

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Lectures on History of Philosophy. by Prof. Fenellosa.

K. Ichishima.
The 2nd year student of Literature in the Imperial University of Tokei.

20th of Sept. 1879.

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Introductory Lectures
on the study of
Philosophy.

20th of Sept. 1879. by Prof. Fenollosa

I suppose you all have vague idea of what philosophy is. You know this study is somewhat different from other studies. You know that it has something to do with mind. You know some wise men studied and written about it. Their writings had great influence upon other men. Still you are all probably conscious that your thought about philosophy after all somewhat confused and perhaps are not able to explain its exact relation with other studies. I am going to try to give give a more precise idea of what philosophy

Exactly, what kind of a thing it is that you study philosophy. Philosophy is simple thinking, all there is of philosophy is merely thinking. The poor man who sit down at night and thinks how to earn his next day meal is so far as he thinks a philosopher. A lonely shepherd far away on the hills who thinks stars is a philosopher. So is a boy who ponders over a strange ~~strange~~ shell picked up by the beach, the naturalist who carefully and closely classifying & examining his species is the philosophyzing. But mark you each of these is a philosopher only so far as he thinks. In so far as he merely thinks collect species and

manipulate apparatus he is not philosopher. All scientific pursuit are not then philosophy, only that part which is real genuine thinking. Philosophy then is not anything very strange. In studying philosophy you are not approaching a far away abstruse subject in which common people have no interest. You are simply going to carry to completion what they already began instinctively and crudely. Every body except idiot thinks more or less philosopher. How much he is philosopher depend upon how much he thinks. How much do you learn philosophy in this course depend upon how much you are
I can not teach you the

subject of philosophy, I can only teach you to think your selves.

Philosophy is then simple thinking with which you are already familiar. What then history of philosophy? Must it include all sciences? & and all the crude thoughts of ordinary men? No. It need not include little thoughts of little men, because the large thoughts of great men contain them and great more, just as the history of certain war or battle does not recount valorous deeds of each soldier, but only the prowes & brave deeds of each individual hero & generals. So the history of philosophy does not busy itself with the crude thinking of ordi

nary men, but considers only the great thought of leading men of the time and the country.

A great thinker thinks all the thought of a little thinker and very much more, we need not then trouble ourselves about the little thinker of the past. If we study the thought of great thinkers we shall get all that which thoughts affords, all the philosophers of the times, for it is the privelge of great men to be the representative of the time. Questions which are crudely but earnestly discussed in the workshops, in the street, & even in schools are finally thought out to solution and completion in the study of some great philosophers. He is a great philosopher only he

thinks much more. because
his thinking absolves all the
thinking of the histories & brings
them to a focus. He clearly
and boldly declares what
others barely ventures to sug-
gest. He translates for men
into clear language their own
familiar, but confused &
misunderstood thoughts.

But now let us consider
more closely what character
the thought of the great thinker.
Are they the greatest because
they spend the longest time
in thinking? Not so, for many
people spent a life time
in thinking who have not been
great thinker. Are they then
great because they think
about great many things.
yes. But not this only,
also because they thinks

great many thoughts about
each thing, they think about
each thing in all its relations.
In its relation to its cause,
in its relation to its effects,
in its relation to all the
surroundings and in its
relation to our knowledge
of it. A philosopher asks
about each thing how it come
to be, what it is, how it affect
all things about it, what will
be the final result of it,
& how we came to know it.
Thus and questions like this
he has been asking and
endeavouring to answer.
But how can there be any order
or end in this infinitely multi-
plicity of these questions.
The answer is the thought
itself find its ends & order.
Thought out of its own nature

in a unifier. It thinks many things under one formula. It reduces billions of individual things to thousands of general thoughts. Such is the thought boy, mind, good, stone & it uses these comparatively few, general thoughts, to represent innumerable individuals.

But thought is not satisfied with this simplification. Having reduced its thoughts to thousand of classes it tries to reduce still further into higher + higher generalization till it reaches the extreme point when it formulate all things as beings or existences. Under this thing all things are reduced to unity. Thought has now possessed itself of the many degree of general thought subordinate

to one. It next tries to come down the ladder of these thoughts and to see their relations & to one another. That is the difficult matter of philosophy to carry thoughts to such a point that it thinks all the relations between all its general thoughts. Thus thought tries to give a connected account of it to itself.

