



特別  
イ 4  
2236  
29





特件

2236

29

My Library.

No. III.

F. S.



二  
尤之サ  
方し心ヲ  
富義快  
味十

(善) Least fatiguing is its recep-  
tive enjoyment of Art, and I  
shall almost appear to trifle if  
I mention the disagreeables con-  
nected therewith; yet they  
are important, since with in-  
creasing love of ease (e.g. in  
age) they are, in fact, able to  
deter most receptive minds  
from obtaining the enjoyment  
of art. They are the vis-  
iting of the galleries, the heat  
and ~~closeness~~ closeness of the  
theatres and concert-rooms,  
the risk of catching cold, the  
fatigue of seeing ~~and~~ and hear-  
ing which is wont to be so severe,  
because payment has to be made  
for ~~viewing~~ viewing the whole  
gallery or hearing the entire  
concert, whilst half of the  
entertainment were sufficient.  
Of the enjoyment of amateur





performances and the subsequent debt of complements I would rather be silent, as my readers may perhaps be amateurs themselves. (Hartmann's Philosophy of unconsciousness, Vol. 3, P. 65-6)

(註) So far as sleep is, dreamless, it is a complete inactivity of the brain and brain-consciousness, for as soon as the brain becomes at all active, it begins to sport with images. ....

There is one source of error which may lead to our assuming a clearer satisfaction in unconscious sleep than can in fact exist; this is the comfortable feeling to that one often detects on falling to sleep or awaking, i.e., in passing from the dormant to the waking state and conversely. But here the cerebral consciousness is

睡眠及  
覺  
無  
全之無  
的否  
半睡=快  
/ 持  
/ 一部  
/ 御  
= 22

still actual, and that satisfaction manifestly a perception of the cerebral consciousness; one therefore forgets that just this cerebral perception of satisfaction disappears in dreamless sleep. Of the satisfaction, however, which my lower nerve-centres feel I can form no conception, because I am, simply and only my brain-consciousness. Yet, notwithstanding, unconscious sleep is the relatively happiest condition, because it is the only painless one known to us in normal life.

As for dreams, all the troubles of the waking state are prolonged into the dormant condition, but not the one thing which may in a measure reconcile the cultivated with life—the pleasure of Science and Art. Add to that that a joy cannot well

真, 進  
八世  
/ 學  
+ 7-10  
其  
中  
+ 31



pleasant  
 性質ト  
 十又若  
 一不如意  
 性  
 質ト十

be otherwise expressed in dreams than as a pleasant, cheerful mo-  
 od, e.g., the feeling of being dis-  
 embodied, of floating, flying, and  
 the like, whilst displeasure is  
 expressed not only as mental  
 mood, but also in all sorts  
 of definite inconveniences, vexation,  
 chagrin, quarrelling, and conflic-  
 ct, inability to accomplish one's  
 desires, or other cross purposes  
 and disappointments. On the ave-  
 rage, therefore, the verdict with  
 regard to the worth of dreams  
 will be in accordance with  
 that on the real life, but, on  
 certain sides, will be far more  
 unfavorable.

睡ト入  
 十又若  
 一自覺  
 一若ト  
 二ト

Falling to sleep is, if one can  
 fall quickly to sleep, a pleasure,  
 but yet only because fatigue had  
 made waking a torment, and fall-  
 ing to sleep frees me from this

十又若  
 一自覺  
 一若ト  
 二ト  
 十又若  
 一自覺  
 一若ト  
 二ト  
 十又若  
 一自覺  
 一若ト  
 二ト

Torment. Awakening is also said  
 by many people to be pleasurable.  
 I have, however, never found it  
 so, and fancy that this assertion  
 rests on a confusion with the  
 pleasure which consists in not  
 being obliged to rise when actual-  
 ly weary, but in being able to  
 go on slumbering with semi-consci-  
 ousness. But how few people  
 are in a position to ~~the~~ enjoy  
 this pleasure! That an awaken-  
 ing quickly passing into a state  
 of complete vigilance should be  
 a pleasure to anybody I cannot  
 believe; I regard it rather as  
 a pain, since one has once more  
 to exchange the ease of rest  
 and sleep for the drudgery of  
 the day. That on being wide-  
 awake, and after a sufficient  
 period of sleep, the fatigue of the  
 past evening has disappeared



由 + 2 2  
+ 11

and the status quo of capacity for work and enjoyment is restored, cannot possibly pass for positive pleasure, since only the level of sensation has been again attained. But it certainly is a decided pain when one rises fatigued, not having had one's fill of sleep. In this position, inability to spare sufficient time for sleep before work, we find, however, a large part of the poorer classes of all nations. Even of Westphalian peasants I have heard that the whole family, after the field-work of the day, is compelled to spin for some hours into the night, although this labour is worth little more than a farthing an hour. (Hartmann's *unconscious philosophy* VI III P. 67-8)

(2) ——— It is here that writers fal-

sely describe the facts of life and society, and imagine that untruth is a substitute for poetry. History in its broad outlines leaves unnoticed the finer lights and shades of private characters, and scenes in domestic life. To supply these traits appears to be the duty of fiction, which, while free with regard to names, dates, and the order of events, should still be essentially true. If judged by this rule, many so-called fashionable historical romances must be condemned. Of old popular legends, though adventures are fanciful, we would speak a deep and true meaning. Our censure applies to fictions, neither real nor ideal, which describe neither this present world nor any better state of society. Such tales, having no basis either in poetic imagination



or in observation ~~of~~ life, attempt to supply the defect by introducing a worn-out series of fictitious characters. Here we find the wicked steward, and the hero, who, ~~at~~ without a purpose, and impelled hither and thither by others, obtains at last perfect happiness in the shape of a princely estate. Here also is the rival, full of wickedness, but employing sagacity and persevering energy which are doomed to be made fruitless by a stroke of the novel-writer's pen. Here also is the innocent, but mysterious heroine, radiant with a supernatural beauty; and here we ~~also~~ meet (too often) the wandering gentleman, without ~~any~~ funds, who travels everywhere without meaning or purpose, and thinks nothing of leaving ~~land~~

~~don~~ London, and journeying over the continent in order to have the pleasure of abruptly meeting the heroine at Vienna! These are some of the beauties of third class fictions (I name fiction). --- (Gostwick and Harrison's German literature p. 535)

——  
11 →  
21 又  
40 = 25  
21 又 25  
9 又 40 25  
+ 11  
當 25 刻  
25 刻

(25) --- The mind finds in itself a number of sensations, which, although bound up with individual peculiarities, have yet so much semblance that an identical portion can be set apart: this receives the name Beautiful. Now when the cause of this sensation is referred to external ~~object~~ objects which are constructed of ~~two~~ simultaneous perceptions, this cause is stamped as the quality of these objects and likewise receives the







expression merely in use for conceptions and judgements.

