



*My Library*  
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is wholly insipid. (5) Intricacy is pleasing because the unravelling of it gives the interest of pursuit. ---

(6) Magnitude contributes to raise our admiration. (Bain's M.S. P. 306-7)

(7) Allison endeavours to show that this effect is something quite different from Sense, being in fact, not a ~~simple~~ ~~emotion~~ or the exercise of some ~~moral affection~~, simple, but a complex emotion, ~~involving~~ involving (1) the production of some simple emotion, or the exercise of some moral affection, and (2) a peculiar exercise of the Imagination. The author occupies many pages in describing the nature of this peculiar exercise of Imagination, which must go along with the simple pleasure. When any object of sublimity or beauty is presented to the mind, every man is conscious, he says, of a train of thought being awakened analogous in character to the original object; and unless such a train be awa-

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二アハシ  
後記  
Emotion  
+ハハシ

Kened, there is no aesthetic feeling --- Again  
 Again, there are associations that increase  
 the exercise of imagination, and also the  
 emotion of beauty. Such are the local  
 associations of each ~~one's~~ one's life, and  
 the historic associations whereby the in-  
 terest of places is enhanced. --- It  
 is necessary to enquire farther into the  
~~distinct~~ distinctive nature of those trains  
 of Imagination; or, wherein they differ  
 from other trains. The author resolves the  
 difference into these two circumstances:  
 1st. The nature of the Ideas or Conception  
 themselves, and 2ndly, the Law of their  
 Succession. On the first head, he remarks,  
 that, while the great mass of our ideas  
 excite no emotion whatever, the ideas of  
 Beauty excite some Affection or Emotion ---  
 Gladness, Tenderness, Pity, Melancholy,  
 Admiration, Power, Majesty, Terror; whence  
 they may be termed ideas of emotion.  
 On the second head, --- the Law of  
 succession, --- the ideas of imagination  
 have an emotional character allied to

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 = 同感ニ  
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 観テ成  
 ガク情  
 = 予ノ心ヲ  
 知ルニ及  
 其情ノ實  
 = 予ノ心ヲ  
 知ルニ及  
 其情ノ實

世ノ劇  
 快意ヲ  
 假シテ  
 事ヲ  
 之ニ以テ

the original emotion; The emotional  
 Keeping is preserved ~~the~~ throughout.  
 (Bain's M.S. P 308)

(新) It is a common observation,  
 that objects which in the reality would  
 shock, are in tragical, and suchlike  
 representations, the source of a very  
 high species of pleasure. This, taken  
 as a fact, has been the cause of  
 much reasoning. The satisfaction has  
 been commonly attributed, first, to  
 the comfort we receive in con-  
 sidering that so melancholy a  
 story is no more than a fiction;  
 and, next, to the contemplation of  
 our own freedom from the evils, wh-  
 ich we see represented. (Burke's  
 sublime and Beautiful P. 51)

(新) It is thus in real calamities,  
 or imitated distresses the only difference  
 is the pleasure resulting from the effects  
 of imitation; for it is never so perfect  
 but we can perceive it is imitation,  
 and on that principle are some-

十川同書  
二卷二  
十

what pleased with it. And indeed in some cases we derive as much or more pleasure from that source than from the thing itself. But then I imagine we shall be much mistaken, if we attribute any considerable part of our satisfaction in tragedy to the consideration that tragedy is a deceit, and its representations no realities. The nearer it approaches the reality, and the farther it removes us from all idea of fiction, the more perfect is its power. (Burke's Sublime P. 53)

實物ヲ  
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十川同書  
二卷二  
十

When the object is represented in poetry or painting is such as we could have no desire of seeing in the reality, then I may be sure that its power in poetry or painting is owing to the power of imitation, and to no cause operating in the thing itself. So it is with most of the pieces which the painters call still-life. In these a cottage, a dunghill, the meanest and most ordinary utensils of the kitchen, are

十川同書  
二卷二  
十

capable of giving us pleasure. But when the object of the painting or poem is such as we should run to see if real, let it affect us with what odd sort of sense it will, we may rely upon it that the power of the poem or picture is more owing to the nature of the thing itself than to the mere effect of imitation, or to a consideration of the skill of the imitator, however excellent. Aristotle has spoken so much and so solidly upon the force of imitation in his Poetics, that it makes any further discourse upon this subject the less necessary. (Burke's Sublime & beautiful. P. 56-7)

十川同書  
二卷二  
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imitation  
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(美) Whenever anything looks like what it is not, the resemblance being so great as nearly to deceive, we feel a kind of pleasurable surprise, an agreeable excitement of mind, exactly the same in its nature as that which we receive from juggling. Whenever we perceive this in something produced by art, that is to say, whenever the work is seen to resemble something which we know it is not, we receive what I call an idea of imitation. Why such ideas are pleasing, it would be out of our present purpose to inquire; we only know that there is no man who does not feel pleasure in his animal nature from gentle surprise, and that such surprise can be excited in no more distinct manner than by the evidence that a thing is not what it appears to be. Now two things are requisite to our complete and more pleasurable

perception of this: first, that the resemblance be so perfect as to amount to a deception; secondly, that there be some means of proving at the same moment that it is a deception. The most perfect ideas and pleasure of imitation are, therefore, when one sense is contradicted by another, both bearing as positive evidence on the subject as each is capable of alone; as when the eye says a thing is round, and the finger says it is flat; they are, therefore, never felt in so high a degree as in painting, where appearance of projection, roughness, hair, velvet, etc. are given with a smooth surface, or in wax-work, where the first evidence of the senses is perpetually contradicted by their experience; but the moment we come to marble, our definition checks us, for a marble figure does not look like what it is not: it

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looks like marble, and like the  
 form of a man, but then it is marble  
 and it is the form of a man. It  
 does not look like a man, which  
 it is not, but like the form of a  
 man, which it is. Form is form, bona  
 fide and actual, whether in marble  
 or in flesh — not an imitation or  
 resemblance of form, but real form.  
 The chalk outline of the bough of a  
 tree on paper, is not an imitation;  
 it looks like chalk and paper — not  
 like wood, and that which it sug-  
 gests to the mind is not properly  
 said to be like the form of a  
 bough, it is the form of a bough.  
 Now, then, we see the limits of an  
 idea of imitation; it extends only  
 to the sensation of trickery and  
 deception occasioned by a thing's  
 intentionally seeming different from  
 what it is; and the degree of the  
 pleasure depends on the degree of  
 difference and the perfection of the

resemblance, not on the nature of the  
 thing ~~resembled~~. The simple ple-  
 asure in the imitation would be  
 precisely of the same degree, (if the  
 accuracy could be equal) whether  
 the subject of it were the hero or  
 his horse. There are other colla-  
 teral sources of pleasure, which  
 are necessarily associated with this,  
 but that part of the pleasure which  
 depends on the imitation, ~~then~~ is  
 the same in both. (Ruskin's M. P. P. 18)  
 (B) Ideas of imitation, then, act by  
 producing the simple pleasure of sur-  
 prise, and that not of surprise in its  
 higher sense and function, but of the  
 mean and poltry surprise which  
 is felt in juggling jugglery. These  
 ideas and pleasures are the most con-  
 temptible which can be received from  
 art; first, because it is necessary  
 to their enjoyment, that the mind  
 should reject the impression and  
 address of the thing represented,

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and fix itself only upon the re-  
flexion that it is not what it ~~seems~~  
seems to be. All high or noble  
emotion or thought are thus rendered  
physically impossible, while the mind  
exults in what is very like a str-  
ictly sensual pleasure. We may con-  
sider tears as a result of agony or  
of art, whichever we please, but not  
of both at the same moment. If  
we are surprised by them as an  
attainment of the one, it is impo-  
ssible we can be moved by them  
as a sign of the other.

