main points of justification for this neglect probably was that ever since Dutch Formosa

was first annexed to the Imperial Crown, Aboriginal Formosa has been considered as being outside of the limits of the Empire, and by entering it the Japanese had not threatened Chinese territory. But as the Central Government has lately been induced to believe that the occupation of the Southern end of aboriginal Formosa by the Imperial Japanese Majesty's forces, had for its object much less the punishment of the aborigines than the taking of preliminary steps towards the occupation of the whole island, they now make the provincial rulers responsible for all the consequences that may result from the invasion.

In a secret memorial, addressed by Su Kwei, the present

President of the Board of War at Peking, to the Empress-resent, dated the 9th year of Tung Che, 7th moon, 18th day, and a copy of which is in my possession, the following passage occurs:

"At the ports along the
"Coast of the Fuk Kien pro-
"vince, heretofore there have
"been soldiers prepared for
"defense. But since the third
"year of Tung Che the depen-
"dence has been on the large
"bodies of soldiers from the
"provinces of Yunnan and
"Kupeh, to be distributed in
"camps or sent on active du-
"ty as occasion requires. More
"recently, in consequence of
"deficiency in the Treasury,

"the soldiers have been grad-
"ually dismissed. At the pres-
"ent time there are retained
"in the important places, both
"of the upper and the lower
"part of the province, at
"some points only two or
"three hundred soldiers, and
"at some only a few tens.
"In all there is not the
"show of an army."

The Viceroy then having
pointed out how he could
defend certain parts of his
province by aid of the mili-
tia, goes on to say:-

"As regards Formosa, it
"is an island by itself in
"the sea, and difficult to
"protect. The soldiers are
"very few, and the people

"are easily led away from
"loyalty. It gives more anx-
"iety than Foochow and
"Amoy".

The officer who, at the
time the above report was
made, was in command of
the troops is still in Fuh-
Kien, occupying his old po-
sition of Tartar-General and
Superintendent of Customs.
He is an officer of the first
rank, very old, and a relation
of the Emperor.

The fears which, in 1870,
the Imperial Government en-
tertained of a war breaking
out with France, on account
of the Tientsin massacre, and
which had led to the inquiries
that brought forth the ne-

moral quoted above, were soon after allayed by the successful negotiations of Chung How; and therefore no change was made in the irregular state of military affairs as they existed at that time, and the province remains as unprotected as ever. This fact will be noted by the Imperial Commissioner when he arrives at Foochow on his way to Formosa to treat with General Saigo. If the difficulties between Japan and China are satisfactorily settled, both the Tartar General and the Viceroy of Tschukyen will not find it difficult to justify themselves before their Imperial

masters. But if they are not adjusted, the Imperial Commissioner will not fail to lay the blame on the shoulders of the Viceroy and Tartar General, who had neglected to place the province in a state of defence. In the latter case the penalty to which they will be liable is death.

It clearly results from the above that the Viceroy and Tartar General of Tschukyen are more interested than any one else to have these matters adjusted; and if Japan, through her commissioner, does not make excessive demands upon these officers, it is evident that

they will make all possible efforts to have these demands granted at Peking.

What can be these demands?

First. — Japan can claim that, as Southern Aboriginal Formosa does not by right belong to China, since she (Japan) has conquered it, she is entitled to keep it.

Second. — If, on the contrary, Japan concedes that she has gone to Southern Formosa simply to take reprisals for the murder of the Sew Chuan and to inaugurate measures to prevent the recurrence of such tragedies on that coast, she can say to China that she will return to her the

conquered territory on certain conditions, one of which might be the payment of an indemnity.

If the settlement to be arrived at between Japan and China is to be made according to the first demand, then the negotiator sent to Pochow will need to show the agents of the Emperor there, that they may in turn show to their Imperial master, that it is to the interest of China that Japan should occupy that country. In support of this view, he might make use of the arguments submitted to Your Excellency in my letter of the 30th of June

last, forwarding my Memo.
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But if a settlement in accordance with the second demand be desired, I believe that the sending of an iron-clad to Foochow, and of another to Amoy, would be a great aid to the provincial authorities. For in this case, they would simply have to protect themselves against any damaging disclosure by the Imperial Commission, concerning the poor state of defence in which the province has been allowed to remain, by securing his silence by bribery, and entering into a league with him to represent at Peking

that if the landing of the Japanese at Sialiao was not resisted, it was simply because of the want of iron-clads to cope with those sent by Japan to blockade their ports, and prevent the sailing of transports with troops for Formosa. They would thus become accusers instead of defendants, and they would be only too glad to secure the evacuation of Formosa by the Japanese troops by signing a convention, subject to the approval of both governments, whereby they would guarantee to pay to Japan the expenses of the expedition, and such other indemnities as might

be judged equitable. It is not to be doubted that, ~~on~~ having once signed this convention, the Chinese commissioner would find means to have it ratified in Peking.

In the above I have given but a mere outline of the plans by which either of these two settlements might be arrived at. Of course the negotiations will demand good management, into the details of which one could not enter without writing volumes. These details should be left in the hands of the commissioner, to be determined by him according to the circumstances and exigencies of

the moment. He should also
 be allowed to employ, both
 openly and secretly, any
 persons who, in his judg-
 ment, may be of use to
 him in carrying out his
 ends.

Tokio, July 5th, 1876.

Respectfully Submitted

Ch. W. Lawrence

His Excellency

Okuma Shigenobu,

Minister of Colonization,

etc. etc. etc.

Tokio, July 5th, 1894.

Your Excellency:

I have the honor to hand you, in an informal way, my Memo. no. 33. I would have sent it to you officially, were it not that I suspect that you may not consider it expedient to make use of it in your conferences at the Daijokwan, in which case you will have simply to suppress it from the files.

I have the honor to be
Your Excellency's
Most Obedient humble servant,
Chikashi

His Ex. Okuma Shigenobu
etc. etc. etc.