



My Library
T. S.
No. I.

特別
14
2236
27



特イ4
2236
27

May Librarian



Hartley (15)
1-5-72-13
vibration
+ associa-
tion + = 7
5-7-11

We can now arrive at a collec-
tive view of the entire doctrine, and
see how all is explained by two things
only, vibrations and association.

To simple vibration corresponds sen-
sation.
To associated vibration complex sen-
sations.

To the vibratuncle, the simple idea.
To associated vibratuncles, comp-
lex ideas.

To the motory vibration's automatic
movement.

To motory vibratuncles, voluntary
and semi-voluntary movements.

Such are the general laws which,
according to Hartley, regulate and
explain all the mechanism of the
human mind. --- (Ribot's English Psychology)

Hartley
love, 13

(15) Child is not afraid of fire
until he has been burned; or of
a dog, until the dog has bitten him.
In the same way, the passion of
love is born of the association of

agreeable circumstances with the idea of the object which produces this love. (Ribot's Eng. Psycho. P 41)

Hartley (10) Hartley classifies our passions in rather an arbitrary way, under the following titles:—

The pleasure and pain of imagination, of ambition, of self-interest, of sympathy, of theopathy, of moral sense. (11)

J. Mill (12) James Mill's fundamental thought is, in the psychological world there is only one fact, sensation, only one law, association. --- (12 P 45)

J. Mill (13) The primitive phenomenon is impression, or as it is commonly called sensation; idea is a feebler copy of this; then ideas associate themselves, unite, and there result complex or aggregate phenomena.

Mr. James Mill admits only sensations, ideas, and associations of ideas. (12 P 48)

J. Mill (14) Hume, as we know, had said that our ideas associate themselves

on three principles: contiguity in time and space, resemblance, and causality. Mr. Mill, who admits the first principle only, contiguity in space (synchronic order), and contiguity in time (successive order), endeavours to bring the two others into this one, an attempt at simplification which in the judgement of Mr John Stuart Mill, "is perhaps the least happy in the whole work".

(15) As we have seen, there are many grounds for believing that our sensations are represented by so many groupings of nerve-cells and fibres in the brain, that ideas consists of organic cohesions or associations among such groupings, and that the so-called exercise of reason, judgement, or will is an automatic struggle for predominance between revived and associated impressions, one set of which finally asserts itself, and is translated into action. (Nisbet)

1. 連貫
2. 時間
3. 空間
4. 因果

連貫
時間
空間
因果
1. 感覺
2. 意志
3. 判斷
4. 行動

連支及
1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31. 32. 33. 34. 35. 36. 37. 38. 39. 40. 41. 42. 43. 44. 45. 46. 47. 48. 49. 50. 51. 52. 53. 54. 55. 56. 57. 58. 59. 60. 61. 62. 63. 64. 65. 66. 67. 68. 69. 70. 71. 72. 73. 74. 75. 76. 77. 78. 79. 80. 81. 82. 83. 84. 85. 86. 87. 88. 89. 90. 91. 92. 93. 94. 95. 96. 97. 98. 99. 100.

insanity of genius 254 P.)
(L) --- There must be a cohesion formed between the present sensation and a group more or less extensive of past sensations; and just in proportion as these associations readily established and far reaching, will the person's ideas be simple or complex. The individual, therefore, is clever or stupid, sharp or dull, according to the receptivity of his centres of sense and the facility with which in these, hosts of associated feelings can be summoned up. (Σ± 255 P.)

(L) In order that genius may incontestably assert itself, there must be a special excitability of both the sensory and motor areas of the brain. The energy so manifested may be rapid and temporary, or slow and persistent. In the former case we have men of brilliant achievement, like Shelley, Byron, and Brongham; in the latter, slow

天才
sensory + motor
= 力 + 質
= 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31. 32. 33. 34. 35. 36. 37. 38. 39. 40. 41. 42. 43. 44. 45. 46. 47. 48. 49. 50. 51. 52. 53. 54. 55. 56. 57. 58. 59. 60. 61. 62. 63. 64. 65. 66. 67. 68. 69. 70. 71. 72. 73. 74. 75. 76. 77. 78. 79. 80. 81. 82. 83. 84. 85. 86. 87. 88. 89. 90. 91. 92. 93. 94. 95. 96. 97. 98. 99. 100.

夢 / 夜
- 277 頁
人 / 天才
/ 學
知 / 得

inspiration
= 力 + 質
= 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31. 32. 33. 34. 35. 36. 37. 38. 39. 40. 41. 42. 43. 44. 45. 46. 47. 48. 49. 50. 51. 52. 53. 54. 55. 56. 57. 58. 59. 60. 61. 62. 63. 64. 65. 66. 67. 68. 69. 70. 71. 72. 73. 74. 75. 76. 77. 78. 79. 80. 81. 82. 83. 84. 85. 86. 87. 88. 89. 90. 91. 92. 93. 94. 95. 96. 97. 98. 99. 100.

天才
= 力 + 質
= 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31. 32. 33. 34. 35. 36. 37. 38. 39. 40. 41. 42. 43. 44. 45. 46. 47. 48. 49. 50. 51. 52. 53. 54. 55. 56. 57. 58. 59. 60. 61. 62. 63. 64. 65. 66. 67. 68. 69. 70. 71. 72. 73. 74. 75. 76. 77. 78. 79. 80. 81. 82. 83. 84. 85. 86. 87. 88. 89. 90. 91. 92. 93. 94. 95. 96. 97. 98. 99. 100.

and laborous workers like Wordsworth and Flaubert. (Σ± 250 P.)

(L) Dreams, in all their variety, are the product of the automatic action of brain. The degree of the soul's creativeness in sleep, says Lamb, might furnish no whimsical criterion of the quantum of poetic faculty resident in the same soul waking. The remark is absolutely just. (Σ± 258 P.)