(Hartmann's Unconscious philosophy Vol. I. P. 295-6)

(註) --- But now aesthetic sensation is distinguished from merely sensuous feelings in this, that it stands on the shoulders of the latter; that it uses them perhaps as material, also as concomitant presentations through which its special quality is in every case determined; but that as feeling it stands above them and is built upon them. If, therefore, the unconscious genesis of the sensuous qualities is an immediate reaction of the soul on the nerve irritant, the unconscious genesis of aesthetic sensation is rather a reaction of the soul on ready-made sen-

高貴感  
は美面/  
名譽の上  
立つて  
下情を主  
として  
批評の上  
豊十一年

suous feelings, — a reaction of the second order, as it were. This is the reason why the origin of sensuous feeling will probably always remain veiled in impenetrable obscurity, whilst we have already partially, in the discursive form of conscious representation, reconstructed and comprehended, i.e., consequently resolved, the process of origin of aesthetic sensation. (Hartmann's Unconscious philosophy Vol. I. P. 294)

(註) We have as little to ~~trouble~~ trouble ourselves here about the essence of the Beautiful as about the essence of the Amoral in the last chapter. As it there sufficed us that the predicate moral could only be applied to actions from the point of view of consciousness, but that the actions themselves, to which



This predicate is given or refused, are in the last resort incalculable reactions of the unconscious, so the only point to be considered here is the cognition that the aesthetic judgment is an empirically established judgment, but has its foundation in aesthetic feeling, whose origination falls entirely within the unconscious. (Hartmann Vol. I. P. 274-5)

(譯) If, now, any-body possesses a lively imagination, at the same time a fine sense for the beautiful, and a copious store of remembered ideas ever at command, wherein the beautiful elements are particularly richly represented, it will not be difficult for him, by leaning on Nature, ~~that~~ that is, on given sense-perceptions, by eliminating ugly

藝術的  
 印象  
 7.1. 印象  
 1. 印象  
 2. 印象  
 3. 印象  
 4. 印象  
 5. 印象  
 6. 印象  
 7. 印象  
 8. 印象  
 9. 印象  
 10. 印象

idealise  
 2. 理想  
 = 理想  
 3. 理想  
 4. 理想  
 5. 理想  
 6. 理想  
 7. 理想  
 8. 理想  
 9. 理想  
 10. 理想

and interesting beautiful elements, which yet do not offend against truth and unity, to create in an artistic fashion. E.g., when any one ~~can~~ paint a portrait, essential truth is lost by simply rendering the chance aspect of the person. This would be a mechanical, not an artistic performance. But when the artist places the person in such a light, position, direction, and attitude that he shows himself in the most favourable manner possible; when, of the various moods and expressions during the sitting, the artist retains that which makes the finest impression; and accordingly represses or lets pass all unfavourable and non-beautiful traits and singularities, but, on the other hand, brings



into the foreground and places in a favourable light all advantageous traits and details, perhaps even adding new ones so far as the truth of the idea, i.e., the likeness, allows, then he has produced a work of art, for he has idealised.  
(Hartmann Vol. I, p. 297)

(譯) Thus works of ordinary talent; it produces artistically by means of rational selection and combination, guided by its aesthetic judgment. At this point stands the ordinary dilettante and the majority of professional artists. They are and all cannot comprehend that these means, supported by technical routine, may perhaps accomplish something excellent, but, can never attain to anything great, can

天不才  
心不才  
一不才  
十不才  
百不才  
千不才  
萬不才  
十萬不才  
百萬不才  
千萬不才  
十萬萬不才  
百萬萬不才  
千萬萬不才  
十萬萬萬不才  
百萬萬萬不才  
千萬萬萬不才  
十萬萬萬萬不才  
百萬萬萬萬不才  
千萬萬萬萬萬不才

無之計  
大平富  
作小量十  
十天十  
十

never pass out of the well-worn grooves of imitation nor produce an original work; for, if they admitted that, they must perforce adjure their calling and declare their life to be a failure. Here everything is still done with conscious choice; there is wanting the divine frenzy, the vivifying breath of the Unconscious, which appears to consciousness as higher inexplicable suggestion, which it is forced to apprehend as fact without ever being able to unravel its law. Conscious combination may, in course of time, be acquired by effort of the conscious will, by industry, endurance, and practice. The creation of genius is an unwill- ed, passive conception; it does not come with the most



earnest seeking, but quite unexpectedly, as if fallen from heaven, on journeys, in the theatre, in conversation, everywhere where it is least expected, and always suddenly and instantaneously. Conscious combination works out laboriously the smallest details, and gradually constructs a whole with painful hesitation and head-splitting, with frequent rejecting and re-summing of the single parts. The conception of genius receives the whole from one mould, as gift of the gods, unearned by toil; and it is just the details which are wanting to it — must be wanting, because in the larger compositions (grouped ~~and~~ images, poetic works) the human mind is too narrow to obtain more than

the most general total impression at a single glance. Combination procures the unity of the whole by laborious adaptation and experimentation in detail, and therefore, in spite of all its labour, never accomplishes its purpose, but always allows, in its bungling work, the conglomerate of the details to be visible. Genius, in virtue of the conception from the unconscious, has, in the necessary appropriateness and mutual relations of the several parts a unity so perfect that it can only be compared to the unity of natural organisms, which likewise spring out of the unconscious. (Hartmann's Unconscious philosophy Vol. P 277-9)

=====  
(\*) ----- How far, however, it







mediateley hinders the reception of the Idea from the Unconscious, because the causal nexus of the two terms in respect of such extraordinary demands of the Unconscious is so subtle, that every pre-occupation of the consciousness in this direction must act disturbingly, every actual one-sided tension of the parts of the brain concerned makes the ground to be traversed ~~in uneven~~.