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ハ訓大  
+ハ子音+ハ  
カハハ  
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カハハ

Ideas of imitation are contemptible  
in the second place, because not  
only do they preclude the spectator  
from ~~enjoyment inherent~~ enjoying in-  
herent beauty in the subject, but  
they can only be received from  
mean and paltry subjects, because  
it is impossible to imitate anything  
really great. We can paint a  
cat or a fiddle, so that ~~they look~~

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They look as if we could take them  
up; but we cannot imitate the ocean  
or the Alps. We can imitate fruit,  
but not a tree; flowers, but not  
a pasture; cut-glass, but not the  
rainbow. All pictures in which  
deceptive powers of imitation are dis-  
played are therefore either of contem-  
~~ptible~~ ptible subjects, or have the imitation  
shown in contemptible parts of them,  
bits of dress, jewels, furniture, etc.

Thirdly, these ideas are contemptible,  
because no ideas of power are associ-  
ated with them; to the ignorant, imi-  
tation, indeed, seems difficult, and its  
success praiseworthy, but even they  
can by no possibility see more in  
the artist than they do in a jug-  
gler, who arrives at a strange end  
by means with which they are un-  
acquainted. To the ~~not~~ instructed,  
The juggler ~~is~~ is by far the more  
respectable artist of the two, for  
they know sleight of hand to be ~~not~~

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442 頁  
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an art of immensely more difficult  
acquisition, and to imply more  
ingenuity in the artist than a  
power of deceptive imitation in  
painting, which requires nothing more  
for its attainment than a true eye,  
a steady hand, and moderate in-  
dustry — qualities which in no de-  
gree separate the imitative artist  
from a watch-maker, pin-maker,  
or any other neat-handed arti-  
ficer. These remarks do not apply  
to the art of the Diorama, or the  
stage, where the pleasure is not  
dependent on the imitation, but  
is the same which we should re-  
ceive from nature herself, only  
far inferior in degree. It is a  
noble pleasure; but we shall see  
in the course of our investi-  
gation, both that it is inferior to  
that which we receive when  
there is no deception at all, and  
why it is so. (Ruskin's M.P. Vol. P. 1920)

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(英) — I prefer saying "that it is not  
what it seems to be," to saying "that  
it seems to be what it is not," be-  
cause we ~~per~~ perceive at once what  
it seems to be, and the idea of imi-  
tation, and the consequent plea-  
sure, result from the subsequent  
perception of its being something else  
— flat, for instance, when we  
thought it was round. (Ruskin M.P. Vol. P. 20)

(英) The word truth, as applied to  
art, signifies the faithful state-  
ment, either to the mind or to  
senses of any fact of nature.  
We receive an idea of truth, then,  
when we perceive the faithfulness  
of such a statement.

The difference between ideas of truth  
and of imitation lies chiefly in the  
following points.

First, — Imitation can only be  
of some something material, but truth  
has reference to statements both  
of the qualities of material things.



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and of emotions, impressions, and thoughts. There is a moral as well as material truth, — a truth of impression as well as of form, — of thought as well as of matter; and the truth of impression and thought is a thousand times the more important of the two. Hence, truth is a term of universal application, but imitation is limited to that narrow field of art which takes cognizance ~~and~~ only of material things.

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Secondly, — Truth may be stated by any signs or symbols which have a definite signification in the minds of those to whom they are addressed, although such signs be themselves no image nor likeness of anything. Whatever can excite in the mind the conception of certain facts, can give ideas of truth, though it be in no degree the imitation or resemblance of those

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Perceptive  
truth、一、一  
一、一、一

facts. If there be — we ~~do~~ do not say there is, — but if there be in painting anything which operates, as words do, not by resembling anything, but by being taken as a symbol and substituted for it, and thus inducing the effect of it, then this channel of communication can convey uncorrupted truth, though it do not in any degree resemble the facts whose conception it induces. But ideas of imitation, of course, require the likeness of the object. They speak to the perceptive faculties only; truth to the conceptive.

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Thirdly, — And in consequence of what is above stated, an idea of truth exists in the statement of one attribute of anything, but an idea of imitation requires the resemblance of as many attributes as we are usually cognizant of in its real presence. A pencil outline of the bough of a tree on white paper

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is a statement of a certain number of facts of form. It does not yet amount to the imitation of anything. The idea of that form is not given in nature by lines at all, still less by black lines ~~set~~ with a white space between them. But those lines ~~do~~ convey to the mind a distinct impression of a certain number of facts, which ~~it~~ it recognizes as agreeable with its previous impressions of the bough of a tree; and it receives, therefore, an idea of truth. If, instead of two lines, we give a dark form with the brush, we convey information of a certain relation of shade ~~to~~ between the bough and sky recognizable for another idea of truth; but we have still no imitation, for the white paper is not the least like air, nor the black shadow like wood. It is not ~~still~~ until after a

certain number of ideas of truth have been collected together, that we arrive at an idea of imitation. (Ruskin's M.P. Vol P. 21-2)

== (#) Hence it might at first sight appear, that an idea of imitation, inasmuch as several ideas of truth were united in it, was nobler than a simple idea of truth. And if it were necessary that the ideas of truth should be perfect, or should be subjects of contemplation as such, it would be so. But, observe, we require to produce the effect of imitation only so many and such ideas of truth as the senses are usually cognizant of. Now the senses are not usually, nor unless they be especially devoted to the service, cognizant, ~~with~~ with accuracy, of any truths but those of space and projection. It requires long ~~and~~ study and attention before they give certain evidence of even the

simplest truths of form. — Although therefore, something resembling the real form is necessary to deception, this something is not to be called a truth of form; for, strictly speaking, there are no degree of truth, there are only degree of approach to it; and an approach to it, whose feebleness and imperfection would instantly offend and give pain to a mind really capable of distinguishing truth, is yet quite sufficient for all the purposes of deceptive imagination. It is the same with regard to color — — — — The only facts then, which we are usually and certainly cognizant of, are those of distance and projection, and if these be tolerably given, with something like truth of form and color to assist them, the idea of imitation is complete. (Ruskin's M.P. Vol. I. p. 22-3)

— We shall see, ~~the~~ in the course of our investigation of ideas of truth,

that ideas of imitation not only do ~~deceive~~, ~~are~~ not imply their presence, but even are inconsistent with it; and that pictures which imitate so as to deceive, are never true. But this is not the place for the proof of this; at present we have only to insist on the last and greatest distinction between ideas of truth and of imitation — that the mind, in receiving one of the former, dwells upon its own conception of the fact, or form, or feeling stated, and is occupied only with the qualities and characters of that fact or form, considering it as real and existing, being all the while totally regardless of the signs or symbols by which the notion of it has been conveyed. These signs have no pretence, nor hypocrisy, nor legerdemain about them; — there is nothing to be found out, or sifted, or surprised in them; — they bear their

message simply and clearly, and it is that message which the mind takes ~~from them~~ from them and dwells upon, regardless of the language in which it is delivered. But the mind, in receiving an idea of imitation, is wholly occupied in finding out that what has been suggested to it is not what it appears to be; it does not dwell on the suggestion, but ~~on~~ on the perception that it is a false suggestion: it derives its pleasure, not from the contemplation of a truth, but from the discovery of a falsehood. So that the moment ideas of truth are grouped together, so as to give rise to an idea of imitation they change their very nature — lose their essence as ideas of truth — and are corrupted and degraded, so as to share in the treachery of what have they produced. Hence, finally, ideas of truth are the foundation,

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and ideas of imitation The destruction, of all art, (Ruskin's M.P. Vol. P. 20)  
 (註) But although everything in nature is more or less beautiful, every species of object has its own kind and degree of beauty; some being in their own kind and nature more beautiful than others, and few, if any, individuals ~~possessing~~ possessing the utmost degree of beauty of which the species is capable. This utmost degree of specific beauty, ~~necessarily~~ necessarily ~~is~~ consistent with the utmost perfection of the object in other respects, is the ideal of the object. (Ruskin's M.P. Vol. P. 20)  
 (註) It cannot but be evident from the above division of the ideas conveyable by art, that the landscape painter must always have two great and distinct ends; the first, to induce in the spectator's mind the faithful conception of any natural objects

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~~whatsoever~~ whatsoever; the second, to guide the ~~of~~ spectator's mind to those objects most worthy of its contemplation, and to inform him of the thoughts and feelings with which these were regarded by the artist himself.

