

Tokai, June 30th, 1874.

Your Excellency,

I have the honor to hand you a memo to serve in framing a reply to the Tsung li yamen despatch of the 26th day, 8th month, 13th year of Chuanghe.

Points that cannot find place in this reply might be explained with advantage, in conferences with the members of the Tsung li yamen by the Japanese Minister at Peking, and by the person intrusted to conduct the negotiations with the imperial commissioner sent to Formosa. For instance, that the object of Japan in sending a mission to aboriginal Formosa, is to set at rest the apprehen-

sions which China, and Japan as well, cannot help feeling, while aboriginal Formosa remains in the disturbed state in which it has been for two hundred years past, that, sooner or later, some Western power may find in the wrongs inflicted upon them by the Formosans, and in the absence of any regular form of government there, a too just pretext for making a new settlement upon the Asiatic coast. Now Japan has the same interest to keep herself free from any undue American or European influence that the United States have to prevent the spread of foreign influence in America, and the European countries in Europe. Although Japan has determined to change her customs, she intends doing so in her own way, which she could not do were any Western nation to

obtain over her people, by acquiring extensive possessions on or near her coast, an influence that would counterbalance her own. For the day when this would happen would see the prestige of her government disappear, and, with it, all prestige of authority in a land whose people have not yet learned to govern themselves; and a state of anarchy might follow from which foreign nations would be by far the heaviest sufferers. On the other side, with the establishment of steam and telegraphs, the necessity for foreign nations to acquire territory whereon to locate military or naval stations for the protection of their trade in Asiatic quarters, has ceased to exist, and it would be no more reasonable of them to ask of Japan such privileges in Asia, than it would be for the

United States, for instance, to ask of a European power similar privileges in Europe.

If anything can remove the objections which China still has to having Japan as a neighbor in Formosa, it would be these ideas, well presented and amplified by the Japanese minister to Peking.

In my opinion a great mistake was committed by Mr. Yanagiwara when he consented to negotiate with the Imperial Commissioner's deputy at Shanghai. He was accredited to the Court of Peking, not to that officer or to the Commissioner, whose mission was to meet General Saigo or his assistant. These two officers, in connection with the viceroy of Fuk. Kien, might have negotiated subject to the approval of their

government, whom they could not bind, and who, after the question in dispute had been fully discussed, might have given instructions to their representatives at Peking to make a convention. Had affairs been conducted in this way, much time would have been gained by Japan, during which, without the slightest risk of disturbing the peace between the two countries, the preliminary arrangements for the conquest of Amoy and Formosa, from December to June next, might have been completed.

What may yet be done to come to a friendly understanding with China, in conformity with the original plan laid down before the departure of the mission from Tokio, without detriment to the honor or

Dignity of Japan, and without losing the benefit derived from the friendly relations which have been established with the aborigines and the victories gained by H. I. M.'s troops in Bonosa under the able guidance of General Saigo and his assistants, Your Excellency is fully able to determine. Should Your Excellency, however, desire me to express my views, I need not say that I am ready to do so at any time I may be sent for.

I have the honor to be,

Your Excellency's

Most obedient humble servant,

Chū W. Kōfukū

His Excellency,

Okuma Shigenobu,

Minister of Colonization.

U. S. S. S.

Memo. No. 32.

to serve in framing a
reply to the despatch of the
Tung-li Yamen of the 26th day,
8th month, 13th year of Tung-che.

Hainan quoted the Tung-li Yamen's des-
patch, H. S. Terashima might well say:—

From the above despatch it
plainly appears that when Minis-
ter Soyeshima was in Peking
he said, through Interpreter Lei,
that "the intention of Japan in
"sending a mission to the Formo-
"san savages was only to request
"from them the good treatment of
"her people in the future should
"they ever go to their district,
"and not in any way to make
"war upon them"; that these
words were received by you

as "a token of good relations between China and Japan; and that the result of the Minister's message was "the clearing away at once of all distrust, if any, "on both sides."

This happy impression created by Minister Soyeshima's declaration relative to the sending of a mission to aboriginal Formosa seems to have been somewhat regrettably affected by the view which the Court of Tokai takes of the relations of the country where the aborigines live towards China, and by the manner in which the idea of sending the mission has been carried into effect by my government.