~~(Hartmann Vol. I, P. 282)~~ Hence the occurrence of the conception, when quite other parts of the brain are occupied with quite other thoughts, as soon as through a still looser association of ideas the impulse is given to the causality of the Unconscious; but such an impulse there must be, if it is also for

the most part immediately forgotten again, for the universal laws of mind can even here not be transgressed, (Hartmann Vol. I, P. 282)

~~(Hartmann Vol. I, P. 282) Hence the occurrence of the conception, when quite other parts of the brain are occupied with quite other thoughts, as soon as through a still looser association of ideas the impulse is given to the causality of the Unconscious; but such an impulse there must be, if it is also for~~



# Bain

pleasurable; in Degree, various, according to the stimulation, which may be acute or massive. ~~It~~ It has no Speciality.

The pleasure is, in fact, the primitive charm of all sensation, before it has been dulled by continuance and satiety. It has the vagueness of character belonging to mere organic stimulation.

3. The corresponding pain is Monotony, tedium, ~~ennui~~ ennui. This arise from some parts of the system being unduly drawn upon while others have their stimulation withheld. Its ordinary modes are generally known; the extreme and agonizing degrees are made use of in punishment.

Monotony is often aggravated by the pain of excessive Subjectivity or self-consciousness. The absence of objective attraction leaves

凡行恩道  
 心果開曉  
 極之痛引  
 限之快樂  
 十  
 苦悶  
 苦痛  
 單調、共  
 痛、化印、  
 盛、北和之  
 = 引卷、一  
 都不活者  
 十、由集  
 又  
 苦悶、苦  
 苦、心、十  
 = 引卷、一  
 十、印、苦

*[Faint handwritten notes in Chinese characters, mostly illegible.]*

(1) I, The Objects of emotion of Novelty are well understood, The physical circumstance may be inferred to be a change in the locality of nervous action, extending also to the allied organs — the muscles and the senses. The pleasure should arise from varying the parts and organs stimulated, is a necessary consequence of the fact that stimulation is pleasurable.

2. The Emotion is, in Quality,

神經性  
 快  
 快、引、感  
 化、苦、悶  
 快樂、本、引



看 十 十 十 十 十  
主 希 之 力 (白 誠)  
ノ 之 力 (白 誠)  
十 十 十 十 十  
十 十 十

the mind in the subjective condition, which, when long continued, gives the sense of intolerable ennui. To be confined in the dark, or without occupation, is to be made the victim of subjective tedium.

Under the Species of Novelty, we ~~may~~ may indicate, first, the simple Sensations, as encountered in early life. Such of these as are in their nature pleasing, are, in the first experience, pre-eminently so. The general exhilaration designated by the word Freshness, is due, among other causes, to novelty of sensation.

The primary sensations are speedily gone through, and fall into the ordinary routine of pleasures, which, by being re-mitted or alternated, continue to afford a certain measure of delight.

流 十 十 十 十 十  
十 十 十 十 十  
十 十 十 十 十  
十 十 十 十 十

二 十 十 十 十 十  
十 十 十 十 十  
十 十 十 十 十  
十 十 十 十 十

十 十 十 十 十  
十 十 十 十 十  
十 十 十 十 十  
十 十 十 十 十  
十 十 十 十 十

The charm of novelty then belongs only to new and varied combinations, and in that form it may be sustained, although with decreasing force, to the end of life. New scenes, new objects, new ~~per~~ persons, and new aspects of life, constitute the attractions of travel. Novelty in incidents and events is furnished by the transactions of life, and by the pages of story. Inventions in the Arts, and the discoveries in science, have the initial charm of novelty, as well as the interest of permanent utility. In Fine Art, whose end is pleasure, the powerful effects of novelty are earnestly invoked, pleasurable surprises are expected by originality; while the passion



此乃一極之  
心之極也  
笑

此乃極之  
元大也

此乃  
極

此乃  
一極

for change, ~~is~~ uncontrolled, leads in the end to decadence. Last of all, in Fashion, novelty is supreme. Throughout the whole, but one rule prevails; other things the same, the greater the novelty, the greater the pleasure.

4. Next to Novelty is Variety, alternation, or change.

The longer any stimulant has been remitted, the greater the impression on its renewal. Variety is a minor form of novelty.

Our happiness depends materially on the wise remission and variation of objects of delight. Mere change of pleasures ~~is~~ will produce, within limits, a continuance of the pleasurable wave. Still, it is likely that periods of absolute indifference and quiet, if not

此乃  
極  
心之極也  
笑

此乃

此乃

此乃

此乃

此乃

此乃

此乃

此乃

此乃

此乃

此乃

of painful privation, should intervene, in order to maintain the highest zest of enjoyment.

5. Surprise is a breach of expectation, and in addition to mere Relativity, includes an element of Conflict.

In surprise, we are said to be startled. There is a shock of contradiction, which is always exciting. The excitement may be pleasurable, painful, or neutral, according to the case, be pure conflict, it would be a source of pain; as a pungent stimulus, when the nerves are fresh, it may be pleasurable.