(L) The mysterious gift of inspiration, essential to all literary and artistic genius, is evidently nothing but the automatic activity of the nerve-cells of the brain, — a phase of that morbid condition which finds its highest expression in insanity. For this reason inspiration can never carry us beyond the limits of experience. Milton's archangels are only disguised men. (Σ± P. 283)

(L) The difference between genius and talent may be thus defined. In genius there is a spontaneous morbid activity

平 1 分
張 1 十 1
十 7 帶 佳
思 考 =
把 1 處 1
十 7

Beaconsfield on one occasion, 'is a being with a predisposition which is irresistible, a bent, which he cannot in any way avoid, whether it drags him to the abstruse researches of erudition or induces him to mount into the fervid and turbulent atmosphere of imagination.' (合上 P. 254-55)

用 1 處 1
如 2 處 1
1 直 1
考 1 多
十 1 由
1 7 多 1

(15) It has (style) its basis in our sensory and motor cohesions, and is therefore dependent upon the reciprocal action and retentiveness of the several centres of the brain. A necessary part of the faculty of choosing the right words is to be able to discriminate between the associations of one word as compared ~~to~~ with those of another which may have pretty much the same meaning. Such associations may be extremely delicate, in many cases almost indefinable. (合上 P. 273)

Hoeffding's Psy.

情 1 念 1
= 2 7 下 宜
2 1 2 1 = 7
地 1 念 1 =
我 地 1 別 1
十 7 故 2 情
= 7 情 我
同 處 1 別 1
1 地 1 1
存 2 1 7
十 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1
egoism
2 1 1 7 7
1 2 1 7 7
1

(15) At first, this contrast, which fully developed becomes the contrast between egoism and sympathy, can not appear. In the dawn of conscious life, ideas are but little clear and definite, and the idea of self can not therefore be contrasted with the idea of something outside the self, or of a different self, so that it is psychologically without meaning, to speak of a native egoism, if by egoism is understood the conscious setting of the weal and woe of others below our own. It would be just as correct to speak of native effrontery, because a child knows at first neither bashfulness nor shame. (Hoeffding's Psychology, P. 242)

idea 1
美 別 1 2
考 1 平
事 律 1

(16) The original and essential unity of an idea becomes broken up into the multiplicity of individual, which is subject to sensations and cerebral ~~of the~~

← 117
184.71
+ 118
A Will
Knowledge
= 3382
21120

subjectivity, i.e., the will, again obtain the upper hand, a proportional degree of discomfort or unrest also enter; of discomfort, because our corporeality (the organism which in itself is the will) is again felt, of unrest, because the will on the path of thought, again fills the consciousness, through wishes, emotions, passions, and cares. For the will, as the principle of subjectivity, is everywhere the opposite, nay, the antagonist of knowledge. The greatest concentration of subjectivity consists in the act of will proper, in which therefore we have the most distinct consciousness of our own self. All other excitements of the will are only preparations for this; the act of will itself is for subjectivity

what for the electric apparatus is the passing of spark. Every bodily sensation is in itself an excitement of the will, and indeed oftener of the voluntas than of the voluntas. The excitement of the will on the path of ~~the~~ thought is that which occurs by means of motives; thus here the subjectivity is awakened and set in play by the objectivity itself. This takes place whenever any object is apprehended no longer in a purely objective manner, thus without participation in it, but, directly or indirectly excites desire or aversion even if it is only by means of a recollection, for then it acts as a motive in the widest sense of the word. (Σ = P. 126-7-8).

Hume's Essays

212
知能

ledge and appeals immediately to knowledge alone. (全集 P. 129)

文

(文) In short, delicacy of taste has the same effect as delicacy of passion; it enlarges the sphere both of our happiness and misery, and makes us sensible to the pains as well as to the pleasures, which escape the rest of mankind. (Hume's essays, - 全集 P. 9-10)

感傷

delicate

情

憂

道

美

進

心

心

心

心

心

心

心

心

心

心

心

心

(2) Nothing is so improving to the temper as the study of the beauties, either of poetry, eloquence, music, or painting. They give a certain elegance of sentiment to which the rest of mankind are strangers. The emotions which they excite are soft and tender, they draw off the mind from the hurry of business and interest; cherish reflection; dispose to tranquility; and produce an agreeable melancholy, which, of all dispositions of the mind, is best suited to

3

7

文

立

道

文

文

文

文

文

文

文

文

文

文

文

文

文

文

文

文

文

文

文

love and friendship. --- A delicacy of taste is favourable to love and friendship, by confining our choice to few people, and making us indifferent to the company and conversation of the greater part of men. (全集 P. 10-11)

(2) The few critics who have had some tincture of philosophy, have remarked this singular phenomenon, and have endeavoured to account for it.

L'Abbe Dubos, in his reflections on poetry and painting, asserts, that nothing is in general so disagreeable to the mind as the languid, listless state of indolence, into which it falls upon the removal of all passion and occupation. To get rid of this painful situation, it seeks every amusement and pursuit; business, gaming, shows, excursions; whatever will rouse the passions and take its attention

及一節
 人連記十
 此記新
 至即即
 長人活
 中十之
 下字除
 大類
 雙力
 吾人當
 一記記
 其言人
 之可記
 一記記
 下之
 十之
 二之
 何一
 一

from itself. No matter what the passion is; let it be disagreeable, afflicting, melancholy, disordered; it is still better than that insipid languor, which arises from perfect tranquility and repose. — It is impossible not to admit this account, as being at least in part, satisfactory. — There is, however, a difficulty in applying to the present subject, in its full extent, this solution, however ingenious and satisfactory it may appear. It is certain that the same object of distress, which pleases in a tragedy, were it really set before us, would give the most unpeigned uneasiness; though it be then the most effectual cure to languor and indolence. Fontenelle seems to have been sensible of this difficulty; and accordingly attempts another solution of the phenomenon;