Now there is one logical condition which all thought bound to obey, that is the <u>law of self-consistency</u>. If I say a boy is not a boy, it is not a rational thought but a meaningless contradiction. A thought which contradict itself is not thought. This is the most fundamental of all the laws of thought. Every body admits that thought which

contradicts itself commits a logical suicide. Valid thought must be then self-consistent throughout; philosophy is then self-consistent thinking. I told you that the great philosophers attempt to find the relation of all thoughts to others and things to one another. This thinking must be self-consistent no matter how much ground it covers.

I may now define philosophy more exactly. Philosophy is a self consistent account of all things and of all thought which thought attempt to get to itself any such attempt of thought to give a consistent account is philosophy. Now there has been many such attempts in the history of mankind. Each such individual attempt of thought is called a system of philosophy. The history of philosophy is the history of all the past attempt to give the consistent account of universe. But why are so many systems needed? Why so many ever came to exist? Why have they succeed one another in such a peculiar order? Answer to these questions thought itself alone can furnish. Each system has been an attempt to give the consistent account of the universe but such attempt has been found not wholly successful. The system thought out with infinite care has after all contained somewhere a hidden inconsistency. It was not, however wholly false

but as a system it was incomplete. Now as soon as this inconsistency clearly perceived, a new philosophy would arise who in turn attempted to supply the missing portion & render it at last, a consistent whole, but in turn his new system contain new inconsistency somewhere. It had to give way to a new system and so thought went on trying to perfect itself as fast as it perceives the errors of its old systems. These systems have followed one another not by accident but by a natural progression of thought. The history of these systems therefore (the History of Philosophy) is itself a philosophy. It is the attempt of thought to give a

consistent account of the universe prolonged over many centuries & throughout many systems. Past system is never wholly false but is the same old thought completed & vivified by the new. The progress of the systems is the natural progress of thought from incompleteness to completeness. It forms then a whole a single growth or development just as a growth of a tree from seed to maturity forms the whole. The history of philosophy is not a haphazard collection of independent false philosophy. It is the whole of philosophy itself as it has developed itself in time. It must then be the whole of philosophy as it develops itself in my thought, in your

thought, in every man's thought. The history of philosophy is all one with the development of your own thought. It must be so since both are identical with philosophy. Two things equal to a third thing are equal to one another. See then what an interest my result [illegible] were already sought out.

The system of philosophy developed out of one another in the same order as the thoughts must be developed out of your own mind. See then the value to you of the History of philosophy. In studying the History of philosophy you are developing the thought of your own mind by a natural and healthy process. If you were to begin by trying to philosophize for your-

selves, you would be at fault to find out the beginning. You would fall into the same errors as the philosophers have in the past, & you would die before you would have been able to see all your inconsistencies and correct them, but we hold this systems & errors & corrections as the precious legacy of the past. The matter have been already thought out so far for us. It is of privilege therefore to let our thought be naturally guided to by the worked out thought of others and to attain finally the highest point of view which should as yet be attained.

This is the reason why writers who are ignorant of the History of philosophy fall into the

same old mistakes which they might have avoided by studying the experience of others. You, the students of the History of Philosophy by on the contrary by studying diligently the failure & progress of others, rise at last to the highest point of view of philosophy yet attained. You will then be able to point out to others where it is faile, how it is they fail, for you will have already solved all their contradictions & you can assign these contradiction to their proper place in the ~~the~~ slow painful progress of human thought. Having reached this highest point of view it will then be your knowledge if you are able to take a one step further than those who ever has gone before

to give a new system to the History of Philosophy.

26th sept 1879.

Lecture II

Descartes.

The close of 15th century in Europe was the eventful era in the European history. It was the period of revolution. it was the period of her complete awakening from the superstition & mental slavery. It was the commencement of new era of the civilized world. A remarkable coincidence of startling events brought it about. For over a thousand years Greek philosophy & Greek science have been dead. Catholic Christianity had grown into an all powerful political and spiritual organization. The Christian Church had succeeded in establishing her

doctrine as absolute truth.
She had crushed under her own
weight all oppositions & condemned
them as hereticis. She had im-
posed on the world her own
test of truth & certainty. She
had stamped out the rights and
habit of individual judgment.
Men under her sway had lost
the faculty of thinking for them-
selves. No longer did the ablest
men ever dreamed of testing
any proposition by any rule
of evidence. The authority of
some early Christian writers
was deemed sufficient to decide
all questions of truth or falsi-
food. All thoughts, all opinions,
all philosophy, all science were
taken on mere authority of ig-
norant saints. Reason was
expressly denounced by the
church and declared to be