Frequently, it is ~~not~~ neither, being our typical instance of neutral emotion. The circumstances of the surprise may farther affect than we expected, there is an



Sully

access of pleasure; when worse, of pain (Bain's Mental science p. 229-30)

excitement  
 兴奋  
 兴奋  
 "love of excitement"

凡于情之  
 常快若恨  
 至一快然也  
 77  
 32

(b) — Much of what we call excitement is distinctly pleasurable, as is seen in the use of the expression "love of excitement," and in people's eagerness in the ~~pursuit~~ pursuit of it. Other forms, e.g., a sudden shock, are, as sudden and confusing, distinctly disagreeable. Lastly, it must not be forgotten that states of feeling are rarely pure pleasures or pure pains. The complexity of our mental life produces a constant intermingling of affective elements. Thus a surprise is commonly at once disagreeable and agreeable; disagreeable as producing momentarily disturbance of the mental mechanism, agreeable as a

new, unexpected experiences which as such exhilarates us, stimulating us to more intense thought-activity. In many of our affective states, as we shall see, there is this meeting of the opposed elements of the agreeable and the disagreeable, and the collision of the two, e.g., in the love of the marvellous, in the pleasure of pathetic story and tragedy constitutes a part, and a very important part, of what is known as excitement. (Sully's Human Mind Vol. I p. 4)

一时、得意  
 兴奋、喜悦  
 兴奋 (即自  
 得、心、快)  
 兴奋、喜悦  
 兴奋、喜悦

(c) The effective effect of the disturbance is to call forth a self-preservative reaction, viz., the intensified look by help of which the strange, unexpected object becomes clearly apprehended. This intensified atten-



知 又 延 行  
連 合 意 像  
4 盛 7519

tion, necessitated by the absence of all pre-adjustment or "pre-perception," gives the characteristic expression. Through this special reaction mental activity is increased, the strange object is carefully inspected, imagination is stimulated by associative suggestion, and in this way the momentary shock leads on to the agreeable feeling of relief, of self-readjustment, and of intellectual mastery.

If, instead of being merely unexpected at the moment, the object is strange and unfamiliar, the feeling of surprise passes into the more prolonged state of wonder or astonishment. Here we have affective elements, growing out of nascent process of reproduction and comparison,

Thus when we are astonished at a strange or rare phenomenon, as an eclipse, we are affected by the fact of novelty or of rarity. This realization of something new and extraordinary is in itself exhilarating, and, under favourable circumstances, we find wonder manifesting itself as a distinctly pleasurable relation involving an energetic and prolonged reaction of attention. That this is so seems proved by the fact that people eagerly seek the stimulus of the marvellous in nature and in art, and find a certain gratification in wondering even where, as in the case of preternatural wickedness, the object is qualitatively repulsive; and further, by the existence



of such expressions as "love of the marvellous". On the other hand, the sight of what is strange, ~~so~~ especially if it is, at the same time, big and suggestive of power, is apt to excite apprehension or fear, a child shows the recoil of timidity rather than the joyous greeting of wonder at the first appearance of a vast, many-voiced sea.

The bare feeling of wonder is not an intellectual emotion, though closely related to it. Since the pleasurable excitement depends on the strangeness of the phenomena, it may readily oppose the process of understanding, that is, assimilative comprehension, this is what happens whenever the love of marvel and mystery so

intoxicates the vulgar mind as to lead it to resent a ~~scientific~~ scientific explanation of those natural phenomena and human actions (e.g., of the mystery-man or conjurer) which excite the passion of wonder, an affect ~~so~~ abundantly illustrated in the history of superstition. (Sully's Human Mind Vol. 1, P. 125-6)

—  
連念!  
子と外言  
能連念  
念、或連  
念、連  
念、或連  
念、或連  
念、或連  
念、或連  
念、或連  
念、或連

(英) The laws of the association of ideas or sequence of thought contain three essential moments: (1) the evoking idea; (2) the idea called up; and (3) the special interest leading to the calling up of the idea. As for the ~~inter~~ inter-relations of its ~~mechanical~~ first two apart from the third, and the laws of their connection, they must be referred essentially to the me-



此=70三件  
 各件之件  
 若上之件  
 能于一兩處  
 會一連之  
 且全一之  
 便接接  
 的十之  
 一之

mechanical causality of the mo-  
 lecular vibrations of the brain,  
 to the greater or less affinity  
 of the cerebral vibrations corres-  
 ponding with the exciting idea  
 to the various latent dispo-  
 sitions in the brain (called by  
 the improper expression, "slumber-  
 ing ideas of memory"). Such a  
 limitation of our consideration  
 to the exciting and the excited  
 idea would, I conceive, be jus-  
 tified only if there are condi-  
 tions in human life in which  
 man is free not only from  
 every conscious purpose, but  
 also from the sway of or co-  
 operation of every unconscious  
 interest, every passing mood.  
~~interred~~ This is, however, a  
 condition hardly ever occur-  
 ing, for even if one in ap-  
 pearance completely abandons

此三件  
 各件之件  
 若上之件  
 能于一兩處  
 會一連之  
 且全一之  
 便接接  
 的十之  
 一之  
 dominant  
 feeling  
 此三件  
 各件之件  
 若上之件  
 能于一兩處  
 會一連之  
 且全一之  
 便接接  
 的十之  
 一之

his train of thought to accident,  
 or if one abandons oneself en-  
 tirely to the ~~most~~ involuntary  
 dreams of fancy, yet always  
 other leading interests, domi-  
 nant feelings and moods pre-  
 vail at one time rather  
 than at another, and these  
 will always exert an influ-  
 ence on the association of  
 ideas. Of ~~not~~ still greater  
 influence, however, must  
 of ~~course~~ course be some spe-  
 cial motive determining the  
 train of thought to a parti-  
 cular goal, and this point it  
 is also which we have here  
 particularly to deal.  
 For example, if I look at a  
 right-angled triangle, all man-  
 ner of ideas may become connect-  
 ed with it without any parti-  
 cular reason; but if I am



asked for the proof of some proposition which I should be ashamed not to know, I have a particular ~~or~~ notion for linking on to the ~~present~~ presentation of the triangle those ideas which are serviceable for the demonstration. It is this interest in the end then which conditions the manner of the association of ideas in the different cases. For if, in the case of the triangle, otherwise any other possible idea might occur to me, only not exactly that one which I want, and this interest in the discovery of the proof brings it about that suitable ideas arise which otherwise most probably would not have been called up, still a motive must

二月の  
叶の  
三二  
又  
三  
三月  
二  
三  
二  
二  
二  
二  
二  
二  
二  
二  
二  
二  
二  
二  
二  
二  
二  
二

be the cause of this. But now, who is the intelligent being who seeks out, among innumerable possible ones, the idea corresponding to an end on this stimulus of some motive? It is certainly not consciousness; for in semi-conscious dreams always only such ideas as correspond to the main interest of the moment, but unintended, occur; in the intentional search of consciousness in the drawers of memory, on the other hand, one is often just left by it in the lurch. Aids may be doubtless be used if what is wanted will not occur to me, but it is not got by importunity; and often, when one is thrown into perplexity by



記憶の  
gift  
記憶の  
選り果し  
217  
12

such failures, the idea in question comes hours, nay, days afterwards, suddenly rained in upon consciousness, when one least of all was thinking of it. One sees, then, that it is not consciousness that selects, since it is completely blind, and receives each piece which is fetched from the treasury of memory as a gift.