(2) 悲喜 =
 同情 = 同
 同情 = 友
 有同之
 人及事
 十十
 一十
 “十”

at least makes some addition to the theory above mentioned. “Pleasure and pain,” says he, “which are two sentiments so different in themselves, differ not so much in their cause. From the instance of tickling, it appears, that the movement of pleasure, pushed a little too far, becomes pain; and that the movement of pain, a little moderate, becomes pleasure. Hence it proceeds that there is such a thing as sorrow, soft and agreeable; it is a pain weakened and diminished. The heart likes naturally to be moved and affected. Melancholy objects snit it, and even disastrous and sorrowful, provided they are softened by some circumstance. It is certain, that, on the theatre, the representation has always the effect of reality; yet it has

not altogether that effect. However we may be hurried away by the spectacle, whatever dominion the sense and imagination may usurp over the reason, there still lurks at the bottom a certain idea, of falsehood in the whole of what we see. This idea, though weak and disguised, suffices to diminish the pain which we suffer from the misfortunes of those whom we love, and to reduce that affliction to such a pitch as converts it into a pleasure. We weep for the misfortune of a hero, to whom we are attached. In the same instant we comfort ourselves, by reflecting, that it is nothing but a fiction; and it is precisely that mixture of sentiments, which composes an agreeable sorrow, and tears that delight us. But as that affliction, which is caused by exterior and sensible

(3) 藝術
夫し向身
二面口味
カハナク快
来カ悲ニ
ニ誠ニカ
ナリカ行
悲劇カ
ナカカ
心カ快
多是快
カカ快
万角ニ行
ニカ快
カカ快
味カ多
ナカカ

objects, is stronger than the consolation which arises from an internal reflection, they are the effects and symptoms of sorrow, that ought to predominate in the composition."

This solution seems just and convincing; but perhaps it wants still some new addition, in order to make it answer fully the phenomenon, which we here examine. All the passions, excited by eloquence, are agreeable in the highest degree, as well as those which are moved by painting and the theatre. — The pathetic description of the butchery, made by Verres of the Sicilian captain, is a masterpiece of this kind; but I believe none will affirm, that the being present at a melancholy scene of that nature would afford any entertainment. Neither is the sorrow here softened by

fiction; for the audience were convinced of the reality of every circumstance. What is it, then, which in this case raises a pleasure from the bosom of uneasiness, so to speak; and a pleasure, which retains all the features and outward symptoms of distress and sorrow? I answer: this extraordinary effect proceeds from that very eloquence, with which the melancholy scene is represented. The genius required to paint objects in a lively manner, the art employed in collecting all the pathetic circumstances, the judgement displayed in disposing them: the exercise, I say, of these noble talents, together with the force of expression, and beauty of oratorical numbers, diffuse the highest satisfaction on the audience, and excite the most delightful ~~and~~

movements. — The same principle take place in tragedy; with this addition, that tragedy is an imitation; and imitation is always of itself agreeable. This circumstance serves still farther to smooth the motions of passion, and convert the whole feeling into one uniform and strong enjoyment. Objects of the greatest terror and distress please in painting, and please more than the most beautiful objects, that appear calm and indifferent. The affection, rousing the mind, excites a large stock of spirit and vehemence; which is all transformed into pleasure by the force of the prevailing movement. It is thus the fiction of tragedy softens the passion by an infusion of a new feeling, not merely by weakening or diminishing the sorrow.

的短歌
1 歌月記
+ 11 + 11

resque, an event of actual life
poetical; for it is only this
that throws over the objects
of the real world that mag-
ic's gleam which in the case
of sensibly perceived objects
is called the picturesque, and
in the case of those which
are only perceived in imagination
is called the poetical. Of poets
sing of the blithe morning,
the beautiful evening, the
still moonlight night, and
many such things, the
real object of their praise
is, unknown to themselves,
the pure subject of knowledge
which is called forth by those
beauties of nature, and on the
appearance of which the will
vanishes from consciousness,
and so that peace of heart
enters which, apart from this,
is unattainable in the world.

新島地
カ一階路
歌の十
天 Willカ
及口ル
ハ+11
劇+11
舞台+11
遠陽地
+211
和211

— Further, that the stranger
or the mere passing traveller
feels the picturesque or poetical
effect of objects which
are unable to produce this
effect upon those who live
among them may be explained
from the fact that the no-
velty and complete stran-
geness of the objects of such
an indifferent, purely objective
apprehension are favorable to it.
Thus, for example, the sight
of an entirely strange town
often makes a specially
agreeable impression upon the
traveller, which it by no
means produces in the inha-
bitant of it; for it arises
from the fact that the for-
mer, being out of all rela-
tion to this town and its in-
habitants, perceives it purely
objectively. Upon this depends

partly the pleasure of tra-
 velling. This seems also to be
 the reason why it is sought
 to increase the effect of nar-
 rative or dramatic works by
 transferring the scene to dis-
 tant times or lands.

If now perfectly objective, in-
 tuitive apprehension, purified
 from all volition, is the con-
 dition of the enjoyment of
 aesthetic objects, so much
 the more is it the condi-
 tion of their production. Every
 good picture, every genuine poem,
 bears the stamp of the frame
 of mind described. For only

what has sprung from per-
 ception, and indeed from pu-
 rely objective perception, or is
 directly excited by it, contains
 the living germ from which
 genuine and original achieve-
 ment can grow up; not only

創作の
 心
 直接に
 心
 直接に
 心
 直接に
 心
 直接に

心
 直接に
 心
 直接に

Will
 心
 直接に
 心
 直接に
 心
 直接に
 心
 直接に

in plastic and pictorial art,
 but also in poetry, nay even
 in philosophy. The *punctum*
 saliens of every beautiful work,
 of every great or profound thought,
 is a purely objective perception, ~~that~~
 such perception, however, is abso-
 lutely conditioned by the complete
 silence of the will, which leaves
 the man simply the pure sub-
 ject of knowledge. The natural
 disposition for the predominance
 of this state is genius. (P. 129-31)

With the disappearance
 of volition from consciousness,
 the individuality also, and with
 it its suffering and misery,
 is really abolished. Therefore I
 have described the pure subject of
 knowledge which then remains over
 as the eternal eye of the world,
 which, although with very different
 degrees of clearness, looks forth
 from all living creatures, unton-

カク知ルコト
ヲ物カ善
道性ノ如ク
トナシテ
ニテ
心ヲ
トシテ
カク知ルコト
ヲ物カ善
道性ノ如ク
トナシテ
ニテ
心ヲ
トシテ
カク知ルコト
ヲ物カ善
道性ノ如ク
トナシテ
ニテ
心ヲ
トシテ

thus know- are the Ideas of things, but out of these there now speaks a higher wisdom than that which knows of mere relations. And we also have then passed out of the relations and have thus become the pure subject of knowledge. But what now exceptionally brings about this state must be internal physiological processes, which purify the activity of the brain, and heighten it to such a degree that a sudden spring-tide of activity like this ensues. The external conditions of this are that we remain completely strange to scene to be considered, and separated from it, and are absolutely not actively involved in it. (E P 133-134)