In attaining the first end, the painter only places the spectator where he stands himself; he sets him before the landscape and leaves him. The spectator is alone. He may follow out his own thoughts as he would in the natural solitude, or he may remain untouched, unreflecting and regardless, as ~~he~~ his disposition may incline him. But he has nothing of thought given to him, no new ideas, no ~~but~~ unknown feelings, forced on his attention or his heart. The artist is his conveyance, not his companion, — his horse, not his friends. But in attaining the

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second end, the artist not only places the spectator, but talks to him; makes him a sharer in his own strong feelings and quick thoughts; hurries him away in his own enthusiasm; guides him to all that is beautiful; snatches him from all that is base, and leaves him more than delighted, — ennobled and instructed, under the sense of having not only beheld a new scene, but of having held ~~some~~ communion with a new mind, and having been endowed for a time with the keen perception and the impetuous emotion of a nobler and more penetrating intelligence. (Ruskin's M.R. Vol R 442-5)

(譯) Observe, however, I do not mean by excluding direct exertion of the intellect from ideas of beauty, to assert that beauty has no effect upon, nor connection with the intellect. All our

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moral feelings are so involved with our intellectual powers, that we cannot affect the one, without in some degree addressing the other; and in all high ideas of beauty, it is more than probable that much of the pleasure depends on delicate and untraceable perceptions of fitness, propriety, and relation, which are purely intellectual, and through which we arrive at our noblest ideas of what is commonly and rightly called "intellectual beauty." But there is yet no immediate exertion of the intellect; that is to say, if a person receiving even the noblest ideas of simple beauty be asked why he likes the object exciting them, he will not be able to give any distinct reason, nor to trace in his mind any formed thought, to which he can appeal as a source of pleasure.

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He will say that the thing gratifies, fills, hallows, exalts his mind, but he will not be able to say why, or how. If he can, and if he can show that he perceives in the object any expression of distinct thought, he has received more than an idea of beauty — it is an idea of relation. (Ruskin's M.P. Vol 1 P. 27)

(第) — It is not true that Poetry does not concern herself with minute details. It is not true that the high art seeks only the invariable. It is not true that imitative art is an easy thing. It is not true that the faithful rendering of nature is an employment in which "the slowest intellect is likely to succeed best." All these successive assertions are utterly false and untenable, while the plain truth, a truth lying at the very door, has

# Burke

all the ~~still~~ while escaped him, — that which was incidentally stated in the preceding chapter, — namely, that the difference ~~between~~ between great and mean art lies, not in definable methods of handling, or styles of representation, or choices of subjects, but wholly in the nobleness of the end to which ~~the~~ the effort of the painter is addressed. (Ruskin's M.P. Vol 3 P. 22)

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(註) On the whole, the qualities of beauty, as they are merely sensible qualities, are the following; First, to be comparatively small. Secondly, to be smooth. Thirdly, to have a variety in the direction of the parts; but fourthly, to have those parts not angular, but melted as it were into each other. Fifthly, to ~~see~~ be of a delicate frame, without any remarkable appearance of strength. Sixthly, to have its colours clear

# Schiller

and bright, but not very strong and glaring. Seventhly, or if it should have any glaring colour, to have it diversified with others. These are, I believe, the properties on which beauty depends; properties that operate by nature, and are less liable to be altered by caprice, or confounded by a diversity of tastes, than any other. (Burke's Sublime & beautiful P. 129-130)

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美、優、  
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P 7

(註) There are moments in life when nature inspires us with a sort of love and respectful emotion, not because she is pleasing to our senses, or because she ~~sets~~ satisfies our mind or our taste (it is often the very opposite that happens), but merely because she is nature. This feeling is often elicited when nature is considered in her plants, in the mineral kingdom, in rural districts; also in the case of human nature, in the case of children,

and in the manners of country people and ~~to~~ of the primitive races. Every man of refined feeling when he walks out under the open sky, when he ~~has~~ lives in the country, or when he stops to contemplate the monuments of early ages; in short, when escaping from factitious situations and relations, he finds himself suddenly face to face with nature. ----- It is ~~tot~~ taken for granted that no affection exists in the matter, and moreover that no accidental interest comes into play. But this sort of interest which we take in nature is only possible under two conditions. First the object that inspired us with this feeling must be really nature, or something we take # for nature; secondly, this object must be in the full sense of the word simple, that is, presenting the

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entire contrast of nature with art, all the advantage remaining on the side of nature. Directly this second condition is united to the first, but no sooner, nature assumes the character of simplicity. Considered thus, nature is for us nothing but existence in all its freedom; it is the constitution of things taken in themselves; it is existence itself according to its proper and immutable laws. It is strictly necessary that we should have this idea of nature, to take an interest in ~~phenomena~~ phenomena of this kind. If we conceive an artificial flowers so perfectly imitated that it has all the appearance of nature and would produce the most complete illusion, or if we imagine the imitation of simpli-



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二 行 道 長  
655 心 或  
1 15 定 十 9  
直 道 = 20  
2732 二 行  
概 念 =  
200 + 9

city carried out to the extremest degree, the instant we discover it is only an imitation, the feeling of which I have been speaking is completely destroyed. It is, therefore, quite evident that this kind of satisfaction which nature causes us to feel is ~~not~~ a satisfaction of the ~~aesthetical~~ aesthetical taste, but a satisfaction of the moral sense; for it is produced by means of a conception and not immediately by the single fact of intuition: accordingly it is by no means determined by the different degrees of beauty in forms. For, after all, is there anything so ~~specially~~ specially charming in a flower of common appearance, in a spring, a moss-covered stone, the warbling of birds, or the buzzing of bees &c. ? It ~~is not~~ is not these objects in themselves; it is an idea represented by them

其 子 物 1  
idea 7 姓  
4 + 1 大  
恨 - 昆 行  
存 200 様  
7 姓 4 + 1  
之 手 白 望  
1 物 1  
其 人 7 行  
其 幼 時 1  
其 母 記 憶  
7 友 友 地  
400 + 9 又  
一 方 = 概 1 1  
其 人 1 理  
其 母 記 憶  
其 母 1 理  
其 母 1 理  
其 母 1 理  
其 母 1 理  
其 母 1 理

that we love in them. We love in them life and its latent action, the effects peacefully produced by beings of themselves, existence ~~in~~ under its proper laws, the ~~inmost~~ inmost necessity of things, the eternal unity of their nature. These objects which ~~capture~~ captivate us are what we were, what we must be again some day. We were nature as they are; and culture, following the way of reason and of liberty, must bring us back to nature. Accordingly these objects are an image of our infancy, irrevocably past — of our infancy ~~of~~ which will remain eternally very dear to us, and thus they infuse a certain melancholy into us; they are also the image of our highest perfection in the ideal world, whence they excite a sublime emotion in ~~the~~ us.

(Schiller's Essays — simple and sentimental poetry)

(美) --- It is the condition of the simple that nature should triumph over art, either unconsciously to the individual and against his inclination, or with his full and entire cognizance. In the former case it is simplicity as a surprise, and the impression resulting from it is one of ~~great~~ gaiety; in the second case, it is simplicity of feeling, and we are moved.