If consciousness were the selector, it would indeed be able to see by its own light what was eligible, which, as is well known, it is not, since only that ~~which~~ which is already selected emerges from the night of the unconscious. If, then, consciousness were the selector, it would grope about in absolute dark

ness, could accordingly not possibly choose appropriately, but only take at random what first came to hand. That unknown one, however, does choose judiciously in fact, namely, in accordance with the special purpose. According to psychology, which only knows of conscious psychical activity, there is here a manifest contradiction. For experience testifies that an appropriate selection of ideas takes place before their emergence, and denies that this selection is undertaken by consciousness. For us, who have already become acquainted with the purposive activity of the unconscious on many sides, there is here only a fresh support



意識的  
創作  
創作  
創作  
創作  
創作  
創作  
創作  
創作  
創作  
創作

of one view. It is just a reaction of the unconscious upon the motive of the conscious will, which, in the form of its manifestation and in its ~~occasional~~ occasional non-appearance or severe partial tension of the brain, perfectly agrees with the creative power of the artist. The reflection just made holds good of the association of ideas in abstract thinking as well as in sensuous imagining and artistic combination. If a result is to be arrived at, the right idea must readily offer itself at the right time from the ~~storehouse~~ storehouse of memory; and that it is just the right idea which appears, for that the un-

意識的  
創作  
創作  
創作  
創作  
創作  
創作  
創作  
創作  
創作  
創作

意識的  
創作  
創作  
創作  
創作  
創作  
創作  
創作  
創作  
創作  
創作

意識的  
創作  
創作  
創作  
創作  
創作  
創作  
創作  
創作  
創作  
創作

conscious alone can make provision. All aids and artifices of the understanding can only facilitate the office of the unconscious, but never take it away. A suitable and yet simple example, is wit, which is a mean between artistic and scientific production, since it pursues artistic aims with, for the most part, abstract material. Every witicism is, according to the common expression, a flash. The understanding may perhaps make use of puns, ~~can impress the material more or~~ aids to facilitate the flash; practice, especially in the case of puns, can impress the material more vividly on the memory, altogether



strengthen the verbal memory; talent may endow particular persons with an ever-sparkling wit, — in spite of all that, every single witticism remains a gift from above; and even those who think they are privileged in this respect, and have wit completely in their power, must have the experience that just when they most wish to compel it, their talent denies them its services, and that ~~nothing~~ nothing but worn out absurdities or witticism learnt by rote will out of their brain. These folk ~~know~~ know also quite well that a bottle of wine is a far readier means of setting their faculty a-going than any intentional

第八冊已  
譯+同  
空 組織  
= 1/2

effort.

If we have gathered from the foregoing that all human artistic production depends on an intrusion that ~~all but~~ ~~man~~ of the Unconscious, it will no longer excite surprise to find the laws of beauty contained as much as possible in those organisms of Nature which we have recognised as the most immediate apparition of the Unconscious. This point could not well have been mentioned before; it is, however, one important reason the more for the regular coming into being of organisms according to pre-existing ideas. Let one only look at a peacock's feather. Every barb of the feather receives its nutriment from the



shaft; the nutriment is the same for all barbs; the colouring matters are for the most part not yet present in the shaft, but are first separated from the common nutritive fluid in the barbs themselves. Every barb receives different colouring matters at different distances from the shaft, which are sharply separated from one another. The distances of these borders of colour from the shaft are different in the case of every barb. How are they determined? By the aim of giving closed figures, peacock's eyes, in the juxtaposed layers of the barbs, and how can this end be determined? Only by the beauty of the marking and brilliancy

~~of colour.~~ of colour (Hartmann's Unconscious philosophy Vol. P. 283 — 287)

自美善ハ  
色之成ハ由  
来ハ巧ヲ  
示ス  
ハ之成ハ由  
来ハ巧ヲ  
示ス

理也ハ  
色之成ハ由  
来ハ巧ヲ  
示ス

(新) — If we, however, assume one assertion to be admitted, the difference between the artistic production of man and of Nature lies, in the last resort, not in the essence and origin of the conception of the idea, but only in the mode of its realisation. In Nature's beauty the idea is nowhere presented to a consciousness before the execution, but the individual, who is at the same time marble and sculptor, realises the idea perfectly unconsciously; in human artistic production, on the other hand, the instigation of consciousness intervenes. The idea is not directly realised as natural existence, but as



7-27  
21117  
無主論 / 中  
= 2

cerebral vibrations, which confront the consciousness of the artist as construction of fancy, whose conversion into external reality depends on the conscious will of the artist. (Hartmann Vol. 1, p. 291)