In order to see that a purely objective, and therefore

真ノ実
ハ純善
心ヲ
トシテ
カク知ルコト
ヲ物カ善
道性ノ如ク
トナシテ
ニテ
心ヲ
トシテ
カク知ルコト
ヲ物カ善
道性ノ如ク
トナシテ
ニテ
心ヲ
トシテ

correct, comprehension of things is only possible when we consider them without any personal participation in them, thus when the will is perfectly silent, let one call to mind how much every emotion or passion disturbs and falsifies our knowledge, indeed how every inclination and aversion alters, colours, and distorts not only the judgement, but even the original perception of things. — As now here the falsification of the idea through the will in the case of special abhorrence or love is unmistakable, so is it present in a less degree in every object which has any even distant relation to our will, that is, to our desire or aversion. Only when the will with its interest has left consciousness, and the intellect freely follows its own

Wallace's Kant

laws, and as pure subject mirrors the objective world, yet in doing so, although spurred on by no volition, is of its own inclination in the highest state of tension and activity, do the colours and forms of things appear in their true and full significance. Thus it is from such comprehension alone that genuine works of art can proceed whose permanent worth and ever renewed approval arises simply from the fact that they express the purely objective element, which lies at the foundation of and shines through the different subjective, and therefore, distorted, perceptions, as that which is common to them all and alone stands fast; as it were the common theme of all those subjective variations. For certainly the nature which is displayed before our eyes ex-

Objectivity
artist 77K 77K
jectivity, intell
est, will 77K
77K 77K = 77K
77K = 77K

Originality
77K 77K
77K 77K
77K 77K
77K 77K
77K 77K
77K 77K
77K 77K
77K 77K
77K 77K

hibits itself very differently in different minds; and as each one sees it so alone can he repeat it, whether with the pencil or the chisel, or with words and gestures on the stage. Objectively alone makes one capable of being an artist; but objectivity is only possible in this way, that the intellect, separated from its root the will, moves freely, and yet acts with the highest degree of energy. (77K) The characteristics of genius are Originality, so that it is no mere result of the application of rules, — exemplary, so that its products serve to indicate a rule for others to carry out, — unconscionness in its methods, so that it seems like inspiration, and suggests more than natural gifts. In other words, genius, though a personal and purely individual power, yet exhibits a universal law, not as a mere rule of understanding which others

Lindner's Psy,

can copy, but as a living type out of which kindred spirits severally read the appropriate guidance for themselves, and yet understanding can not explain the rationale of the process. Thus, though genius produces what taste can only estimate and criticise, they both ultimately throw us back to something inexplicable or inexpressible by the understanding. (W. Wallace's Kant. P. 196)

(2) That which self-observation teaches about consciousness may be reduced to three fundamental facts. There are given:

1. A multitude of ideas (concepts), which come and go;
 2. The ever changing ~~states of consciousness into the oneness of self-consciousness, in the form of a single unchangeable ego, or I.~~ unity of the same in the form of consciousness;
 3. The union of the successive states of consciousness into the oneness of self-consciousness, in the form of a single unchangeable ego, or I.
- The interpretation of

志念, 意
 識, 自識
 ≡ 78a 7u
 2) 1. Ego.

Percept
 1. 2)

Play 1
 玩 却的
 + 1 當 弄
 1. 要 却的
 P. 1)

These three fundamental facts has led to the assumption of a soul, ~~essence~~ essence, or substance. (Lindner's Psychology)

(1) The sensation may become a perception, it must be freed, or separated from the totality of impression caused by that which is simultaneously felt; i.e., it must be isolated, and referred to the external stimulus which caused it; i.e., be projected. The perception is, therefore, nothing more than a sensation, isolated from all others, and outwardly projected. (Σ P. 60)

(2) Man, like every other organism, lives perpetually surrounded by an environment. The environment acts upon the organism, and the organism reacts upon the environment. Hence arise the two fundamental portions of our psychical nature, the passive and the active: a difference incorporated in the nervous system by the sen-

Allen's Physical Aesthetics

sony and motor fibres and their central organs. Connected with the passive side of our nature, are the organs and faculties of sight, hearing, touch, taste, smell, and organic sensibility generally. Connected with the active side are the muscular system and the nerves which govern it. In this primordial distinction we see the root of the difference which we recognise between Play and the Aesthetic Feelings. The first is active, the second ~~is~~ are passive (Allen's Physiological Aesthetics P. 84)

(←) The main difference is this; in the first (intellectual gratification) set of cases the component sensuous factors may be beautiful or ugly indiscriminately, and the intellectual impression is that of useful and interesting knowledge; in the second set of cases, the component sensuous factors are in the

總論 1快
1快
1快
1快
1快

臺 摺 1 =
若 方 寫 對
1 Emotion =
七 五 十 十

Bain

mselves beautiful, and the intellectual 'impression' is that of immediate and disinterested pleasure. So that there are two necessary principles which must govern every aesthetic intellectual pleasure: first, its sensuous elements must themselves be beautiful; and, second, it must be remote from all ulterior aims. (2/189)

(←) And here it is proper, once more, to dwell upon the commanding sweep of the opposed pair — Love and Malice. Their bearings upon Art correspond with their ramified operation as pleasures. In their first exercise they are unaesthetic, as being limited to the individuals; the love of a parent for his or her child is exclusive. But they readily assume the ideal character; and, as depicted in art or in story, they give pleasure all around. Not only do they make up the absorbing interest of Personality, but

Lindner

They extract this interest from the impersonal world, by working out, to an extraordinary degree, the personal similitudes. (Bain's Emotion & Will p 231-2)

