

114  
A 4479



大臣  
次官

明治廿一年十月廿一日  
日譯了

細澤保長

大正十一年  
侯爵邸

總理大臣伯爵大隈重信閣下

以書翰詰上仕假陳心這般國之再々帝是

内閣ノ首班ニ列ヤル熱喜ニ不堪候

分ヤ日本ノ外交ニ多事危急ノ過渡期ニ了此際



外務ヲ統督セラルルニハ最大ノ慎重ト智識トヲ要セ  
ル義ト存候就ラハ研問ニテ各考ニ供セガ為メニ日表ニ即  
在時中呈進シタルカ如キ秘信ヲ以テ重ネテ茲ニ貴意ヲ得  
申候

現下注目ヲ要スル最大ノ事件ハ俄國皇帝ノ忽然各國ニ提供  
セラルル彼ノ軍備縮小ノ議ニ有之候本件ハ各國就中露國ノ同  
盟國ト指定セラルル伊國共他國ヲ以テ一驚ヲ喫セシメタル義ニ有之其由  
ニ關シテハ伊國ノ外交志ハハウラハルル皇帝ノ意思之ヲ察スル者ト爲シ又或ハ露國外務省

ニ務務スル國際公法ノ大家タルド、マルテンス氏ノ  
學理上ニ於ケル推諱ニ由ルト爲スモノアリト雖モ要ス  
ルニ尚ホ秘密ニ屬スル次第ニ有之候  
余ニ於テハ此ノ顯然タル提議ヲ生じタル所以ノ  
モ、ハ仁義禮智ノ人道及ビ政治上ノ感觀ニ在リテ  
存スルモノト思料致候而シテ前者ハ皇帝ノ感  
奮ニ出デ後者ハ其輔弼ノ當ル人士ノ發心ニ出  
テタル義ト被存候露國ノ平和ヲ欲スル次第ハ苟モ



政治上先見ノ明アル人、於テ吾國ノ近者世界ノ  
各部ニ於テ企圖シ先各種ノ大事業ヲ視察スル  
ニ當リテハ悚然トシテ然レカルヲ得ル義ニ有之候ハ領  
會シ得ベキ義ニ有之實ニ其行動先無謀ニシテ胆大ナル投  
機師ニ類シ從來ハ其放膽慄慄ノ如ク由リテ克ク之  
ヲ支持シ得ヌルト云モ一朝樞要ノ地占メホテ一敗地ニ  
降レシキ事お決息ハ由リテ以テ不測ノ災害ヲ被ルベキ次第ニ  
有之候

吾國ノ歐洲ノ取引所ニ於テ不充ナル資本ヲ以テ輸  
吉覬ヲ爭ハレトスル 相場師ノ<sup>女リニミテ</sup>一朝株式場裡ノ恐慌ニ遭遇  
セシキ其四方ノ要求ニ應ズルヲ得ルモノ、如ク現今數多ノ  
所ニ事ヲ構<sup>ヤ</sup>ムニヨリ其廣大ナル陸海軍ノ力ヲ以テスルモ  
同時ニ  
巴耳汗地方波斯印度辺境及ヒ支那ニ於テ軍役ニ從事シ  
兼テ其填國ニ對シテ其西境ヲ防衛スルハ其ノ堪エガレ所ニ有之  
至危至險ノ境遇ニ在ル義ニ候得ハ吾國ノ政治家之ヲ以テ墟邊  
ニ火藥其裏ヲ積ミヌカ如クニ感知<sup>由</sup>シテ救急ノ策ヲ講スルノ必要ナ



ルラ見タルヤ知ルベキ次第ニ有之ハ

先トモ吾國ノ近キ年ニ於テ有ラレトスル主眼ノ目的地ハ

極東ニアリ故ニ歐洲諸國殊ニ其西境ニ接スル諸國ニ於テ厚

備ノ縮小<sup>小</sup>ヲ觀ルコトヲ得ル在方ニ對シテ從來ニ比シ優勢ノ軍

隊ヲ派遣スルコトヲ得ヤリ然レテ其現時ノ陸海軍ノ大ニ之ヲ添

少スルモ亦印度支那及日本ニ對シテハ兵力ヲ増大スルコトヲ得

ベキ義ニ有之候

遠東ノ事余ニ於テ閣下ニ對シテ深ク諱究スルノ由ニ於テ義ニ有之

英國ノ政治亦ニ在ラレモ吾國自皇帝ノ提議ニシテ獨リ歐洲

ニ限ラレシモノニシテ全世界ニ普及スルモノナラントノ保障ヲ得ガハ<sup>(三非ス)</sup>格ナ

其結果ノ會大ニベキヲ着目スルコトニ有之向敷ト思料致候

余ハ日本ノ平和會議ニ參加ノ交渉ニ接シタルヤ否ヲ知得セルトモ

モ心ニヤ其事アリシコトト推想能ハ在候若シ然ラバ<sup>ル</sup>於テハ日本國

久モ此ノ如キ會大ニ集會ニ參同ヲ許ハサレハ其ノ利益ニ

非ガレバト存候由テ其必要アルニ於テハ外國ニ對シテ日本ニ支那

ニ異ナリ新條約ニ由リテ國際公法裡ノ一國トナリ先ニ及ビ土耳



右ト虽モ巴里ノ平和會議ニ於テ 特ニ參同セシメラレタリトシ  
提議有之可然ト存候日本ノ實ニ凡ソ五細五洲ニ関スル事  
項例ハ北緯度旨題等ニ就テ<sup>申</sup>ニテ<sup>申</sup>歐洲五協公法ノ  
制ニ干聯スル全般ノ國家的施為ニ就キテモ之ニ與カル權利ヲ  
有スル義ニ有之候

