

Foochow, 21st Oct. 1874.

Sir

I had the honor of addressing your excellency on the 4th inst. Letters have since that date come in from Peking saying that Okubo has required definite replies to be made to his proposals by the 25th instant. The letters also make known a change, or apparent change, in the councils of the state which seems to satisfy the susceptibilities of the officials and people here, and in the more Northern parts of China. It is not possible for me to know whether the accounts of change of policy are true to the full extent reported, or whether qualification is necessary, but it is believed that the Tsun-li yamen has definitely agreed not to pay any indemnity to Japan for the costs of the expedition to Formosa, and it is said the war, or from the Chinese point of view - national party of China is for the moment in the ascendant.

The apparent hesitations of the Peking government had greatly recited the people of the sea board provinces, and I firmly believe if
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an indemnity had been given, to avoid or postpone the radical changes which would have become inevitable in time of war, the dynasty would have been overthrown. It is now said, with what truth I know not, the hesitations of the court of Peking were assumed that the time might be gained. The idea of ^{the} mere possibility of a hostile expedition to that capital, the most vital, and indeed only vital part of the Empire, was dreadful; but now winter is near and that chance of danger over. In six weeks from this time North China will be closed by ice until April next. No attack can now be made on Peking until June or July next, and before that time the defensive system will be, if in complete to foreign eyes, yet very formidable to any invader. For defensive purposes the forces of China are now very considerable, and daily increasing in efficiency of a certain sort, and in the next few months the Chinese government may bring the forces under some rough and primary organization and central direction. This matter occasions violent discussion, but will be settled in a few weeks, and if the war, or national, party of China is powerful

powerful enough to overcome all opposition, immense and organic changes will occur.

It is known that a foreigner in your service has urged upon your government the advantages of an attack upon Peking, by landing a considerable force at one of two points in North China:

- 1^o at a place, north of the Peiho river, where the great wall runs to the sea shore;
- 2^o or at a place said to be 40 or 50 miles south of the Peiho.

From this I judge he thinks the Taku and Poku forts, on the Peiho, are too strong to be forced.

I think I will do well to say before your Excellency solid reasons for saying that under existing circumstances such an expedition would not succeed.

Your Excellency will recollect in May or June last, when I was invited to do so, I explained through M^{re} Katakeyama the amount of tonnage required for the transport, in time of war, of 5000 men infantry, cavalry, artillery, &c. &c. I showed as the average size of merchant steamers owned

owned in Japan was not over
500 tons, seventy would be required
to convey the troops, horses, guns,
commissariat, fodder, fuel, tents, am-
munition, guns of position, stores for
6 months, and to provide for coal
supply, hospital service, post com-
munication, &c. &c. (to the entire slop-
page of Japanese trade). I also
showed the ^{then} available fleet of 10 or
12 steamers of all sizes would barely
suffice for convoy of the transports
while at sea, for protection on ene-
mies shores, to silence forts or bat-
eries, to cover landing of troops and
stores, and to perform necessary op-
erations in conjunction with the army.
But the recent purchases of large
steamers like the New York & others
has probably doubted your power of
transport, which may now be suffi-
cient to carry 10,000 men of all arms
for a weeks voyage. Assuming that
10,000 men should be landed upon
Chinese territory in time of war,
and that sufficient naval force can
be given - after providing for the
protection of your own shores from
a counter naval attack - sufficient
for convoy, and to beat off hos-
tile steamers, that your war ships
can

can ensure by their fire the safe landing of your troops, then the 10,000 men might be landed, provisioned, and entrenched with all equipments and stores complete in about 10 days time after the first landing operations. In three weeks later the transport fleet will have gone to Japan, under convoy of a part of your fleet and have returned with another 10,000 men. As in North China the Tartar cavalry is numerous, and would be troublesome, your force of 20,000 men should include 2500 cavalry, and to operate well should have 100 field guns, 2 siege trains, and 2 pontoon trains. By the shortest route indicated the distance from the landing place to Peking is about 150 miles. By the time you have provided for the defence of your landing place, for communications on a long line, with two great forts at Taku & Koku in the rear of your army the force to go before Peking will not be large, after encountering Si Hung Chang's main army. In November the weather is uncertain, in December the sea-board is inaccessible until April following.

lowing, and in the interval your army must depend on its own stores as all access to Japan will be closed.

To obtain command of the Peiho and grand canal you must force the Taku & Hoku forts, now not easily attacked since torpedoes close the bar and river heads. If you could open the entrance to the Peiho your army would have water transport to within 12 miles of Peking. But a landing north or south of the Peiho would be ill advised, as the difficulties of transport over a country of execrable roads would be excessive. In time of war the Chinese would carry far inland all carts, horses, mules, cattle, and marceable provisions, so that the Japanese army must depend on its own means of transport, and stores afford.

In 1860 the English & French troops assisted by a very large and powerful fleet forced the Taku, and got up to Peking by the line of the Peiho and grand canal. But the Taku forts are much stronger now, and cannot be forced in the rear. To force the ports in 1860 was a difficult operation, and required over 20,000 European troops, and many gunboats

gunboats. To reduce Taku in 1875 will be an enormous enterprise. But unless you can do so your army will hardly be able to move in force for want of transport. I should say therefore that for such an expedition you need rather 50,000 than 20,000 men, because Li Hung Changs army will hold two central and almost unavailible positions, so that he can by moving quickly an interior line resist your landing at either indicated point, and afterwards strike your troops with heavy blows during the long march.

As Peking is the only vital point of China, no other occupation will be useful to you. Once in Peking you can exact any terms you please to ask. Canton is being prepared for defence by heavy guns, torpedoes and numerous soldiers. Foochow with its torpedo system, batteries on the heights, and gun boats. I can order very difficult of attack, if indeed the river could be forced; and bender it is understood that owing to the magnitude of foreign interests

interests the treaty ports will be held neutral, and their neutrality enforced. This is a matter your Excellency should look to, as the imposition of neutrality should be reciprocal, and apply to Japanese treaty ports as well.

The other point of attack is on the Yangtze to go command of the Grand Canal. But as the Yangtze is the great highway of foreign trade, and blockade, or occupation might lead Japan to complications with foreign nations, as the loss which would be inflicted on foreign trade would be borne with impatience. And in China, on the sea board, and on the Peiho and Yangtze, it is hard to say whether foreign interests could be separated from Chinese nominal ownership. The questions will be difficult to solve and from it will arise incessant complications with foreign authorities.

Your Excellency and colleagues I know have many plans laid before you like that of an advance to Peking. I do not for a moment mean to intercede upon your suggestions of advice or recommendation, but as your Excellency has
often

often done me the honor to
me for my candid opinion I think
I serve your Excellency well by poin-
ting out difficulties plain to me
from my knowledge of the country.
And he is a friend to Japan who
does his best to keep her at peace
with China.

I have the honor to be
Sir

Your most obedient servant
J. S. Dunn

To His Excellency
Tomomi Iwakura
Tokio