With regard to simplicity as a surprise, the person ~~must~~ must ~~be~~ be morally capable of denying nature. In simplicity of feeling the person may be morally incapable of this, but we must not think him physically incapable, in order that ~~it~~ it may make upon us the impression ~~of~~ of the simple. This is the reason

白笑 妙  
如 草 草  
外 十 區  
ア 不 止  
区 外 二  
ア 行 事  
二 伴 行 事  
又 小 區 傍  
上 學 外 十  
ア 行

入 区 1 区  
外 十 區  
白 箭 十 區  
artful 十 區  
ア 行 事  
ア 行 事  
ア 行 事  
ア 行 事

why the acts and words of children only produce the impression of simplicity upon us when we forget that they are physically incapable of artifice, and in general only when we are exclusively impressed by the contrast between their natural character and what is artificial in us. Simplicity is a childlike ingenuousness which is encountered when it is not expected; and it is for this very reason that, taking the word in its strictest sense, simplicity could not be attributed to childhood properly speaking. (Schiller's Essay — simple and sentimental poetry)

区 十 區  
本 区 1 區  
十 十 區  
life 十 區  
理 性 的 本  
区 1 區

(註) The object of the sensuous instinct, expressed in a universal conception, is named Life in the widest acceptance ~~acceptation~~ acceptation: that a conception that expresses all material existence and all that is immediately present in the sen-

Life of all material existence

form 形式

play instinct  
1. sense 1  
form 1 形式  
living form  
形式 形式

living form 形式  
life 生命  
form 形式  
living form 形式

ses. The object of the formal instinct, expressed in a universal conception, is called shape or form, as well in an exact as in an inexact acceptation; a conception that embraces all formal qualities of things and all relations of the same to the thinking powers. The object of the play instinct, represented in a general statement, may therefore bear the name of living form; a term that serves to describe all aesthetic qualities of phenomena, and what people style, in the widest sense, Beauty. Beauty is neither extended to the whole field of all living things nor merely enclosed in this field. A marble block, though it is and remains lifeless, can nevertheless become a living form by the architect and sculptor; a man, though he lives and has a form, is far from being a living form

形式 形式  
形式 形式  
形式 形式  
形式 形式  
形式 形式

形式 形式  
形式 形式  
形式 形式  
形式 形式  
形式 形式  
形式 形式

on that account, For this to be the case, it is necessary that his form should be life, and that his life should be a form. As long as we only think of his form, it is lifeless, a mere abstraction; as long as we only feel his life, it is without form, a mere impression. It is only when his form lives in our feeling, and his life in our understanding, he is the living form, and this will everywhere be the case where we judge him to be beautiful. (Schiller's Essay — Aesthetical Letters XV) (格) — — The reason, on transcendental grounds, makes the following demand: There shall be a communion between the formal impulse and the material impulse — that is, there shall be a play instinct — because it is only the unity of reality with the form, of the accidental with the necessary, of the passive state with freedom,

in huma-  
nity, 人  
性

that the conception of humanity is completed, Reason is obliged to make this demand, because her nature impels her to completeness and to the removal of all bounds; while every exclusive activity of one or the other impulse leaves human nature incomplete and places a limit in it. Accordingly, as soon as reason issues the ~~same time the~~ mandate, "a humanity shall exist," it proclaims at the same time the law, "Here shall be a beauty."

(Schiller's Essay — Aesthetic Letter XIV)

Nature  
of man =  
reality  
of nature  
形は=位  
心は=力  
知は=心  
知は=心  
心は=心

(英) It is nature herself which raises man from reality ~~from~~ to appearance by endowing him with two senses which only lead him to the knowledge of the real through appearance. In the eye and the ear ~~the~~ the organs of the senses are already freed from the persecutions of nature, and the object with ~~us~~ which we are immediately in contact

耳, 目, 舌  
(全P)

through the animal senses is remoter from ~~the~~ us. What we see by the eye differs from what we feel; for the understanding to reach objects overleaps the light which separates us from them. In truth, we are passive to an object; in sight and hearing the object is a form we create. ~~While~~ While still a savage, man only enjoys through touch merely aided by sight and ~~some~~ sound. He either does not rise to perception through sight, or does not rest there. As soon as he begins to enjoy through sight, vision has an independent ~~value~~ value, ~~so~~ he is aesthetically free, and the instinct of play is developed.

Appearance  
y 心は=目  
寫真心識  
一葉心也  
心は=目

形は=位  
心は=力  
知は=心  
知は=心  
心は=心

The instinct of play likes appearance, and directly it is awakened it is followed by the formal imitative instinct which treats appearance as an independent thing. Directly man has

主として  
藝術の  
造形  
formの  
伴の引  
〜の考  
「の」  
の  
〜

come to distinguish the appearance from the reality, the form from the body he can separate, in fact ~~the~~ he has already done so. Thus the faculty of the art of imitation is given with the faculty of form in general. The inclination that draws us to it reposes on another ~~tendency~~ tendency I have not to notice here. The exact period when the aesthetic instinct, or that of art, develops, depends entirely on the attraction that mere appearance has for men.

As every real existence proceeds from nature as a foreign power, whilst every appearance comes in the first place from man as a percipient subject, he only uses his absolute sight in separating semblance from essence, and arranging according to subjective law. With an unbridled liberty he can unite what nature has severed, pro-

vided he can imagine his union, and he can separate what nature has united, provided this separation can take place in his intelligence. Here ~~nothing~~ nothing can be sacred to him but his own law: the only condition imposed upon him is to respect the border which separates his own sphere from the existence of things or from the ~~realm~~ realm of nature.

This ~~the~~ human right of ruling exercised by man in the art of appearance, and his success in extending the empire of the beautiful, and the guarding the frontiers of truth, will be in proportion with the strictness with which he separates form from substance: for if he frees appearance from reality he must also do the converse. But man possesses sovereign ~~power~~ power only in the world of appearance, in the unsubstantial realm

人何、  
概之符、  
範圍、  
appearance  
= 出現  
好、ideal  
= 存在、  
階、  
已、  
本、  
區、  
十、

of 'imagination, only by abstaining from giving being to appearance in theory, and by giving it being in practice. It follows that the poet transgresses his proper limits when he attributes being to his ideal, and when he gives this ideal aim as a determined existence. For he can only reach this result by exceeding his right as a poet, that of encroaching by the ideal on the field of experience, and by pretending to determine real existence in virtue of a simple possibility, or else he renounces his right as poet by letting experience encroach on the sphere of the ideal, and by restricting possibility to the conditions of reality.

reality、  
自由、  
好、  
十、  
人、  
劃、

It is only by being frank on disclaiming all reality, and by being independent or doing without reality, that the appearance is aesthetic. Directly it apes reality, ~~that the appearance~~ or needs re-

投、  
也、  
物、  
unreal、  
心、  
行、  
得、  
reality、  
善、  
已、  
國、  
十、  
画、  
十、  
善、  
画、  
life、  
十、  
十、  
十、  
十、

ality for effect it is nothing more than a vile instrument for material ends, and can prove nothing for the freedom of the mind. Moreover, the object in which we find beauty need not be unreal if our judgment disregards this reality; for if it regards this the judgment is no longer aesthetic. A beautiful woman if living would ~~not~~ no doubt please us as ~~much~~ much and rather more than an equally beautiful ~~woman~~ woman seen in painting; but what makes the former please men is not her being an independent appearance; she no longer pleases the pure aesthetic feeling ~~feeling~~ feeling. In the painting, life must only attract as an appearance, and reality as an idea. But it is certain that to feel in a living object only the pure appearance requires a greatly higher aesthetic culture than to do without life in the appearance. (Schiller's Essay

Ladd

Letter XXVI)

美學之感  
藝術之美  
後二五〇  
元一三五五  
一五三三二  
善ヲ善ノ  
化規トシ  
中ハニヤ  
ノ定義ニテ  
ニ也ナリ  
ニ

(善) ---- Nothing can be regarded as beautiful — the ideal of beauty can never be realized — except as it is concretely presented to the senses or to the imagination, ~~in~~ in pictorial form, for contemplation; and unless on being contemplated, it produces that characteristic form of happiness which we may call aesthetic, within the contemplative mind. The beautiful must be actually agreeable, whether its entire essence be held to consist in being agreeable, or not. If we speak of the beautiful as an idea, or an ideal, we must admit the correctness (though not necessarily the completeness) of Hegel's definition of beauty, — "The sensible manifestation of the idea."