(25) If, in conclusion, we sum up the result of this chapter, we obtain the following:— The discovery of the beautiful and the creation of the beautiful by man proceed from unconscious processes, whose results, the feeling of the beautiful and the discovery of the beautiful (conception), are presented in consciousness. These moments form the straight point of further conscious work, which, however, at every instant needs more or less the support of the

unconscious. The underlying unconscious process is entirely withdrawn from introspection, but it undoubtedly unites in every single case the same terms, which an absolutely correct Aesthetics would give in discursive ~~success~~ succession as the foundation of the beautiful. That such a transformation and resolution into concepts and discursive thinking is at all possible, affords proof that we have not to do in the unconscious process with anything essentially foreign, but that in this and the analytic processes of aesthetic science only the form is distinguished as intuitive and discursive thinking in general, but that thought in itself, or the logical elements, and the moments, from whose



intuitive logical union beauty results, are common to both and identical. This holds good, without doubt, just as much for the elementary judgments of so-called formal beauty, as for the material beauty of the highest ideas presented in adequate sensible manifestation. (Leibniz called the discovery of musical proportions an unconscious arithmetic, and the beauty of geometrical or metrical figures is ~~in~~ in direct ratio to the wealth of mathematical ideas and logical-analytical relations, which in the aesthetic intuition of the same determines the judgment as its unconscious and implicit content.) If the union of the beautiful was not susceptible of logical ~~analysis~~

analysis, if the beautiful were not ~~merely~~ merely a particular manifestation of the logical, we should certainly be obliged to recognise in the creative unconscious, besides the logical ~~essence~~ essence, which we have hitherto found to be the only active element, an additional somewhat, heterogeneous, out of all relation with it. But the history of aesthetics indicates too ~~unmistakably~~ unmistakably the goal of this science, the derivation of all and every beauty from logical moments (in application to real data of course), to allow of our being diverted by the imperfect character of current explanations from believing in this final aim. (Hartmann Vol. I, p. 291-2)



美、审美、  
admiration + 1  
美、美、  
esthetics  
+ 1 美、  
深利、  
2

(美) ----- 1. The subjective element of beauty consists in the emotion of admiration. 2. The objective element of beauty consists in the quality of ~~suggestiveness~~ suggestiveness. 3. Beauty attaches only to utility. 4. The appearance of beauty varies inversely with the appearance of utility. (P. 10)

sensation  
+ emotion  
r = 16  
is + na  
intellect  
+ 1

An operation of the intellect — an interpretation by the understanding — an exercise of the faculties, is the connecting link between the occurrence of a sensation and the emotion which follows it in the mind, as has already been shown. (P. 12)  
Summing up the foregoing remarks, we find that an object of sight ~~is~~ first of

第一、  
1、  
2、  
3、  
4、  
5、  
6、  
7、  
8、  
9、  
10、

all causes several simple sensations in us — colour, shape, and motion, to wit; secondly, that each of these sensations are species of vibrations in the retina; thirdly, that each of them may be pleasant or unpleasant in themselves; ~~fourth~~ fourthly, that in no case can any of these sensations be themselves beautiful or ugly; that neither individually nor collectively can they as sensations be admirable or disgusting, and therefore that they form neither the objective nor the subjective element of beauty proper; that they are mere corporeal feelings, animal affections, and being carefully sifted and discrimi-



景之  
方善  
心之  
2

nated from the emotions which follow them, may be dismissed from our further consideration. And we find, lastly, that the emotion of admiration is capable of being called into existence by the presence of an object of beauty, in other words, by sensations which are not, and should not be termed, beautiful. (P. 34)

emotion  
of sensation  
1 異 心 八 度  
2 心 心 7 3 2  
性 質 心 心  
+ 7

The second great class of feelings, that called the ~~emo~~ emotions, does not differ from the class ~~called~~ called sensations in degree; it differs in kind, the two classes being, in fact, radically diverse and intrinsically inconsistent. How, then, can an object, as a whole,

be capable of producing an effect altogether ~~of~~ different in kind from that which any of its parts are fitted ~~severely~~ severally to cause? What is the relation of an emotion to a sensation? Can any number of ~~sensations~~ sensations constitute an emotion? Can ~~like~~ like produce unlike? How is it that on looking on a primrose and ~~receiving~~ receiving from the flower ~~with~~ nothing but sensible impressions, ~~I~~ I nevertheless admire it as beautiful? The answer to these questions must be found in the fact that the emotion is entirely due to the link ~~of~~ which connects the two feelings — the sensation and the emotion; in other words,



sensation  
an emotion  
142-11  
intellect  
18-20

知力  
知力  
知力  
知力

知力  
知力  
知力  
知力

to an operation of the intellect. The intellect it is which takes hold of the sensations and so manipulates and disposes them that their ultimate combination produces in the mind that particular feeling called admiration. An activity of the intellectual faculties is therefore necessary for every appreciation of beauty to every emotion of admiration; and as it is with one emotion so it is with all. They are all due to an operation of the intellect, by which we are led to estimate the value of our sensations. Every proposition estimate of the intellect is followed by an agreeable emotion of greater or ~~less~~

less intensity, and every unfavourable estimate by the contrary. Bearing these facts in mind, then, we shall find little difficulty in accounting for the admiration which is consequent on the recognition of beauty. (p. 35)

The objective element of beauty — and the same applies to all aesthetic phenomena — is the quality of suggestiveness; and it is the response of the intellect to this suggestiveness which causes the emotion of admiration. Of ~~course~~ course, when I speak of a ~~suggestiveness~~ suggestive quality being objective, I do not imply any necessary objectivity, but merely that which the



suggestive  
1. 暗示性  
2. 連合性  
3. 感應性  
4. 联想性  
5. 暗示性  
6. 联想性  
7. 暗示性  
8. 联想性

mind itself has previous-ly endowed the object with. This endowing by the mind of suggestive qualities is done by what is called associa-tion of ideas. We see a certain object, and we re-collect certain sensations which we believe to ~~co-exist~~ co-exist in that object, and which we have before expe-rienced in connection with it; we see it of a certain colour, and we recollect something else of a similar colour; we see it of a certain sha-pe, and we recollect some-thing else of similar shape; we see it with a certain motion, and we recollect something else with a simi-lar motion; that is, we associate with the object

before us, its colour, shape, or motion, other objects with their colour, shapes, or motions not before us.---

art.  
Nature  
7. 暗示性  
8. 联想性

Beauty is twofold—natural and artificial; and the art-ificial seems to consist in imitating the natural; nat-ural beauty, therefore, shall engage our attention first. suggestive qualities, being at-tached by the mind to the object, operate afterwards by a reflex action whenever the object acts upon our appropriate senses and the mind is at leisure to allow such ~~reflex~~ reflex action to take effect. A beauti-ful quality is one which, directly or indirectly, pro-ximately or remotely, sug-