情 - con-
cept, 申
結 (律) ②
+ 4

(1-) Therefore, there arise in our consciousness a constant arrest and furthering. If these are weak and transitory, they pass unnoticed. But where a concept mass or concept series which was originally in the act of arising into consciousness is suddenly restrained or suppressed by an opposition, X, the concepts will resist the arrest which they are about to suffer, and thereby bring this arresting process now finds itself compressed between two opposing forces; i. e., between the concepts which ~~arrest~~ arrest and those which furthering further the movement of thought. Resistance to arrest gives rise to a feeling, and, more precisely, to a feeling of pain. If the arrest is

wholly or partially removed, in that the opposition is overcome by the furthering concepts, there arises a sudden furthering or promotion of the thought movement, which we become conscious of as a feeling of pleasure. . . . A feeling is therefore, the consciousness of a furthering or an arrest of the movement of thought: when a furthering, a feeling of pleasure; when an arrest, a feeling of pain. The life of the soul is a concept life; every furthering of concepts ~~is~~ is at the same time a promotion of the life activity of the soul; every arrest of concepts is also an arrest of soul life. Feeling can, therefore, also be defined as the consciousness of the rising or sinking of the ~~soul~~ real life-activity of the soul. (Lindner's Psychology. p. 169-170)

(1-) Feeling is often confused with sensation. The two are different;

Bain

sensation
トハ 感 + 覚
知覚
の 知覚
の 知覚

for, 1. Sensations are original, feelings, derived states of the soul; 2. Sensations bring to consciousness states of the body, but feelings states of the soul. Hence vital feeling must not be confounded with vital sensation though the two are closely related; for, the vital sensation is only the result of the increase or decrease of mind activity in which the organic body-sensations are concerned, whereas the vital feeling is the effect of ~~all~~ all concepts ~~to~~ present to consciousness. (全上 P. 171)

Humor
至 諷 調 和

(英) Perhaps the greatest triumph of art in dealing with the resentful passion is seen in the well-known effect that we designate Humor. ~~Hence~~ Here opposites are ~~re~~ reconciled; the lion is made to lie down with the lamb. (Bain's Emotion & Will P. 255)

(英) A certain number of the Fine arts derive their subjects from natural

模倣術
1 模倣術

音楽や 飾り
の 直物 =
sensibility
1 直物 = 直
別 = 物 / 飾り
2 飾り = 飾り
の 直

善力ヲ 飾り
ニ 為 = 模倣
ニ 為 = 飾り
不 飾り 善
ヲ 飾り 飾り
ノ 飾り 飾り
ニ 飾り 飾り
ノ 飾り 飾り

things, which they copy and adapt; and these are called the Imitative arts. They are principally, — Imitative (as opposed to effusive) Poetry, Painting, and Sculpture; the Stage and Pantomime; and a small portion of the art of Decoration. The remaining members of the class, namely, Architecture, Decoration, Music, Refined Address, are only in a slight degree imitative of originals in nature; they apply themselves at once to the gratification of our various sensibilities, without being encumbered with any extraneous condition, such as fidelity to some prototype. I cannot regard the imitation of nature occurring in the first-named class, in any other light than as an accident; but, the fact once occurring, a certain deference has to be paid to it. Where we profess to imitate, we ought undoubtedly to be faithful. Not, I imagine, because a

高上同経
7 控之
11 云々

higher artistic charm thereby arises, but because of the revolutive shock that misrepresentation is liable to produce. If the poet draws from reality, he ought not to give a misleading picture, seeing that we receive his composition, not solely as pleasing melodies and touching images, but also as ~~not~~ narratives and descriptions of human life.

There is, ~~doubtless~~ doubtless, a limit to what we are to expect from an artist, who must be mainly engrossed with the effects proper to Art, and cannot be, at the same time, a botanist, a zoologist, a geologist, a meteorologist, an anatomist, and a geographer. (全上 P 255)

(著) Although I conceive that fidelity, in the imitative class of arts, is to be looked upon, in the first instance, as avoiding a stumbling look, rather than imparting a charm, there are ~~some~~ still some

控之
高上同経
7 控之
11 云々

高上同経
7 控之
11 云々

作之方者
學方經
控之
高上同経
7 控之
11 云々

respects wherein the aesthetic pleasure is enhanced by it. We are drawn by sympathy towards one that has attended to the same objects as ourselves, or that has seized and put into vivid prominence what we have felt without expressing to ourselves. The coincidence of mind with mind is always productive of the lightening charm of mutual support; and, in some circumstances, there is an additional effect of agreeable surprise. Thus, when an artist not merely produces in his picture the ordinary features that strike every one, but includes all the minuter objects that escape common notice, we sympathize with his attention, we admire his powers of observation, and become, as it were, his pupils in extending our study and knowledge of nature and life. We feel a pungent surprise at discovering, for the first time, what has long been before our eyes.

真如心
 7巻 1巻
 材=貝心
 コレコレ之ヲ
 面白ク入
 心子入
 心
 真如心
 巻22心
 修4巻2心
 1巻子入
 心

Moreover, we are brought forward as judges of the execution of a distinct purpose; ~~we~~ we have to see whether he that is bent on imitation does that part of his work well or ill, and, if our verdict is favourable, admire the power displayed. There is, too, a certain exciting effect in the reproduction of an appearance in some foreign material, as when a ~~plane~~ plane surface yields the impression of solidity, and canvas or stone imitates the human appearance. Lastly, when fidelity of rendering is allied with artistic charm, the sentiment of reality and truth, as opposed to fiction or falsehood, appealing to our practical urgencies, disposes us to derive an additional satisfaction, and to assign a superior value to the work. Thus, Imitation, which properly speaking, is immaterial to art as such, — just as there is

美術家
 自然や真理
 7巻 1巻
 又1巻2巻
 1巻子入
 2=アヤ科
 字巻+巻心
 心

little or no place for it in music, architecture, or the decoration of the person, — becomes the centre of a class of agreeable or acceptable effects. These effects are the more prized, that we have been surprised with the purely aesthetic ideals. We turn refreshed from the middle age romance to the graphic novel of our own time. (全上P.256)

(一) Conceiving, as I do, that the first object of an artist is to gratify the feelings of taste, or the proper aesthetic emotions, I can not assent to the current maxim that nature is his standard, or truth his chief end. On the contrary, I believe that these are precisely the conditions of the scientific man; he it is that should never deviate from nature, and that should care for truth before all other things. The artist's standard is feeling, his end is refined pleasure; he goes to nature, and selects what chimes in with his feelings

科学の取
扱、権ヲ能
ハレ其術家
ハ遊藝ニシテ
得目遊藝ニ
カニシテ之能
ハ能ハレトシ
ニ得ルナリ

of artistic effect, and passes by the rest. He is not even bound to adhere to nature in her very choicest displays; his own taste being the touchstone, he alters the originals at his will. The scientific man, on the other hand, must embrace every fact with open arms; the most nauseous fungus, the most loathsome reptile, the most pestilential vapour, must be scanned and set forth in all its details.