The peculiar play of the imagination ~~of~~ to which beautiful objects constructively appeal is not simply constructive of these objects. It is projective of projective of the life of the soul affected

善ヲ感ス  
心ハ善ニ  
Constructively  
ノ想像力  
ヲ感スニハ

トシテ又  
projective  
ノ想像力  
ヲ感スニ  
我ノlifeノ  
想像ノlife  
ニ感ス  
善ヲ感ス  
心ハ善ニ  
Constructively  
ノ想像力  
ヲ感スニハ

with with the aesthetic feeling into into the life of the object. The beautiful in any high degree, intelligently appreciated, implies a communion of life, a sympathy of being between its life and the life of the soul. Nothing dead, or conceived of as dead, can appear beautiful to the living contemplating mind. ---- What we cannot, by imagination, project ~~out~~ ourselves into as sharing with us a common life, that we cannot regard as beautiful: so essential is ~~sympathetic~~ activity of the imagination. ---- If the object be a natural object, the imagination considers the soul-life of nature to be ~~revealed~~ revealed, in some form, in the object. The same thing is true of every beautiful object of artistic production. This sympathetic ~~production~~ projection of imagination is then characteristic of the activity of the mind in the

〜ケル 似  
ハ美ヲ愛  
ノ化祝ト  
ニ  
國事美ノ  
條件ヲ愛  
化ノ國和  
トニケル長  
變化ノ油  
トハ  
變化ガ自限  
ニハハ  
ニハハ  
美ノニ  
件ニ  
凡ク實在ノ  
變化ハ皆  
自限ニテ  
〜  
ニハハ  
ニハハ  
ニハハ

presence of those objects which it calls beautiful. The philosophical aesthetics of Hegel and his school insists upon the presence of some recognizable idea in every beautiful object. Theories of the beautiful in general are accustomed to ~~note~~ note the truth that a ~~unity~~ unity in variety belongs to the nature of the beautiful. If we recur to the results of analysis in the chapter upon Metaphysics, we find that these two forms of statement imply essentially the same experience regarding all reality. The only real unity is obtained by the series of changes through which it passes, by some immanent idea. Now, no object, whether a product of artistic effort or a natural product, which is regarded as subject to unregulated changes, ~~can~~ can be esteemed beautiful. Indeed, strictly speaking, no such object can really exist; on such assumed

九章十

being could become an object to the human mind. Chaos is not beautiful, — would not be beautiful if it were conceivable. Disorder is not beautiful. The beautiful object may, indeed, appear lacking in perfect symmetry; it may appear the more beautiful on account of this lack. But this is because the lack itself is expressive of a natural and joyous spontaneity of movement; while perfect symmetry is liable to appear artificial and forced. Moreover, we have already seen that every beautiful object must appear capable of varied life; it falls under the category of change. But the change cannot be unlimited change, ~~with~~ with no idea or end in view. ~~Final~~ Finality, or the self-limitation of the object according to some idea, appears then to be a necessary factor, or "moment," in every beautiful thing.



第14号  
"life-like"  
~ P. 1)

A more careful consideration of these characteristics of all beautiful objects seems to show that they are such as be possessed — at least in that form and fulness which is necessary to ~~awaken~~ ~~be~~ awaken aesthetical feeling — only by what has life. Indeed, if we were compelled to sum up in a word those characteristics which entitle certain things rather than others to be called beautiful, we should say: It is their "lifelikeness", their fulness of life. Thus does an analysis of the beautiful object lead us around to a conclusion similar to that suggested by an analysis of the state of feeling for the beautiful. This state of feeling was found to be dependent upon an activity of imagination in projecting psychical life into the object contemplated. We now find that, if any objects are to be regarded as really beautiful, they

是=我  
/ 思=物  
到=生=气  
/ 思=物  
主=看=的  
+ 11 对=物  
实=生=气  
/ 11 完=音=的  
/ 第=11

批注  
/ 各=部=分

they must in reality possess the characteristics of ~~the~~ psychical life. ~~Either~~ Either, then, the beautiful is merely subjective, is only a state of pleasurable feeling in the mind of beholder, ~~or~~ or else the object contemplated and esteemed beautiful is itself possessed of such characteristics as entitle it to be called a form of life. The sympathetic communion of our life with other life is necessary to the appreciation ~~to the~~ of the beautiful. If this communion is only a fancy of the mind with respect to the object, and if the object is not in reality possessed ~~of~~ of these characteristics, then we cannot speak of the objectively beautiful, whether in nature or in art. (Ladd's Introduction to Philosophy — Aesthetics) (\*) The ~~the~~ department of philosophical discipline we divide according to the character and interrelation of the great problems proposed to it by the

particular sciences, in the manner shown by the following tabulated scheme:

Real (哲學) I. Philosophy of the Real (Metaphysics, in the wider meaning of the word).

- 1. Theory of Knowledge (Noetics, or Epistemology).
- 2. Metaphysics (Ontology, in the wider meaning of the word).
  - A. Philosophy of Nature.
  - B. Philosophy of Mind.

Ideal (哲學) II. Philosophy of the Ideal (Ideology, or Rational Teleology).

- 1. Ethics (which considers the Ideal of Conduct, — Metaphysics of Ethics, Moral Philosophy, or Practical Philosophy).
- 2. Aesthetics (which considers the Ideal of Art).

Ideal-Real (哲學) III. The Supreme Ideal-Real (The Philosophy of Religion). (Ladd's Introduction to Philo)

(→) Every one knows the difference between imagining a thing and believing in its existence, between supposing a proposition and acquiescing in its truth. In the case of acquiescence or belief, the object

信念  
emotion  
感情  
+ 知 = 知  
= 感情  
一致  
一致 = 7  
consent  
一致  
而此是  
active side  
信即 + 信  
一致

is not only apprehended by the mind, but is held to have reality. Belief is thus the mental state or function of cognizing reality.

----- In its ~~inner~~ inner nature, belief, or the sense of reality, is a sort of feeling more allied to the emotions than to anything else. Mr Bagehot distinctly calls it the 'emotion' of conviction. I just <sup>now</sup> spoke of it as acquiescence. It resembles more than anything what in the psychology of volition we know as consent. Consent is recognized by all to be a manifestation of our active nature. It would naturally be described by such terms as 'willingness' or the turning of our disposition. What characterizes both consent and belief is the cessation of theoretic agitation, through the advent of an idea which is inwardly stable, and fills the mind solidly to the exclusion of contradictory

信ヲ西  
若、信ニ  
以、信ニ  
行、信ニ  
知、信ニ  
ニ、ニ  
 disbelief  
.. belief  
一、信ニ  
天、信ニ  
ニ、ニ  
- belief  
- 信ニ  
心、信ニ  
ニ、  
belief  
若、信ニ  
.. doubt  
+、ニ  
doubt  
emotion  
天、信ニ

ideas. When this is the case, motion effects are apt to follow. Hence the states of consent and belief, characterized by repose on the purely intellectual side, are both intimately connected with subsequent practical activity. This inward stability of the mind's content is as characteristic of disbelief as of belief. But we shall presently see that we never ~~disbelieve~~ disbelieve anything except for the reason that we believe something ~~else~~ which contradicts the first thing. Disbelief is thus an incidental complication to belief, and need not be considered by itself. The true opposites of belief, psychologically considered, are doubt and inquiry, not disbelief. In both these states the content of our mind is in unrest, and the emotion of belief itself engendered thereby is, like the emotion of be-

十、信ニ  
心、信ニ  
信、信ニ  
+、信ニ  
信、信ニ  
種、信ニ  
信、信ニ  
信、信ニ  
信、信ニ

belief itself, perfectly distinct, but perfectly indescribable in words. Both sorts of emotion may be pathologically exalted. — There is, it is true, another pathological state which is as far removed from doubt as from belief, and which some may prefer to consider the proper contrary of the latter state of mind. I refer to the feeling that everything is hollow, unreal, dead. — The most important subuniverses commonly discriminated from each other and recognized by most of us as existing, each with its own special and separate style of existence, are the following: (1) The world of sense, or of physical things as we instinctively apprehended them, ~~which such~~ with such qualities as heat, color, and ~~some~~ sound, and such forces as life, chemical affinity, gravity, electricity, all existing as such within or on

第二科  
學界

the surface of the things.  
(2) The world of science, or of physical things as the learned conceive them, with secondary qualities and 'forces' (in the popular sense) excluded, and nothing real but solids and fluids and their 'laws' (i.e. custom) of motion.

第三科  
學界

(3) The world of ideal relations, or abstract truths believed or believable by all, and expressed in logical, mathematical, metaphysical, ethical, or aesthetic propositions.