I must assume that some objects are beautiful before I ~~inquire~~ inquire why they are so.

gests, not communicates, a pleasant sensation; and where there is no such suggestion there is no beauty, — no admiration. I must assume that certain plants, flowers, insects, fruits, birds, animals, and scenes are beautiful, or more beautiful than others. I shall assume, for instance, that a maidenhair fern, a primrose, an orange, a tortoise-shell butterfly, a swan, a squirrel, and clear sunsets are ~~specimens~~ specimens of beautiful plants, flowers, fruit, insects, birds, animals, and scenes; and having made this ~~assup~~ assumption, I shall endeavour to prove that these things are beautiful by

+ 1 10 12  
1 10 13 13  
1 10 13 13  
1 10 13 13  
1 10 13 13  
1 10 13 13

their suggestiveness, and by no other quality or means. (P. 41—42) (Holmes-Forbes's Science of Beauty)

(7) This theory (theory of spontaneous), which certainly had many attractions, and contained much truth, led to various important results. It drove away from Helicon many versifiers who had inflicted no business there, by depriving them of an audience. The Beatties, A. Kenside, Youngs, and Darwins, who had inflicted their dulness on the last century under the impression that it was poetry, — a delusion shared by their readers, — had to "pale their ineffectual fire," and decamp, when their soporific productions were con-



fronted with the startling and direct utterances of the disciples of the spontaneous. On the other hand, the theory of produced new mischiefs, and generated new mistakes. It did not silence inferior poets; but they were of a different class from what they had been before. It was not now the moralist or the dabbler in philosophy, who, imagining himself to have important information to convey to mankind, and aiming at delighting while he instructed, constructed his ~~poems~~ epic, or ode, or metrical essay, as the medium of communication. It was rather the ~~man~~ man gifted with a fatal

facility of rhyme, with a mind teeming with trivial thoughts and corresponding words, who was misled by the new theory into confounding the rapidity of his conceptions with the spontaneity of genius, and into thinking revision or curtailment of them a kind of treason to the divine afflatus. Such writers generally produced two or three pretty pieces, written at their brightest moments, amidst a miscellaneous heap of "fugitive poems" — rightly so called — which were good for little or nothing. Upon real genius the theory acted both for good and for evil. ~~Social~~ Social success, upon which even



The best poets of the ~~eighteen~~  
~~th~~ eighteenth ~~century~~ century  
had set the highest value,  
was despised by the higher  
minds of the new school.  
They loved to commune with  
nature and their own souls  
in solitude, believing that  
here was the source of true  
poetic ~~was~~ inspiration. The  
resulting forms were, so far  
as they went, most beauti-  
ful and faultless in art; they  
were worthy of the profound  
and beautiful thoughts which  
they embodied. In diction,  
rhythm, proportion, melody,  
— in every thing, in short,  
that constitutes beauty of  
form, — no poems ever  
composed attained to greater  
perfection than Shelley's  
"Skeylark" or Keats' "Hyperion".

Yet these forms, after all,  
were not of the highest  
order. The judgement of  
many generations has ~~assigned~~  
assigned the palm of su-  
periority among poetic forms  
to the Epos and the Dra-  
ma; yet in neither of these  
did the ~~a~~ school of poets  
of which we speak achieve  
any success of moment. This  
was ~~probably~~ probably due  
to the influence of the ~~theo~~  
theory which we ~~are~~ are  
considering. The truth is,  
that no extensive and com-  
plex poem was ever com-  
posed without large help  
from that constructive facul-  
tety, which it was the  
object of the theory to de-  
preciate. Even Shakespeare,  
whom it is — or was — the



fashion to consider as a wild, irregular poet, writing from ~~an~~ impulse, and careless of art, is ~~known~~ known to have carefully altered and re-arranged some of his plays, "Hamlet," for instance, and by so doing to have greatly raised their poetic value. Virgil, Tasso, Dante, must all have expended a great amount of dry intellectual labor upon their respective masterpieces, in order to harmonize the parts and perfect the forms of expression. The bright moments are transitory, even with minds endowed with the highest order of imagination; but, by means of this labor, —

"Tasks in hours of insight

willed  
May be in hours of gloom  
fulfilled."

(Thomas Arnold's English Literature)  
P. 305-6)

(\*) It would result from this theory that a free pleasure, as that which the fine arts procure for us, rests wholly upon moral condition, and all the moral faculties of man are exercised in it. It would further result that this pleasure is an aim, which can never be attained but by moral means, and consequently that art, to tend and perfectly attain to pleasure, as to a real aim, must follow the road of healthy ~~moral~~ morals. Thus it is perfectly indifferent for the dignity of art whether its aim should



be a moral aim, or whether it should reach only through moral means; for in both cases it has ~~always~~ always to do with the morality, and must be rigorously in unison with the sentiment of duty; but for the perfection of art, it is by no means means indifferent which of the two should be the aim and which the means. If it is the aim that is moral, art loses all that by which it is powerful, — I mean its freedom, and that which gives it so much influence over us — the charm of pleasure. The play which recreates is changed into serious occupation, and yet it is precisely in recreating us that art can the better complete the great affair

— The moral work. It cannot have a salutary influence upon the morals, but in exercising its highest aesthetic action, and it can only produce the aesthetic effect in its highest degree in fully exercising its ~~liberty~~ liberty.

It is certain, besides, that all pleasure, the moment it flows from a moral source, renders man morally better, and then the effect in its turn becomes cause. The pleasure we find in what is beautiful, or touching, or sublime, strengthens our moral sentiments, as the pleasure we find in kindness, in love, &c., strengthens these inclinations. And just as contentment of



mind is the sure lot of  
the morally excellent man,  
so moral excellence willingly  
accompanies satisfaction of  
heart. Thus the moral effi-  
cacy of art is, not only  
because it employs moral  
means in order to charm  
us, but also because even  
the ~~ple~~ pleasure which it  
procures us is a ~~mean~~  
~~means~~ means of morality.