Regarding the first point I would state:

Minister Soyeshima says that

shortly after his arrival in Peking, he met the American minister, and heard from him that your government disclaimed all jurisdiction over aboriginal Formosa, this declaration having been recently made to Mr. Low by Your Excellencies at a conference where he had requested Your Excellencies' honorable government to erect a light house within the limits of the Hoaluts territory in Southern Formosa, near a spot where the crew of the American barque "Rover" was murdered in 1867. Therefore Minister Soyeshima now says that when he received Your Excellencies' declaration that your government declined jurisdiction over the aboriginal territory, the fact that you did so was so

generally known and admitted that he thought it useless to discuss it further with you and to request you to consign it to paper in an official communication.

As it is, I have no other evidence of what passed between the Minister Soyeshima and Your Excellencies than his word and your own letter, which do not tally. But I have a record of a conversation that passed between Minister Soyeshima and Mr. Low, in a despatch from Mr. Low to the American Secretary of State, published in the Diplomatic Correspondence for 1873, page 188, and of which the following is an abstract:

"There are, he (Mr. Soyeshima) says, 'only two questions of importance which he desires to discuss with the Chinese Government'."

"First. Whether China is responsi-
 "ble for the acts of the aborigines on
 "the island of Formosa. If the Govern-
 "ment answers this question in the
 "affirmative, he will then demand
 • "redress and indemnity for the murder
 "of some natives of Foo Choo, who were
 "murdered there a year and more ago.
 "If the answer is in the negative,
 "notice will then be given that Jap-
 "an proposes to send a military force
 "to Formosa to chastise the savage
 "and semi-civilized tribes that prac-
 "tically hold undisputed possession
 • "of the larger part of the island; and,
 "as there are no safe harbors on that
 "part of the island where the aborigines
 "reside, permission will be asked to
 "land troops at one of the ports open to
 "trade, and to march them through
 "Chinese territory that lies between

"the points where the troops are intended to operate against the savages."

It may not be altogether unnecessary to state here that your alleged declaration to Minister Soyeshima concerning aboriginal Formosa agrees with the statements which appear to have been made by the Governor of your possessions in the island, to U. S. officers in 1867. (See Report of the Secretary of the Navy. 1867. Page 7. lines 40 to 44; also U. S. Commercial Relations. 1871. Page 166. lines 60 to 68). In support of these statements I may be permitted now to refer you to your own maps wherein of all that was known of the island of Formosa by the Dutch in 1635^(a), only the portion conquered by Hopingwa in 1662^(b) and afterwards

(a). 15th year of Htet-sung.
(b). 1st year of Kang-he.

ceded to the Chinese crown in 1682^(a), that is to say, the northern and a portion of the western coast, is marked. (See Atlas of Chang see King, 16th year of K'ea King; map made by the Jesuits de Maille and Kenderer by order of the Emperor Kang-he, in the 50th year of his reign; and the Taiwan Ize, a work but recently published). For it is but natural to suppose that, if aboriginal Formosa were a part of your organized territory, or a continuation of your wild dominions, you surely would have marked it on your maps, in the same way as you have marked all the regions occupied by aboriginal tribes not yet civilized, which lie on the borders of Canton, Kowanku, Hunan and Hupeh.

(a). 20th year of Kang-he.

Again, if Aboriginal Formosa were a portion of your Empire, it is difficult to explain why you permitted Western nations to make war upon its inhabitants, or to negotiate with them, or why you invited Japan to go and negotiate with them for the granting of rights which you alone, as sovereign or direct ruler, would be justified in obtaining directly from them. The title which H. I. C. Majesty undoubtedly has to his settlements in Formosa was derived by conquest. If he has any rights over the other portion of the island, then it must be that he has very lately conquered it, or else formally annexed it in conformity with the laws and usages of nations, and I can find no records of his having done either.

However this might be, I would have

promptly notified H. I. C. M.'s govern-
 ment of the departure of the mission
 through our minister had we had
 one in Peking, or through your own,
 had your Excellencies' Government had
 a representative residing in Peking.
 That this was not done is more apt to
 show the inconvenience of imperfect-
 ly established diplomatic relations
 than to show any want of regard
 for international obligations on the
 part of Japan towards China. As it was,
 inasmuch as the Government of
 the Mikado found convenient places
 to land our troops in the aboriginal
 portion of the island, and therefore
 had no special request to address
 you regarding the use of one of your
 own harbors in Southern China,
 as was first intended by Minister
 Soyekuni, it was thought sufficient

that the Japanese High Commissioner should forward the message to the Viceroy of Shik. Kyeu and his subordinate, the Tantai of Taiwan. In this letter, copy of which has doubtless been forwarded to Peking, the object of the mission was clearly stated; and in it nothing can be found but the most friendly feelings from my government towards you own.