第四科  
類 / 信仰  
界

(4) The world of 'idols of the tribe,' illusions or ~~pre~~ prejudices common to the race. All educated people recognized these as forming one sub-universe. The motion of the ~~sky~~ sky round the earth, for ~~example~~ example, belongs to this world. That motion is not a recognized item of any of other worlds; but as an 'idol of the tribe' it really exists. For certain philosophers

第五科  
有笑界

'matter' exists only as an idol of the tribe. For science, the 'secondary qualities' of matter are but 'idols' of the tribe.

(5) The various supernatural worlds, the Christian heaven and hell, the world of the Hindoo mythology, the world of Swedenborg's *visa et audita*, etc. Each of these is a consistent system, with definite relations among its own parts. Neptune's trident, e.g., has no status of reality whatever in the Christian heaven; but within the classic Olympus certain definite things are true of it, whether one believe in the reality of the classic mythology as a whole or not. The various worlds of deliberate fable may be ranked with these worlds of faith — the world of the Iliad, that of King Lear, of the Pickwick Papers, etc.

第六科  
指紋界  
第七科  
狂界

(6) The various worlds of individual opinion, as numerous as men are.  
(7) The worlds of sheer madness and

人、思想  
社会、事  
像、事、F  
一、实在、  
God、大  
宇宙、事、  
一、实在、  
一、部、一、事  
道、事、人  
一、部、一、事  
一、实在、  
Practical  
reality、  
3、事、一、事  
3、事、一、事  
interest  
一、事、一、事  
一、事、一、事  
2、事、一、事  
一、事、一、事  
一、事、一、事

vagary, also indefinitely numerous. . . .  
In all this the everlasting partiality of our nature shows itself, our inveterate propensity to choose. For, in the strict and ultimate sense of the word existence, everything which can be thought of at all exists as some sort of object, whether mythical object, individual thinker's object, or object in outer space and for intelligence at large. Errors, fictions, tribal beliefs, are parts of the whole great Universe which God has made, and He must have meant all these things to be in it, each in its respective place. But for us finite creatures, "tis to consider too curiously to consider so." The mere fact of appearing as an object at all is not enough to constitute reality. That may be metaphysical reality, reality for God; but what we need is practical reality, reality for ourselves; and,

to have that, an object must not only appear, but it must appear both interesting and important. The worlds whose objects are neither interesting nor important we treat simply negatively, we brand them as unreal.  
In the relative sense, then, the sense in which we contrast reality with simple unreality, and in which one thing is said to ~~have~~ have more reality than another, and to be more believed, reality means simply relation to our emotional and active life. This is the only sense which the word ever has in the mouths of practical men. In this sense, whatever exists and stimulates our interest is real; whenever an object so appeals to us that we turn to it, accept it, fill our mind with it, or practically take account of it, so far it is real for us, and we believe it. . . .

我レニ至  
 案(實)録  
 一ノ大ケ  
 事物ヲ實  
 トシテ  
 一ノ  
 物ノ實ト作  
 セラレハ  
 在ニテ  
 引リ得ル  
 引留メ  
 之レヲ社  
 会ノ條件  
 生ニ来ル  
 一ノ  
 知二格  
 知三  
 知四

Any relation to our mind at all, in the absence of a stronger relation, suffices to make an object real. The barest appeal to our attention is enough for that. ----- As a rule, the success with which a contradicted object maintains itself in our belief is proportional to several qualities which it must possess. Of these the one which would be put first by most people, ~~to~~ because it characterizes objects of sensation, is its -----  
 (1) Coerciveness over attention, or the mere power to possess consciousness; then follow -----  
 (2) Liveliness, or sensible pungency, especially in the way of exciting pleasure or pain;  
 (3) Stimulating effect upon the will, i.e., capacity to arouse active impulses, the more instinctive the ~~the~~ better;  
 (4) Emotional interest, as object of

知三  
 知四  
 知五  
 知六  
 知七  
 知八  
 知九  
 知十  
 知十一  
 知十二  
 知十三  
 知十四  
 知十五  
 知十六  
 知十七  
 知十八  
 知十九  
 知二十  
 知二十一  
 知二十二  
 知二十三  
 知二十四  
 知二十五  
 知二十六  
 知二十七  
 知二十八  
 知二十九  
 知三十

love, dread, admiration, ~~and~~ desire, etc.;  
 (5) Congruity with certain favorite forms of contemplation—unity, simplicity, permanence, and the like;  
 (6) Independence of other causes, and its own causal importance.  
 These characters run into each other. Coerciveness is the result of liveliness or emotional interest. What is lively and interesting stimulates *ex ipso* the will; congruity holds of active impulses as well as of contemplative forms; causal independence and importance suit a certain contemplative demand, etc. -----  
 As a whole, sensations are more lively and are judged more real than conceptions; things met with every hour more real than things seen once; attributes perceived when awake, more real than attributes perceived in a dream. -----  
 Sensible objects are thus either

our realities or the tests of our realities. Conceived objects must show sensible effects or else be disbelieved.

感性的  
諸力の  
在、條件  
十)

Sensible vividness or pungency is then the vital factor in reality when once the conflict between objects, and the connecting of them together in the mind, has begun.

意志と信  
仰との  
同一  
十)

Will and Belief, in short, meaning a certain relation between objects and the Self, are two names for one and the same psychological phenomenon. (James's psychology Vol. II. P. 283-321)

信仰、  
意志の  
主たる  
諸力の  
一、  
十)

The mental state termed Belief, while involving the Intellect and the Feeling, is, in its essential import, related to the Will.

The mental foundations of Belief are to be sought (1) in our Activity, (2) in the Intellectual Associations of our experience, and (3) in the Feelings. The spontaneity

of the moving organs is a source of action, the system being fresh, and here being no hindrance. Secondary, the additional Pleasure of Exercise is a ~~factor~~ factor prompting to activity. Thirdly, the memory of this pleasure is a motive to begin acting with a view to the fruition of it; the operation of the will being enlarged by an intellectual bond. These three facts sum up the active tendency of volition; the two first are impulses of pure activity; the third is supported by the retentive function of the intellect, (Bain's M.S. P. 371-377)

Higher  
feeling  
の、  
主たる  
諸力の  
一、  
十)

(4) Higher feelings have this peculiarity, that they depend not so much upon the subjective state of mind, as upon the valid and necessary qualities of what is felt. Here, therefore, we may point out the objects to which they relate, as well as distinguish the special content of the feelings. Such objects are

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之善善  
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above all the Truth, the Good, & the Beautiful (then, also, our own ego and egos).

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全作ト  
和ニシテ  
推テハ  
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The possibility of such feelings rests upon the fact that there are objects which are compounded, and whose parts have such a harmonious or unharmonious relation to one another that one needs only to give himself up freely to their apprehension in order to experience a furthering or an arrest of mental activity. Man's consciousness is of course the theater of these feelings; but the furthering or checking concepts involved do not come together by accident, but are rather already given with the object in their harmonious or inharmonious relations, without the need of ~~any~~ any subjective contribution.

真ノ物  
自國ノ上

Such an object we find in the Truth, with its antitheses falsehood and doubt, which together form

油ノ和ヲ  
カ知ル  
和ニシテ

the object of the intellectual feelings of pleasure or pain. Truth is the agreement of all our knowledge with itself, the parts with the whole, the subjects with their predicates. This agreement is not only known through the understanding, but is felt as pleasure in the truth. The furthering then we advance within the borders of truth, the more does this feeling appear as pleasure in investigation. But on the contrary, where we fall into contradictions with our notions, out of which we see no way; where we see unsolved problems before us, or where the objects of our inmost conviction are doubted or denied, there we shall not fail to find intellectual feelings of pain.

善ノ和  
油ノ和ヲ  
和ニシテ  
和ニシテ

The harmonies of truth with itself is the source of our intellectual feeling of pleasure; yet to perceive this harmony is given



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to him who does not spare himself the trouble of investigation within the borders of its objects, which are mostly abstract. But there is a class of objects which are not abstract but sensuous, and which manifest such harmony of parts that every unbiased observer experiences a feeling of pleasure when he yields himself to their contemplation in such a way that this harmony appeals immediately to the senses. Such objects are called beautiful, and the feeling to which they give rise is the feeling of the beautiful, or the aesthetic feeling.