The general course of all  
pleasure, even of sensual  
pleasure, is propriety, the  
conformity with the aim.  
Pleasure is sensual when this  
propriety is manifested ~~by~~  
by ~~means~~ means of some  
necessary law of nature  
which has for physical  
result the sensation of ple-  
asure. Thus the ~~mean~~

movement of the ~~the~~ blood,  
and of the animal life, when  
in conformity with the aim  
of nature, produces in cer-  
tain organs, or in the entire  
organism, corporeal pleasure  
with all its varieties and  
all its modes. We feel  
this conformity by the me-  
ans of agreeable sensation,  
but we arrive at no re-  
presentation of it, either ~~the~~  
clear or confused.

Pleasure is free when we  
represent to ourselves the con-  
~~formity~~ ~~for~~ formability, and  
when the sensation that  
accompanies this representation  
is agreeable. Thus all the  
representation by which we  
have notice that there is  
propriety and harmony be-  
tween the end and the



means, are for us the source of free pleasure, and consequently can be employed to this end by the fine arts. Thus, all the representations can be placed under one of these heads: the good, the true, the ~~the~~ perfect, the ~~the~~ beautiful, the touching, the sublime. The good especially occupies our reason; the true and perfect, our intelligence; the beautiful interests both the intelligence and the ~~the~~ imagination; the touching and the sublime, the reason and the imagination. ~~It~~ It is true that we also ~~take~~ take pleasure in the charm or the power called out by action from play, but art uses charm only to accompany

The higher enjoyments which the idea of propriety gives to us. Considered in itself the charm or attraction is lost amid the sensations of life, and art disdains it together with all merely sensual ~~plea~~ pleasures.

This moral propriety is never more ~~so~~ vividly recognised than when it is found in conflict with another propriety and still keeps the upper hand; then only the moral law awakens in full power, when we find it struggling against all the other forces of nature, and when all those forces lose in its ~~pre~~ ~~presence~~ presence their empire over a human soul. By these words, "the other forces of nature," we must under-



stand all that is not  
moral force, all that is  
not subject to the supreme  
legislation of reason; that  
is to say, feelings, affect-  
tions, instincts, passions, as  
well as physical ~~needs~~ neces-  
sity and destiny. The ~~more~~  
more redoubtable the ad-  
versary, the more glorious  
the victory; resistance alone  
alone brings out the stren-  
gth of the force and ren-  
ders it visible. It follows  
that the highest degree of  
moral consciousness can  
only exist in strife and  
the highest moral pleasure  
is always accompanied by  
pain. (Schiller's Essays)

Of the cause of the pleasure, we  
derive from tragic objects.

(20) Of ~~the~~ cause this can

only be understood of sympathetic  
affections, or those felt as a secondary  
effect after their first impression; for  
commonly direct and personal affections  
immediately call into life in us  
the instinct of our own happiness,  
they take up all our thoughts, and  
seize hold of us too powerfully to  
allow any room for the feeling of  
pleasure that accompanies them,  
when the affection is freed from  
all personal relation. Thus, in  
the mind that is really a prey  
to painful passion, the feeling  
of pain ~~common~~ commands all  
others notwithstanding all the  
charm that the painting of its  
moral state may offer to the  
hearers and the spectators.  
And yet the painful affection is  
not ~~deprived~~ deprived of all  
pleasure, even for him who  
experiences it directly; only



This pleasure differs in degree according to the nature of each person's mind. The sports of chance would not have half so much attraction for us were there not a kind of enjoyment in anxiety, in doubt and in fear; danger would not be ~~encountered~~ ~~or~~ encountered from mere foolhardiness; ~~danger would not be encountered~~ and the very sympathy which interests us in the trouble of another would not be to us that pleasure which is never more lively than at the very moment when the illusion is strongest, and when we substitute ourselves most entirely in the place of the person who suffers.

But this does not imply that

disagreeable affections cause pleasure of themselves, nor do I think any one will uphold this view; it suffices that these states of the mind are the conditions that alone make possible for us certain kinds of pleasure. Thus the hearts particularly sensitive to this kind of pleasure, and most greedy of them, will be more easily led to share these disagreeable affections, which are the condition of the former, and even in the most ~~violent~~ violent storms of passion they will always preserve some remains of their freedom.

Now we only know of two sources of pleasure — the satisfaction of the instinct of happiness, and the accomplishment of the moral laws. Therefore, when it is shown



that a particular pleasure does not emanate from the former source, it must of necessity issue from the second. It is therefore from our moral nature that issue the charm of the painful affections shared by sympathy, and the pleasure that we sometimes feel even where the painful affection directly affects ourselves.

Many attempts have been  
 (5) If we now cast a glance at purely instrumental music, a symphony of Beethoven presents to us the greatest confusion, which yet has its most perfect order at its foundation, the most vehement conflict, which is transformed the next moment into the most beautiful concord. It is rerum concordia discors,

音楽の  
 弄ける  
 情の如  
 抑えられ  
 然るも  
 思ふに  
 の形式  
 二人が  
 二味で  
 1812

520.  
 520  
 5239  
 の事  
 12日の  
 135の  
 3022  
 あり

a true and perfect picture of the nature of the world which rolls on in the boundless maze of innumerable forms, and through constant destruction supports itself. But in this symphony all human passions and emotions also find utterance; joy, sorrow, love, hatred, terror, hope, &c., in innumerable degrees, yet all, as it were, only in ~~at abstract~~ abstracto, and without the substance, like a spirit world without matter. ~~or~~ Certainly we have a tendency to realise them while we listen, to cloth them in imagination with flesh and bones, and to see in them scenes of life and nature on every hand. Yet, taken generally, this is not required



for their comprehension or enjoyment, but rather imparts to them a foreign and arbitrary addition; therefore it is better to apprehend them in their immediacy and purity, (Schopenhauer's The world as will and Idea. Vol. 3d. P 235)

C. 94