日本尙シ本會議ニ參會セハ數多ク且ニ於テ有利ノ地歩ヲ以テ  
ル義ニ有之軍備縮小ノ提議ニ就キテハ日本ノ軍備ハ豫  
算ヲ標準トスルモ 徵兵ト人口トノ比率ヲ目識トスルモ外國ニ比シ

テ多ク但度ニ居ルコトヲ答辯スルコトヲ得ベク又海軍ニ  
就キテモ其備フル所ハ之ヲ沿岸ノ頗ル<sup>廣</sup>キト保護スベキ  
高船ノ益増加スルトノ事實ニ照ラセバ 次シテ過度ニ非ザん  
ヲ疏テスルコトヲ得ベキ義ト存候 左候ハドモ將舟ノ高議  
ニ於テ最モ急ニ要スル義ハ軍備ノ縮小ヲ以テ獨リ之  
ヲ歐洲ニ限ラズ同一ノ比準ヲ以テ之ヲ東洋ニ及ホシ又那  
海及ビ日本海ニ於ケル外國ノ艦隊ヲ制限シ支那及ビ朝  
鮮ノ境壞ニ於ケル露國ノ軍備ヲ侵襲的ナラズル程度

ト  
外務省



ニ制限スルニ在リテ存シハコト、存候

本會議ハ果シテ開會セラルマヤ未ダ知ルマカニトモモ之

ガ向ニ見ルニ到底直ニ何等ノ差違カラ見ルマカラガルモノト

存候然レドモ政治ニ因テ重大ノ事ニ有之候ハ或ハ

大ニ歐洲諸國現今ノ政治トシテ六ケル同盟ニ影響著スルコト

可有之ト存候厥ニ佛國ノ如キ全ク露國ノ提議ニ反対

セザルモ全世界ノ軍備縮小ハ固國ニ在リテハアルマス、ローリーヌレ

ヲ固役セト欲スル希望ヲ損テガルヲ得ガル次第ト相成リハ義ニ

候ハバ從來ノ如ク露國ノ獨尊ニ盲従セザラトスルモノ、如ク

相見エ申候独國ノ速ニ露國ノ提議ニ應ジスハ賢察

アラセラルベキ義ト存候又英國ハ頃者露國トノ關係特ニ

山滿ヲ缺ク所アムヲ以テ之ニ接スルニ先ツ疑念ヲ以テシ其法

止ニ於ケン優勢ヲ破レトスルニ當リテハ之ニ反対可致ト存候

堪ホニ固ク獨國ニ対シテ異議ヲ立ツルモノヲ欲セストモ未ダ

獨國ノ如ク断然露國ノ交渉ニ應ジ不申候尤モ同國ニ

於ケル輿論ハ露國ノ皇帝ノ高高ナル仁義說ニ同情ヲ表



し居り申候所、而して西國ト雖も自う歐洲及五洲五洲  
ニ於テ此ノ縮小ヲ遂行セト計畫スルモノト、信じ難ク候其  
ノ次分ハ果して然らば其五洲ニ於ケル膨脹政界ヲ撤回  
セラルヲ得ル義ニ相成り候故ニ有之候


平和會議果して開設相成り候時、於テ閣下ニ若し余ヲ  
用フべしと爲し、辦理委員ニ付属セシメラし候ハ、詢ニ幸  
甚ノ事ナリ有之候彼ノ露露ノ顧向ニして或ハ本提議ノ格  
知トニ於ケル發案者ナルべしトノ評アリ、本件ニ就キテハ、

ズヤ大ニ參考共ニベキト、マシテ余ト親シク相知ル人  
ナレバ其向日本ノ利益ト相成り候事可有之ト存候  
愛ニ向ら、健勝ニ在ラセラシムルヲ希望ス敬具

千八百九十六年(天文、供)九月三日

ハロコ、アリ、フオコ、じ、ボルト





夕  
積  
中



Private and Confidential

Vienna September 3. 1896.

Rec'd 28-10-98



114  
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大臣

Monsieur le Comte

次官



秘書課



Allow me in the first instance to express to your Excellency my gratification on seeing you again at the head of the Imperial Cabinet.

Your Excellency has assumed the direction of affairs at a moment when the Foreign relations of Japan are passing through a critical period, requiring the greatest caution and the best of information. I therefore, anxious to contribute to the latter, take the liberty to resume my private reports, which your Excellency was pleased to receive with approval during your former tenures of office.