the instrument of the devil by which
he deluded mankind into
damnable heresy. The writings
of the Greek philosophers, when
read at all, were read in
translations only which the
Christian priests had altered
to suit for their purposes.
All Europe was in state of
mental slavery and stagnation.
The thoughts of men advanced
not a step for one thousand
years, now out of the stagnant
ditch choked up by the rank
weeds of superstition and ig-
norance Europe sprang up
at single leap into the clear
light of free reasoning which
we enjoy to-day. I shall not
here analyze in detail all the
causes of this most important
movement but I repeat that
at about the close of the fif-

-teenth century a remarkable
coincidence of startling events
had wrought to bring it about.
In the first place the Conquest
of Constantinople (1453) by the
Turks caused many learned
Greeks to seek refuge in Italy
and other parts of Europe and
these brought with them accurate
copies of philosophical works
of Plato & Aristotle and also
the specimens of Greek art. The
study of these latter soon led to
the wonderful development of
Italian Art culminating with
Michael Angello and Raphael.
The study of the original works
of Plato & Aristotle & their com-
parisons with the falsified trans-
lation of the priests led to an
utter distrust of all Christian
learning & passionate attempt
to revive the study of Greek Lite-

-ature and philosophy. In the next
place just before this time (1440)
printing had been invented
and brought to the general
use. The awakening desire for
knowledge was thus spread ab-
road among thousands of people
to whom all books but the false
translation of the bible had
been unknown. Learning & philo-
sophy which had been almost
exclusively possession of the
priests were now put into the
hands of the public. In the 3rd
place, following on these events
another most astounding events
took place namely, the Discovery
of the New World of America by
Columbus in 1492. It is impos-
sible for us to understand
the full moral effect of this
event upon Europe. Men saw
that there was a whole world of

things which their all authoritative books knew nothing about. To understand & know this world they did not have to refer to the musty old volumes of Christian writings; they had only to use their own faculties of perception and see for themselves. The wonders of the new hemisphere broke up the stagnation of their ignorance. But in the fourth place, immediately after this event another almost as momentous event succeeded. Vasco de Gama doubled the southern cape of the still unknown continent of Africa and found his way by sea to India and the east. The wondering eyes of men were turned at the same time to the new West Indies of America and to the New East Indies of Asia. In

the fifth place. In the year 1520 Magellan burst through the barriers of the American continent and his ships actually for the first time in human history circumnavigated the world. Europe was startled. Here was the positive proof of the roundness of the world in spite of the Christian Church which had declared by omniscient authority to be a flat surface. In the six place. The old feudal system of Europe was in Italy broken to pieces and the descendants of those who had once been slaves of princes were now combined as free citizens of independent and prosperous towns. Politically men were beginning to act and think for themselves. In the seventh place. A successful religious revolu-

tion has broken out. The Reformation as it is called, was a reaction from childish absurdities and vile wickedness into which practises the Catholic church had fallen. Luther dared to think and act for himself and others followed. Such is the brief enumeration of the extraordinary events which crowded in less than one hundred years, & roused all Europe from its night of slumbers. Men suddenly found out that they had been dreaming for centuries. Christianity had claimed the possession of all there was of knowledge, all there was of philosophy, all there was of truth. Now the new world unknown before came before their eyes. All the religious and Social & philosophical systems of the past, sum-

ed crumbling away in the light of the new awakening. Men discovered that they had rights of their own, men discovered that they had reasons of their own and hopes of their own. All Europe was in a ferment. It was an age of expectation and hope. Intoxicated at the emancipation from mental slavery men revelled in the exercise of their freedom. Awe struck & prophetic they saw a new age of reason opening up for the world. At once, the science of Mathematics, physics, Astronomy, Chemistry Medicine started forward at the rapid pace. Discovery succeeded discovery; invention succeeded invention as the result of men's free inquiry. But I am not here dwelling on the history of those times. I only wish