音楽裝飾
ノ如キハ全
ク有笑ヲ豫
メテ之ヲ爲セ
唯人ノ富
美感ヲ満足
スルニシテ
ナリ

The amount of regard that the artist shows to truth, so far as I am able to judge, is nearly as follows. In the purely effusive arts, such as music or the dance, truth and nature are totally irrelevant; the artist's feeling, and the gratification of the senses of mankind generally, are the sole criterion of the effect. So, in the fancies of decorative art, nature has very little place; suggestions are occasionally derived from natural objects, but no one is bound to ad-

物ヲ繪画
ノ如キハ格之
ト異ナリ有笑
ト全ク離レ
カシク有笑ヤ
人生ニ對テ何
レノ天才之ヲ美
装ニシテ描キ出
スナリ之ト其
目的ハ天也
美快感ニシ

apt more of these than good taste may allow. Nobody talks of the design of a calico as being true to nature; it is enough if it please the eye. 'Art is art because it is not nature.' The artist provides dainties not to be found in nature. There are, however, certain departments of art that differ considerably from music and fanciful decoration, in this respect, namely, that the 'basis of the composition' is generally something actual, or something derived from the existing realities of nature or life, such as painting, poetry, and romance. In these, nature gives the subject, and the artistic genius the adornment. Now, although, in their case also, the gratification of the senses and the aesthetic sensibilities is still the aim of the artist, he has to show a certain decent respect to our experience of reality in the management of his subject; this not being

詩人 小説
 空想 主に
 人 寫 直
 理 心 考 辨
 針 心 考 辨
 心 考 辨
 心 考 辨
 心 考 辨
 心 考 辨
 心 考 辨
 心 考 辨
 心 考 辨

purely imaginary, like the figure of a colico, but chosen from the world of reality. Hence, when a painter makes choice of the human figure, in order to display his harmonies of colour, and beauties of form, and picturesqueness of grouping, — he ought not to shock our feeling of truth and consistency, by a wide departure from the proportions of humanity. We do not look for anatomical exactness; we know that the studies of an artist do not imply the knowledge of a professor of anatomy; but we expect that the main features of reality shall be adhered to. In like manner, a poet is not great because he exhibits human nature with literal fidelity; to do that would make the reputation of a historian or a mental philosopher. The poet is great by his metres, his cadences, his ~~song~~ images, his picturesque groupings, his graceful narrative, his

理想 界 考 辨
 空 想 界 考 辨
 人 考 辨
 心 考 辨
 心 考 辨
 心 考 辨
 心 考 辨
 心 考 辨
 心 考 辨
 心 考 辨
 心 考 辨

~~image~~, his exaltation of reality into the region of ideality; and if, in doing all this, he avoid serious blunders or gross exaggerations, he passes without rebuke, and earns the unqualified honours of his genius. (Bain's Sense + Intellect P. 666-8)
 (←) The attempt to reconcile the artistic with the true, — art with nature, — has given birth to a middle school, in whose productions a restraint is put upon the flights of pure imagination, and which ~~also~~ claims the merit of information informing the mind as to the realities of the world, while gratifying the various aesthetic emotions. Instead of the tales of Fairy-Land, the Arabian Nights, the Romances of Chivalry, we have the modern novelists, with his pictures of living men and manners. In painting, we have natural scenery, buildings, men, and animals, represented with scrupulous exactness.

The sculptor and the painter exercise the vocation of producing portraits that shall hand down to future ages the precise lineaments of the men and women of their generation. Hence, the study of nature has become a main element in artistic education; and the artist often speaks as if the exhibition of truth were his prime endeavour, and his highest honour. It is probably this attempt, to subject imagination to the conditions of truth and reality, that has caused the singular transference above mentioned, whereby the definition of science has been made the definition of art.

Now, I have every desire to do justice to the merits of the truth-seeking artist. Indeed, the importance of the reconciliation that he aims at is undeniable. It is no slight matter to take out the sting from pleasure, and to avoid corrupting our notions of reality, while gratifying our

美術の道 =
科学 = 近密
3277 真理 /
探求者ト
21 出来得
→ 415 可ト
418 容易ト
#422

artistic sensibilities. A sober modern ~~rom~~ romancist does not outrage the probabilities of human life, nor excite delusive and extravagant hopes, in the manner of the middle-age romances. The change is in a good direction.

Nevertheless, there is, and always will be, a distinction between the degree of truth attained attainable by an artist, and the degree of truth attained by a man of science or a man of business. The poet let him desire it never so much, cannot study realities with an undivided attention. His readers do not desire truth simply for its own sake; neither will they accept it in the severe forms of an accurate terminology. The scientific man has not wantonly created the diagrams of Euclid, the symbols of Algebra, or the jargon of technical

他、連想
27771之
end 注
tend
= 價值
力有+連想
= 已價值
凡+トテ
托テ、連想
即所爲也
後+トテ、
ハ連想其
ハ自身=價
値也トテ

Imagination to the trains of the poet.
An additional reason may be seen
in another circumstance, which also
affords an interesting illustration of
a law of association already pro-
pounded; namely, the obscuration of
the antecedent part of a train, which
leads to a subsequent, more interes-
ting than itself. In the case of the
lawyer, the train leads to a deci-
sion favourable to the side ~~of~~ which
he advocates. The train has ~~nothing~~
nothing pleasurable in itself. The
pleasure is all derived from the end.
The same is the case with the mer-
chant. His trains are directed to a
particular end. And it is the end
alone which gives a value to the
train. The end of the metaphysical,
and the end of the mathematical
inquirer is the discovery of truth;
their trains are directed to that ob-
ject; and are, ~~not~~ or are not, a
source of pleasure, as that end is,

or is not, attained. But the case
is perfectly different with the poet.
His train is its own end. It is
all delightful, or the purpose is frus-
trate. From the established laws of
association, this consequence unavoid-
ably followed; that, in the case
of the trains of those other classes,
the interest of which was concen-
trated in the end, attention was
withdrawn from the train by being
fixed on the end, that, in the ~~case~~
case of the poet, on the other hand,
the train itself being the only ~~of~~
object, and that pleasurable, the
attention was wholly fixed upon
the train; that hence the train
of the poet was provided with a
name; that, in the cases of the
trains of other men, where the end
only was interesting, it was thought
enough that the end itself ~~it~~
should be named, the train was
neglected.