The greatest event, worth of notice, is the proposal for disarmament, which the Emperor of Russia has so unexpectedly presented to the Powers. This move has taken them quite by surprise and above all started the supposed ally of Russia, the French Republic. The history of

To His Excellency  
Count Okuma Shigenobu  
Prime Minister.





of the causes which led to this has so far remained a secret and whilst some French diplomates ascribe it to the inspiration of Emperor William, another version trace it to the scientific labors of Mr de Martens a great authority on International Law, attached to the Russian Foreign Office.

I am disposed to think that both humanitarian and political motives have produced this remarkable move. The former being the primary motives of the Emperor, the latter those of his Counsellors. His desire for peace is explained by the alarm which any person with political forethought must feel in contemplating the immense engagements and risks which the Russian Policy has been assuming all over the world. Like a reckless Stockexchange-speculator, Russia has ventured so far to play a game, which, though hitherto successful by the very boldness of its moves, might bring on Russia the most terrible of disasters in case of a serious defeat on any vital point.

Russia is like a banker who is playing "a la hausse" on all the European bourses with an inadequate capital, <sup>and</sup> who would be naturally unable to meet the demands on all sides in case

of a general panic in the stockmarket. Russia is at present engaged on so many points, that even its enormous military and naval forces are not equal to carrying on military operations simultaneously on the Balkan, Persia, the Indian frontier and China and to secure its Western frontiers, as the case maybe, against Austria. This would be for Russia an operation full of risks and the Russian statesmen must have felt by this time that they have more than one Powderbag close to the fire which might explode at any time. Hence the necessity for a relief.

But as the main object of the Russian ambition has been of late years the Far East, the disarmament of the European Powers, especially those on its Western frontiers, would allow Russia to dispose of greater forces on its Eastern side and even admitting a considerable reduction of its present army and navy still enable it to exercise increased pressure on its Eastern frontiers towards India, China and Japan.

What this means, I need scarcely develop to your Excellency and I suppose that the British statesmen will not fail to see the important consequences which might follow the Imperial proposition, if inefficient



security is not obtained that the disarmament is to be a general one, not only on the European side but everywhere.

I am not aware whether Japan has been invited to assist at the proposed Conference, but I presume this to be the case. If not it would be at any rate in the interest of Japan not to be excluded from such an important assembly.

Foreign Powers must be reminded if necessary, that by the new Treaties Japan has entered the Comity of Nations to which China does not belong and even Turkey had to be specially admitted by the Congress of Peace in Paris. As such, Japan has the right to take part not only in all questions affecting the Asiatic interests, for instance the Philippine question, but in all state acts connected with the system of the European international Law.

If Japan takes part in the Conference it would have in many respects an enviable position: it could reply to the eventual suggestions for disarmament, that the military preparations of Japan are more moderate than those of most Powers, whether the Budget or the percentage of

of the levies to the population are taken as a basis, and even in case of the navy the Japanese forces will not be found to be excessive, if the considerable extension of the sea coast and the increasing number of merchant ships to be protected, is taken for a measure of naval armament. But the essential point to be kept in view in future negotiations is, that the disarmament is not limited to Europe alone but should be extended in equal proportions to the East also. Thus not only the foreign Fleets assembled in Chinese and Japanese waters should have to be reduced but the military preparations of Russia on the Chinese-Korean frontiers should be limited to non-aggressive proportions!

At this moment it seems not yet certain whether the Congress will assemble and at any rate it seems unlikely that any immediate success will follow its labors. As a political event it is however a move of the highest order which may seriously affect the existing political coalition of European Powers. It becomes already evident that France if not altogether in opposition to the Russian project is at any rate indisposed to follow blindly its lead as heretofore, for a general disarmament would mean the



abandonment of its long cherished hopes for the recovery of Elsass-Lorraine. Hence again the rapidity with which Germany has accepted the Russian ideas. England also whose relations with Russia were of late particularly unsatisfactory looks upon the Russian scheme with evident distrust and will object to it, in case it should aim at destroying its naval supremacy. Austria though unwilling to disagree with Germany has as yet not so unhesitatingly declared its acceptance as Germany, though Public opinion sympathizes with the high humanitarian objects of the Russian Emperor. But Russia itself can be scarcely believed to mean to carry out a general disarmament in Europe and Asia. This would signify on its part the renouncement of its Policy of expansion in Asia!

If a Congress actually takes place I should be very happy if your Excellency would deem it worth while to make use of my services and attach me to the Japanese Delegates. Considering that I have the advantage of a personal acquaintance with Mr de Martens,

the Russian Councillor who is supposed to be the intellectual originator of the proposal and who will at any rate play a predominant part on the Russian side, this might be perhaps of advantage to the Japanese interests.

Hoping that your Excellency is enjoying good health, I remain with high Respect  
Your Excellency's  
very obediently

Baron A. von Siebold



The Russian Committee is to support  
to be the intellectual originator of the  
proposal and will in any case play  
a prominent part in the Russian side  
the right to judge of whether to  
the Japanese interest.

It is to be noted that the Japanese  
government is anxious to get the  
Japanese Committee to support the  
proposal.

1905