to show you the spirit in which modern philosophy was began in Europe. Let us inquire then what was the effect on philosophy of this new birth of reason. This awakening of men to the consciousness of his own powers. The introduction of the study of old Greek philosophy was taking place from about 1450 to the reformation (1526). Everywhere Greek was studied, the false editions of Plato and Aristotle circulated by the Catholic priests were compared with true works of Plato & the true & works of Aristotle. Plato & Aristotle were then compared with each other and the new school of critics in which discussed relative merit of their doctrines. Thus the whole of sixteenth century & even the early part of the

seventeenth century were filled with the writings & discussions of the new system of Platonism & Aristotleanism. The philosophy of Europe ceased to be Christian philosophy but became entirely Greek. Although men had found it possible to ignore the authority of the Christian philosophy and of the Church, yet even this new awakened reason fell unconsciously under the authority of old Greek writers. Not yet men were able to philosophize for themselves. There had been no new original philosophical system since Aristotle sixteen hundred years before. It was not an easy thing for reason to emancipate at once from the control of these powerful intellect. It was left for René Descartes to cast aside

for the first time the learning and authority of the past & for the first time since to create a new system of philosophy.

Lecture III. 27th sept'79

Descartes - continued.

Descartes may be said to be one of the greatest men that ever lived, not that his system of philosophy is the greatest system of philosophy, but he was great because his intellect and reasoning was able to recreate philosophy to think it anew from its very foundations. He is called the father of modern philosophy, and rightly, because all philosophy from his time has been a steady organic growth out of his thought. His influence is very strong in our philosophical thought to-day. The movement of modern philosophy which he originated is therefore an entirely different movement from that of old Greek philosophy. This is the movement which we are going to study entirely in this course. We are going to let our thought begin as Descartes did, and then let them develope as the history of modern philosophy has developed. I shew now going to give you a brief idea of the circumstances under which Descartes philosophy was begun. I will next give you some account of man & philosophy itself.

Descartes as you know was born on the 31st March 1596 at the small village of La Haye in the province of

Lourraine. His family had held lands on a title. He studied at the Jesuit school in Anjou from 1604 to 1612. The result of studys was to convince him the worthlessness of all the philosophies of the time. He was the perfect genius at Mathematics. In fact one of the greatest mathematicians that ever lived and he was quick to see the astonishing difference between mathematics and all other knowledge. Mathematics set out with indisputable axioms & its proofs are deduced absolutely from definitions by the help of these axioms. Mathematics thus became the system of certain knowledge. But how was it with philosophy? Descartes found only disorder & uncertainty. It sets out

with no indisputable axioms. It followed no fixed method of rigorous demonstration, It was only a collection of opinions, discussions & disputations. Thus to Descartes appeared this science taught in his youth. He at once determined hungely to give to philosophy an entire new foundation. There is something interesting in thus regarding this boy hardly 22 years old as with perfect self confidence he makes up his mind that he must recreate his philosophy, but our interest changes to admiration when we mark the calm and independent way in which he sets about it. Instead of giving himself up to study he started off to give good look to the world. This only shows the independent genius of the man. He must

know all there is in the world before he can establish philosophy, so we find him for years, now at Paris, now travelling, now serving as a soldier in the army, but all the time in his study, or the road, at the camp he was observing & thinking out the principles of his future works. After leaving army he lived in Paris for three years devoting himself to society & gaiety, studying the lighter phases of human nature and not at all devoting himself to his books. But at last his plan was ripe, at last he has seen the world, had struggled with himself, had seized the principles of his philosophy & now ready to go into retirement & work them out for leisure. So he went for a quiet retreat in Holland

where he thought and wrote in seclusion for twenty years. He corresponded with the leading philosophers & scientific men of Europe, and their discussions & criticisms form a very interesting chapter in philosophical literature. However we shall have to confine ourselves to the bare exposition of the system of Descartes as a whole & no longer follow in chronological order his writings & thinking. He went to Stockholm in Sweden on the invitation of queen Christina. Descartes' system was an original one and gave an entirely new idea to the history of philosophy.