The beautiful is distinguished from the true on account of its sense side, and in the case with the which every unbiased observer is able to apprehend the ~~same~~ harmony revealed in its composition. The relation between the

四角形  
六角形  
七角形  
八角形

three sides of the right-angled triangle, which the Pythagorean theorem reveals, shows a wonderfully harmonious relation existing among them; but this relation is not beautiful, because a look at the right-angled triangle does not reveal it; only a tedious calculation makes it an object of knowledge. On the other hand, the agreement of the octave with the keynote is beautiful, for we can hear it; and the harmony among the parts of the perfect ~~human~~ human form, for we can see it.

The ugly is the opposite of the beautiful. Objects are called ugly when in the composition of their parts instead of agreement or harmony, we find the opposite, and in such a way that this disharmony appeals immediately to the senses. An object which is not beautiful, is not on this account ugly; it may be aesthetically ~~it~~ indifferent.

Sully

A block of stone is neither beautiful nor ugly, ~~but may be~~ but may become either when formed by the sculptor. Every child perceives that a statue ~~with~~ with a hand ~~broken~~ broken off is ugly, because the harmony of the parts is disturbed. Just as the false is related to the true, so the ugly is to the beautiful. (Lindner's Psychology, P. 184-6)

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(11) This recent psychology draws no sharp distinction between perception and recollection. It finds in both ~~by~~ very much the same elements, though combined in a different way. Strictly speaking, indeed, perception must be defined as a presentative-representative operation. To the psychologist it comes to to very much the same thing whether, for example, on a visit to Switzerland, our minds are occupied in perceiving the distance of a mon-

Lindner

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tain or in remembering some pleasant excursion which made to it on a former visit. In both cases there is a reinstatement of the past, a reproduction of earlier experience, a process of adding to a present impression a product of imagination — taking this word in its widest sense. In both cases the same laws of reproduction or association are illustrated. (P. 10)

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On other words, the percept arises through the fusion of an actual sensation with mental representations or "images" of sensation. (P. 22) (Sully's Illusion)

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(11) It is Herbart's undying service to have revealed the secret of the beautiful by pointing out the fundamental aesthetic relations. The essence of the beautiful was thus placed in the form of the object. Whether this form alone comprises the basis for aesthetic pleasure, or

Kant.

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whether the latter is not rather to be sought in the content inclosed by this form, has recently formed the basis for a lively controversy between the Herbartian school and the adherents of Schelling and Hegel. This controversy is easily settled by the explanations of the foregoing paragraph. The beautiful object does indeed affect by its form, but the form is itself determined by the content, or the idea. Considered by itself, the idea has only a logical, never an aesthetical character (Plan of a house, content of a poem); the idea receives an aesthetic character, only when put into aesthetical form. Even the musically beautiful can not entirely free itself from the content, especially in the higher ~~private~~ kinds of music (sonata, symphony, tone-pictures, opera), even

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藝術  
美術  
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藝術  
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though it must be admitted that this content is less to be sought in a clear, logical idea, than in an obscure harmony of soul in the musician, which appeals to the hearer more as a matter of sensibility than as one of logical clearness. — The Herbartian school have shown themselves inclined to admit the content alongside of the form as a determining element in the beautiful. (Lindner's Psychology p. 193)

(著) In a product of beautiful art we must become conscious that it is Art and not Nature, but yet the purposiveness in its form must seem to be as free from all constraint of arbitrary rules as if it were a product of mere nature. On this feeling of freedom in the play of our cognitive faculties, which must at the same time be purposive,

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rests that pleasure which alone is universally communicable, without being based on concepts. Nature is beautiful because it looks like Art; and Art can only be called beautiful if we are conscious of it as Art while yet it looks like Nature. For whether we are dealing with natural or with artificial beauty we can say generally; that is beautiful which pleases in the mere act of judging it (not in the sensation of it, or by means of a concept). Now art has always a definite design of producing something. But if this something were bare sensation (something merely subjective), which is to be accompanied with pleasure, the product would please in the act of judgment only by sign were directed towards the production of a definite

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nite Object, then, if this were attained by art, the Object would only please by means of concepts. But in both cases the art would not please in the mere act of ~~judging~~ judging; i.e. it would not please as beautiful, but as mechanical. Hence the purposiveness in the product of beautiful art, although ~~designed~~ it is designed, must not seem to be designed; i.e. beautiful art must look like nature, although we are conscious of it as art. But a product of art appears like nature when, although its agreement with the rules, according to which alone ~~it~~ the product can be come what it ought to be, is punctiliously observed, yet this is not painfully apparent; (the form of the schools does not obtrude itself) — it shows ~~no~~ no trace of the rule having

Bosangnet

been before the eyes of the artist and having fettered his mental powers. (Kant's Critique of judgment)

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(註) The doctrine of aesthetic semblance is developed by Schiller out of Kant's account of ~~the~~ aesthetic form, which, in speaking of poetry, he also ~~described~~ described as a semblance (Schein) that is not deceptive. Schiller presses home this idea with considerable acuteness and with the full powers of his rhetoric and has thus made the Kantian distinction between beauty knowledge and practice a common-place of literature, although it can hardly be said that he derives from it any substantive truth which was not included in Kant's four paradoxes. Aesthetic semblance, he insists, is Honest, that is to say, makes no pretence at being more than semblance; and is independent, that is to say, is not

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such as to be capable of enhancement of the pleasure which it gives, through the real existence of the object simulated. Real objects may indeed be aesthetically contemplated, but only in as far as we distinguish their semblance from their existence. And this is a harder ~~task~~ task than to appreciate the work of art in which this separation is performed ready to our hand.

Thus aesthetic semblance is distinguished at once from deception, whether ~~sensuous~~ sensuous or logical, and from its appetitive or practical relation to reality; ~~by~~ and by emphasising from an ~~anthropological~~ anthropological standpoint ~~the~~ the gradual ~~growth~~ growth of an interest in the semblance, and the fact that all difficulties, apparently connected with ~~of~~ representative beauty, really arise not from the

unreality of the semblance, but from insufficient attention to its "honesty" — its confessed ~~to~~ unreality — he ~~paves~~ paves the way for a truer ~~conception~~ conception than Kant possessed of the relative value of natural and artistic beauty, and for a definite justification of the place held by the beautiful in civilised life. His paradox that man is civilised only in proportion as he has learnt to value the semblance above the (common-place practical) reality is a tremendous reversal of the position taken up by Plato, and was influential in the later course of post-Kantian speculation.

There is a difficulty in the psychological distinction which this doctrine of semblance may be held to involve. How can one kind of sense-perception be set down as semblance, and another as reality? Why should visual or auditory

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眼身の form 係一嗅味及音の感作りて一別て其の如し

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sensations be taken to belong to form, while those of taste, smell and touch are set down as giving sheer reality? Surely, the one group are as "objective" or "subjective" as the other! Schiller, though successful in the development of doctrines, is not helpful in exactly tracing their roots, and here he falls decidedly behind Kant. We saw that in Kant's account of the pleasure of simple sensations he at least faces this ~~ultimate~~ ~~difficult~~ ~~with~~ ultimate difficulty ~~with~~ with perfect candour. He treats aesthetic character as dependent on the presence of "form" in contrast with mere sensory stimulation. And "form," which is for him the essence of aesthetic semblance, is a property or nature in sensation distinguishable ~~of~~ from its mere existence as sense-stimulation. In ranking sensations

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according to aesthetic quality he therefore follows a principle which is at least intelligible, and probably contains the true basis of the distinction between the aesthetic and the nonaesthetic elements in ~~sense~~ sense. Schiller replaces this principle by a ~~more~~ more popular phrase. "Reality," he says, "is the work of things; semblance is the work of man." He may mean by this semblance the structural import of any perception; but clearly as it stands the antithesis tells us nothing, for every sensation is a reaction of our organism. His rhetoric expresses in striking phrases what we commonly assume, but does not help us to justify it, "In the eye and ear ~~agreed~~ aggressive matter is already hurled back from the sense, and the object is set at a distance from us, while

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in the animal senses we are directly in ~~not~~ contact with it." Here no attempt is made to point out in what characteristic of sensations the "form" resides, and what constitutes their "reality." The distinction between the aesthetic and the non-aesthetic senses, which was accepted as a fact by Plato's time, is simply assumed by Schiller. (Bosagnuet's Aesthetic History. P. 292-4) He points out with great acuteness how all subsequent tendencies of German aesthetic exist in ~~germ~~ germ within Kant's Critique of the Power of Judgment, and he distinguishes these tendencies as I. the Aesthetic of Content, including, 1. Idealism — abstract from Hegel to Carriere Schelling and Schopenhauer to Weise and Lotze, Concrete from Hegel to Carriere and Schasler — and 2. the Aesthetic of Feeling as in Kirchi-mann and Horwicz; II. the Aesthetic

Knight.