Lindner

that do not originally excite them, as in the cases already illustrated. Thirdly, there may be a coalescence of separate feelings into one aggregate or whole, as in property, Beauty, Justice, and the Moral sense sentiment. (L P 226)

(-) A feeling of pleasure arises in consequence of every change of consciousness whereby the degree of ruling tension (reciprocal arrest) between the concepts is lessened, and consequently the mental activity temporarily promoted, even though but partially; a feeling of pain, on the contrary, arises in consequence of every movement of concepts whereby their degree of tension is increased, thus decreasing the quantity of mental activity. (Lindner's Psychology P. 172)

(-) Pleasure and pain are relative. Diminished pleasure may be felt as pain, and lessened pain as pleasure. An event which today gives

快感、在
教、状の變
行一方、念
が暢申也
以、起、之、が
止、つ、い、は、
苦、感、也

快、感、ハ、
痛、の、ニ、
反、之、快

Spencer

12歳、20才
十才、1才
心、快、十

me joy, may leave me indifferent to-morrow. It is not the absolute exaltation which determines or depression, but the relation which determines the degree of intensity in feeling. In this way are to be explained the illusions which occur in reference to the valuation of external objects, in so far as they appear as vehicles of certain feelings of pleasure. A gift of a hundred dollars produces a different effect, according as the recipient is rich or poor. (L P. 173 foot note)

(-) Thus far we have spoken of feelings as central and peripheral (emotion + sensation), as strong or weak, as vague or definite, as coherent or incoherent, as real or ideal; and whereas we have considered them as differing in quality, the differences named have been such as do not connote anything more than a state of indifference in the subject of them - a passive receptivity. (Spencer's

情、ハ、
之、情、也
愛、ハ、
ハ、Passive
十、P、

Psychology P. 272)

(1) Pleasures and pains are concomitants of certain states, local or general — certain actions, I was about to say, but since pains of one class accompany what we distinguish as inactions (though these can never be absolute while the life, general or local, continues) it is better to use the word states. — P. 273.

Thus recognizing, at the one extreme, the negative pains of inactions, called cravings, and, at the other extreme, the positive pains of excessive actions, the implication is that pleasures accompany actions lying between these extremes. — P. 276.

Generally speaking, then, pleasures are the concomitants of medium activities, where the activities are of kinds liable to be in ~~excessive~~ excess or in defect; and where they are of kinds not liable to be excessive, pleasure increases as the activity increases,

快楽感
1. 快楽感
1. 快 = 由來

苦痛の
苦痛の
苦痛の
苦痛の
苦痛の
苦痛の

情動の
情動の
情動の
情動の

審美の
審美の
審美の
審美の

except where the activity is either constant or involuntary. — P. 277. The central feelings are scarcely in any case made painful simply by excess. Normal emotions responding to the various normal activities do not, however high they may rise, become intrinsically intrinsically disagreeable. We have, indeed, occasional illusion to states in which "joy is almost pain," showing a perceived approach to this effect of excess; but if pain so caused is ever actually reached, it is very rarely. — P. 276 (全)

(2) A further proof that the aesthetic consciousness is essentially one in which the actions themselves, apart from ends, form the object-matter, is afforded by the conspicuous fact that many aesthetic feelings arise from contemplation of the attributes and deeds of other persons, real or ideal. In these

cases, the consciousness is remote from life-serving function, not simply as is the consciousness accompanying play or the enjoyment of a beautiful colour or tone, but also in the further way that the thing contemplated as a source of pleasure, is not a direct action or affection of self at all, but is a secondary affection of self produced by contemplation of acts and characters and feelings known as objective, and present to self only by representation.

For, as we before saw that the aesthetic excitement is one arising when there is an exercise of certain faculties for its own sake, apart from ulterior benefits; so, in these cases we see that the conception of beauty is distinguished from the conception ~~is~~ of good in this, that it refers not to ends to be achieved but to activities incidental to the pursuit of ends.

美と善の区別
 美は目的
 善は手段
 美は手段
 善は目的
 美は手段
 善は目的
 美は手段
 善は目的

美、快
 美、快
 美、快
 美、快
 美、快
 美、快
 美、快
 美、快

最低級
 sensation
 美、快

(See Vol 2nd P 34-5)

(*) Subject always to the cardinal requirement that the feeling is, one not immediately any life-serving function, it follows from what has been said, that the highest aesthetic feeling is one having the greatest volume, produced by due exercise of the greatest number of powers without undue exercise of any. Again, from the general doctrine of mental evolution, it is a corollary that the highest aesthetic feeling is one resulting from the full but not excessive ~~exercise~~ exercise of the most complex emotional faculty. That these two standards harmonize is not at once manifest; but a little thought will show that in most cases, though not in all cases, their dicta agree.

Lowest are the pleasures derivable from simple sensation, as of sweet odours, beautiful colours, fine tones; and somewhat higher

12. Perception
13. Aesthetic
+11

Come the feelings produced by harmony of tones and harmony of colours.

Next above these must be ranged those pleasurable feelings that go along with perceptions more or less complex, of forms, of combined lights and shades, of successive cadences and chords; rising to a greater height where these are joined into elaborate combinations of forms and colours, and elaborate structures of melody and harmony; all these ascending stages evidently fulfilling at once the requirements of greater complexity and greater volume.