Your greatest cause of complaint, however, as shown by your letter, seems to arise from the fact that the mission was accompanied by a large force of soldiers, whose object was to protect it in its pacific labors. This you will admit, I hope, bears no evidence of any evil design. The aborigines of Formosa live, as you state, in a certain portion of an island lying afar off amidst the sea, and they have not

yet been restrained by any legislation, nor had any government been established over them. Therefore it was hardly to be supposed that the Japanese negotiators would be safe amongst them unless they were followed by a large escort. My government was still more strengthened in viewing the position in this way from the fact that, amongst other customs still retained by these aborigines, is one of cutting off the head of any stranger who may land on their shores. To check this practice, the British Captain Broad, who went there in 1867, thought it necessary to provide himself with an escort of several tens of men^(a) and a man-of-war. But he was fired into by the savages, and was compelled to retire without accom-

(a). A Chinese expression.

plishing anything. Such was also the case with the American Admiral Bell, who was accompanied by two armed boats, one of them a large frigate, mounting many heavy guns, and several hundred soldiers and four English gins, and although his force was much greater than that of Captain BROAD, he was unable even to meet the savages face to face and negotiate with them, but was obliged to re-embark his men the same day he had landed them. When the U. S. Consul at Amoy, in the month of September of the same year, proceeded to Sialias, he took with him an escort of Chinese soldiers, which had been given him by the Governor of Taiwan in order to keep friendship with the United States, and which, as will appear from the records, was four times greater than that taken by Admiral Bell.

And when, in 1872, the U. S. Comandante again went to Southern Formosa, to investigate the cause of the murder of our countrymen, he had a large American ship-of-war stationed at Sialias; besides which, there were several American war-vessels at Hong-Kong, Amoy and Swatow, ready to give him assistance in case he should need it.

Now the Bontans being ten times stronger than the eighteen tribes under Sautelat, the government of the Mikado thought it advisable to furnish its High Commissioner with a larger force than was ever before sent to those shores; and as General Le Gendre, who is now in our service, was obliged to return to Tokio on important business, and so could not go with the mission as had been intended, the services of other foreigners who, like

him, were well acquainted with the circumstances of that coast, which was as perfectly unknown to us as it appears from your maps to be unknown to you, were secured. In all this, I can see nothing upon which Your Excellencies can put any hostile construction; and I hope that, upon further consideration, Your Excellencies will coincide with me in saying that nothing has been done by H. S. J. M.'s government which should arouse your suspicions or wound your feelings.

As to the report spread in Peking by the foreign ministers, we believe it to be founded upon the fact that, having already settled the subject of the mission with your Excellencies through Minister Soyechima, the government of the Mikado thought it unnecessary to acquaint the foreign representatives

with the object of the mission, unless they called upon us for information, and some of them may have inferred from our silence that the mission was a secret one, covering some evil design against your honorable country, such as an attack upon your settlements in Formosa; while the paragraph of a letter addressed to the Minister Burlingame in 1867, in reference to the murder of the crew of the barque "Rover", and which letter has since been published in the American Diplomatic Correspondence, may have awakened the same idea in the minds of others.

The paragraph of the letter alluded to reads as follows:

"2. - You are instructed to report whether the Chinese government is established in any or in what degree

"in the region where the atrocious trans-
 "action took place. It clearly so, then to
 "demand investigation and punishment,
 "with such indemnities as are possible.

"3. - If no organized government exists,
 "you will suggest what form of pro-
 "ceeding should be adopted with a
 "view to obtain redress and prevent
 "such transactions in future.

"4. - You are advised that in no case does
 "the United States desire to seize and hold
 "possession of Formosa or any part of said
 "island."

While, in justice to Your Excel-
 "lencies Government and to ourselves,
 "I feel it my duty to commend the
 "last paragraph of this letter to
 "Your Excellencies full consideration,
 "I need not add that I can frankly
 "declare that, in sending a mission
 "to aboriginal Formosa, our object

is simply to establish friendly relations with the natives and achieve the work of pacification of that inhospitable coast, thereby putting to an end all causes of conflict between its inhabitants and foreign forces; and in the name of my Government, I emphatically protest against any design on our part of encroaching upon your possessions in Formosa, the earnest wish of Japan being that China may forever remain in the undisturbed enjoyment of the same.

Trusting that in his declaration Your Excellencies may find a new proof of the sympathy and sincere friendship entertained by our Government towards yours, and by our people towards your people, I send you the new assurance of my

High consideration and respects

Tokio, June 20th 1874.

Respectfully submitted.

Ch. W. Lesuire

His Excellency

Okuma Shigenobu

Minister of Colonization,

et. et. et.