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of Formalism in Herbart and Fimmermann; and III. Eclecticism in Fechner. The distinction which he especially insists on, that between concrete and abstract Idealism, ~~dependent~~ depends on grasping or not grasping the essential doctrine of "Aesthetic show (Schein), viz. that beauty, though it symbolizes ideas, only exists in the concrete forms of sense and fancy, so that in speaking of an idea of beauty we are already on slippery ground, and in speaking of beauty as having existence in an abstract idea we fall into sheer nonsense. (Bosanquet's Aesthetic History p. 427)

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(註) Hartman's theory of aesthetic beauty is expressed in the word "Schein", to which he gives a peculiar meaning. The aesthetic shine is not either in outward objects (landscape, picture, air-vibrations, etc.) or in the mind. It ~~to see~~ is occasioned by outward objects, made by artists or otherwise, and is capa-

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
ble of summoning the "shine" before the mind of all normally constituted people. He ~~takes of~~ talks of eye-shine, ear-shine, imagination-shine, and in this "shine" only is beauty present. The subjective phenomenon alone is beautiful. No external reality is essential to it, provided only this aesthetic shine is set up by whatever means. In natural beauty, however, the shine cannot be diserved from the reality.

A painter sees the "shine" at once, as something different from the real object; so may we, if, for example, we look at a landscape with inverted head! This plan, however, does not answer in a room! It is only the subjective phenomena, however, abstracted from reality, that makes an aesthetic relation possible.

The shine does not pretend to be true, in any sense. We must avoid the expression "phenomenon", "appearance", in connection with it,



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as this suggests objective reality, which is quite irrelevant. The "shine" is not a mental perception, it does not deal with an idea, "the idea of the beautiful"; and no supersensuous idea of the beautiful is at all necessary. In fact, the pretensions of transcendental aesthetic have brought the study into disrepute. Shine is not the same as a picture, unless picture be taken in a psychical or intellectual sense; ~~otherwise~~ otherwise, a "picture" is a real thing, while "shine" is not. It is also to be distinguished from "form".

As a picture stands to the thing pictured, as form stands to substance, so does aesthetic ~~shine~~ shine stand to the ~~subject~~ subject. The subject disappears before it; not only do the interests of self disappear, but the very ego itself. The ~~aesthetic~~ aesthetic subject disappears from the subjective side of consciousness, and it em-

Woffling

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erges again on the objective side. The aesthetic "shine" is thus a disintegration of the ego, yet it is not an illusion. It is a reality of consciousness. Beauty reveals itself to us in a series of steps, but at the last it ~~remains~~ ~~is~~ remains a mystery, and without mystery there would be no beauty. There must be in every work of art, as well as in every material object that is beautiful, something that we feel but do not know, something that we apprehend but do not comprehend. ~~Stight~~ (Knight's Philosophy of the Beautiful, P. 81-4).

(1) But a further consequence of this is, that spontaneity, the power of self-movement, denotes only momentarily — not complete and continued — independence of external influences. Life depends ~~on~~ on a definite relation of reciprocity between the organism and its environment,

絶对の spontaneity 自发性

Spontaneity 自发性  
Irritability 刺激性  
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+ 量 + 質

and would soon come to end if this relation ~~was~~ were entirely suspended. — Absolute spontaneity would be a ~~sort~~ consumption of one's own fat, which could support life only for a brief space.

Spontaneity is only quantitatively different from irritability, the power of responding to external stimulation in a special manner, that is to say by a movement differing in strength and possibly in kind from the stimulus. Its independence becomes of value to the organism only through this power, which makes adaptation to circumstances to possible. The ultimate ~~exact~~ explanation of irritability also is to be looked for in organic process, and especially in the great instability of organic matter. Thus there are infinitesimal forces, producing the greatest effects on the retina and in the brain, and

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~~occasions~~ occasioning muscular contractions or chemical processes within the organism. (Hoffding, P. 309)

(→) No consciousness, as already frequently observed, can be conceived that is ~~resolved~~ resolvable into absolutely simple, momentary sensations. A certain degree of memory, and with it a certain duality, a weaker or stronger opposition between two currents, must always be assumed. But the relation between the two currents may vary to infinity. We have already seen that the opposition between ~~sensation~~ sensations perception and thought passes through a whole scale of degrees, and that the same is true of the opposition between elementary and ideal feelings. In the province of the will a ~~similar~~ similar opposition is met with: between instinct and volition ~~for~~



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consciousness of the past. Thus far Sir W. Hamilton agrees with Reid, who holds that memory is of the past, consciousness only of the present. Reid, however, is of opinion that memory is an immediate knowledge of the past, exactly as consciousness is an immediate knowledge of the present. Sir W. Hamilton contends that this opinion of Reid is "not only false" but involves a contradiction in terms. Memory is an act, and an act exists only in the now. It can therefore be cognizant only of what now is. In the case of memory, what now is, is not the thing remembered, but a present representation of it in the mind, which representation is the sole object of consciousness. We are aware of the past, not immediately, but mediately, through

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the representation. "An act of memory, is merely a present state of mind, which we are conscious of, not as absolute, but as relative to, and representing, another state of mind, and accompanied with the belief that the state of mind, as now represented, has actually been...". So far is memory from being an immediate knowledge of the past, that it is at best only a mediate knowledge of the past; that ~~it is~~ while in philosophical propriety, it is not a knowledge of the past at all, but a knowledge of the present, and a belief of the past. It appears, then, that the true definition of consciousness in Sir W. Hamilton's use of the term, would be immediate knowledge, and he expressly says, consciousness

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and immediate knowledge are thus  
terms universally convertible;  
and if there be an immediate  
knowledge of things external,  
there is consequently the consciousness  
of an outer world. Immediate  
 knowledge, again, he treats  
 as universally convertible with  
intuitive knowledge; and the terms  
 are really equivalent. We know  
 intuitively, what we know by  
 its own evidence — by direct  
 apprehension of the fact, and  
 not through the medium of a  
 previous knowledge of something  
 from which we infer it. (Stewart  
 Mill's Examination of Hamilton)

(30) Landscape gardening, broad in  
 its sensual appeal, is restricted in  
 its spiritual address. All the  
 varied impressions of the mind made  
 through the eye, the beautiful, the  
 grand, the picturesque, the novel, the  
 grotesque, the tragic and the comic

belong to this art. Moreover ~~the~~  
 in Landscape gardening other  
 organs than the eye ~~and~~ are ma-  
 de the medium of ~~appeal~~ appeal;  
 the garden being designed to de-  
 light by its fragrant odors, its  
 luscious flavours, its refreshing  
 coolness, and its grateful mu-  
 rurs and warbles; while even  
 the exhilaration of muscular action  
 is sought in the gymnastic pro-  
 visions of the pleasure garden, and  
 in the hunting park. (Samson's  
 Art Criticism p. 717.)

(31) Painting is divided into six  
 especial branches, according to the  
 subject of its representative viz.,  
 historical, imaginative, portrait, lan-  
 dscape, genre, and still-life. (Abbott's  
 Study of Art p. 134)

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