14. Emotional
15. Aesthetic

Much higher, however, stand the aesthetic sentiments strictly so called, which contain no presentative elements. In the above two lower orders of the feelings we class as aesthetic, the presentative elements are essential and the representative elements incidental. But in the highest order of aesthetic feeling, the

16. Presentative
17. Aesthetic
18. Aesthetic
19. Aesthetic

20. Aesthetic
21. Representative
22. Aesthetic
23. Aesthetic

presentative elements are incidental and the representative elements essential. The impressions of form and colour yielded by a picture, the cadences and chords of an air or chorus, and still more the verbal symbols, oral or written, by which a description of something beautiful or grand is conveyed, are here simply ~~the~~ the agents through which certain emotions are ideally excited. Thus, the feeling produced is high, alike in its remoteness from simple sensation, in its complexity as containing an immense variety of those elements of which emotions are composed, and in its volume as being a faint reproduction of the enormous aggregate of such elements massed together in the course of evolution. Moreover it is to be observed that among these highest aesthetic feelings themselves, a like

Collingwood's Ruskin

324 1-
藝術の正統
心算の正
術-7321
3-11

passes for art is a mockery, a superficial imitation of the real thing, presenting no true reality to study, no universal laws of life to expound; it is derivative, and content with cold reproductions of common types; it aims at no sincere and honest original effort. And the persons who produce these derivative works, however ingenious and clever, are not real artists, but manufactures of pictures or carvings. Strictly speaking, he says what people call inferior painters are in general no painters (Two paths, appendix I - Collingwood's Ruskin)

Sham art
+ real art
+ 正統
+ 325
+
+

(*) --- But his chief concern is generally to mark off Real Art from Sham; for instance, when he says: Art is a language expressing ideas, and the greatest Art is that which expresses the greatest number of the greatest ideas (M.P., Vol I pp. 7-11.) which was his first position with re-

藝術の正統
1 階 20-3
唯一の目的

gard to his subject. In another context, Art has for its business to praise God (M.P. Vol 1); and again, Great Art is the expression of the mind of a God-made great man (M.P. Vol 3), and, differently ~~intended~~ intended, Art is the expression of delight in God's work (M.P. Vol 5). From that he glides to - All great Art is praise; and Art is the ~~exponent~~ exponent to ethical life, which leads the way to the notion of ~~its~~ it as merely human labour regulated by human design, or, any modification of things substantial by ~~its~~ substantial power, so long as it states a true thing or adorns a serviceable one. Fine art is that in which the hand, the head, and the heart of man go together. (Collingwood's, Ruskin P. 37)

(*) The end of art must, therefore, lie in something different from the purely formal imitation of what we find given, which in any case

Hegel

12-2-73

2

can bring to the birth only tricks and not works of art. It is, indeed, an element essential to the work of art to have natural shapes for its foundation; seeing that its ~~representation~~ representation is in the medium of external and therefore of natural phenomena. In painting, for instance, it is an important study ~~of~~ to know how to copy with ~~precise~~ precision the colours in their relations to one another, the effects of light, reflections, ~~etc~~ etc, and, no less, the forms and figures of objects down to their subtlest characteristics. It is in this respect chiefly that the principle of naturalism in general and of copying nature has recovered its influence in modern times. Its aim is to recall an art which has grown feeble and indistinct to the vigour and crispness of nature; or, again, to invoke against the purely arbitrary and artificial conventionalism, as unnatural as it was

inartistic, into which art had strayed, the uniform, direct, and ~~solidly~~ solidly coherent sequences of nature. But however true it is that there is something right in this endeavour from one point of view, yet still the naturalism at which it aims is not as such the substantive and primary concern that underlies fine art. And, therefore, although external appearance in the shape of natural reality constitutes an essential condition of art, yet, nevertheless, neither is the given natural world its end, nor is the mere imitation of external appearance as external its end. (Hegel's Aesthetic — translated + introduced by Bosanquet, P. 86)

複製的
至其
三
7

(譯) Moreover, seeing that the principle of imitation is purely formal, to make it the end has the result that objective beauty itself disappears. For the question is in that case no longer of what nature that is which is

Ruskin

to be copied, but only whether it is correctly copied. The object and content of the beautiful comes then to be regarded as matter of entire indifference. (全 P. 83)

So that, # if I say that the greatest picture is that which conveys to the mind of the spectator the greatest number of the greatest ideas, I have a definition which will include as subjects of comparison every pleasure which art is capable of conveying. If I were to say, on the contrary, that the best picture was that which most closely imitated nature, I should ~~assume~~ assume that art could only please by imitating nature, and I should cast out of the pale of ~~the~~ criticism those parts of works of art which are not imitative, that is to say, intrinsic beauties of color and form, and those works of art wholly, which, like the arabesques of Raffaele in the Loggias, are not imitative at all.

大美術上
第一卷
最大idea
第一卷
7巻也
の421+1

Now I want a definition of art wide enough to include all its varieties of aim: I do not say therefore that the art is greatest which gives most pleasure, because perhaps there is some art whose end is to teach, and not to pleasure. I do not say that the art is greatest which teaches us most, because perhaps there is some art whose end is to please and not to teach. I do not say that the art is greatest which imitates best, because perhaps there is some art whose end is to create, and not to imitate. But I say that the art is greatest, which conveys to the mind of the spectator, by any means whatsoever, the greatest number of the greatest ideas, and I call ~~an idea~~ an idea great in proportion as it is received by a higher faculty of the mind, and as it more fully occupies, and in occupying, exercises and exalts, the

faculty by which it is received, (~~Page~~
(Ruskin's Modern painter vol I P. 12.)

美術, 概論
+ Idea
- 2 P 11

(美) I think that all the source of pleasure, or any other good, to be derived from works of art, may be referred to five distinct heads. (1) Ideas of Power. — The perception or conception of the mental or bodily powers by which the work has been produced. (2) Ideas of Imitation. — The perception that the thing produced resembles something else. (3) Ideas of Truth. — The perception of faithfulness in a statement of facts by the thing produced. (4) Ideas of Beauty. — The perception of beauty, either in the thing produced, or in what it suggests or resembles. (5) Ideas of Relation. — The perception of intellectual relations, in the thing produced, or in what it suggests or resembles.
(EE P. 13)