He aspired to build philosophy anew from its foundation. But in doing so how was he to escape the influence of the past; how was he to avoid the

association & prejudice of the age under which he had been educated. He very well understood that he can do so only by banishing them entirely from his mind; he determined to erase from his conviction all past elements of consciousness; to make his mind tabula rasa which means clean slate on which there should be no past impressions. He knew that the science of his day was uncertain, he determined to doubt at all. Yes, not to take any of it for granted, not even the proof of mathematics. He came to the sceptical conclusion more particularly than "who knows" he says "that there is not an all powerful but evil disposed being who has put these thoughts & scientific demon-

strations into our heads for the very purpose of deceiving us & alluring us into error. How can we be sure that any of our knowledge be really true? We can not. And since it may all be false, let us doubt it all, if we can, or if there be any elements of knowledge, which we can not doubt, let us find when these certain elements are. So Descartes began by doubting everything even mathematics, even the existence of his own body. He has been accused therefore of being sceptic, but the result justifies us in calling him on the contrary, the prince of dogmatists. He doubt the old only that in the end he might believe the new. He thought thus to establish the certainty of knowledge in-

stead of uncertainty. We find him now ready to take his first step. He has banished from his mind all presuppositions, all the suggestions of the old philosophy. He has come to doubt all apparently true facts. He has reduced his mind a tabula rasa, a clean slate. He doubts everything, but he says. Although I doubt everything, yet in the midst of universal doubt there is one thing certain; namely, that my doubt really exist that I exist thinking with doubt I can think that all my knowledge is false but I can not think that my thought does not exist. This contradiction would be. The fact then remain absolutely certain that in the midst of doubt I really exist thinking. Here is

a piece of absolute knowledge which no sceptics in the world can shake. I am sure of my thought's existence, because if I doubt all things it is still I which think the doubt. The form in which Descartes presented his fundamental truth which has become the universal watchword of all modern philosophers is Cogito, ergo sum, I think, therefore I am. ~~I think therefore~~. Here are two pieces of certain knowledge laid down, which it is impossible to doubt. In the first place my thought really exist, cogito. I cannot doubt this fact. In the second place, I the thinker, the personal ego really exist. Here then we have the first two stones in foundation of new edifice of philosophy. These are the only

absolute certainty in our knowledge for even if I doubt everything else still I cannot doubt these.

You must see them already that Descartes' boast that recreated philosophy was not an empty one. He has discarded all the learning of his age as untrustworthy. He had painfully searched that immense ocean of uncertainty & found at last two pieces of solid land. Here was an axiom of philosophy of higher certainty than the axioms of mathematics. Even if an evil disposed god had deceived me into falsely believing the latter, yet I must exist in order to be deceived. This assertion of thought & self was true corner stone on which Descartes built up his philo-

sophy. The true corner stone on which the successors of Descartes had in turn build up their philosophies. It was a new idea for the world.

Hitherto philosophers had been discussing the nature of God the absolute, infinity of time and space, immortality, predestination, never doubting for a moment that they were perfectly confident of their solving stupendous problems. Men had been dealing with the infinites & absolutes outside of themselves as if they were the ground of all things & of all certainties. They had omitted to consider the claim of their own consciousness. Absorbed in the external object they did not regard their own ego their own Consciousness, as the main principles of knowledge. But

Descartes for the first time discovered that the real ground of human certainty is thought itself, consciousness. We are more sure of our own consciousness than we are of any of the things of which we are conscious, more sure of our mental existence than of any outward things or existence.

Henceforth all philosophy must begin with Cogito, I think. If I attempt to inquire how I think or what I think it is all in vain. For this very inquiry is itself thinking. My thought then is the most fundamental thing which I can assert in philosophy. It may be that things which I think about are true but I can only be sure that they are true by proving them true & all proof itself is thought. Therefore in philosophy it is

impossible to escape thought as starting point. It is impossible to begin with things and to proceed up to thought. Because all we know about things is what we think about them. Knowing is thinking. Descartes then at the outset discovered this most valuable truth of philosophy. But there is one point in the beginning about which there has been a great misapprehension. It has been supposed by some critics that Descartes meant to make an argument by a syllogism. When he say "I think therefore I am", they suppose his course of reasoning to be this: all that thinks exists; I think therefore I exist. Then this critic said this does not prove anything for Descartes has assumed in his major premise, all that

thinks exist, the very point which he wishes to prove. We admit, they say, Cogito, I think, but we do not admit reasoning from this that I exist. That is the very point which we want to know. Does every thing which think exist? But the criticism of Descartes that he assumed the point which he wished to prove is the entire misapprehension of his meaning.

Descartes himself protested against them in his own day. He said Cogito ergo sum is not an argument. It is not two truth. It is one whole truth seen not by argument but by intuition. I ought to have said Cogito silicet sum which means "I think that is to say I am" My existence as the thinker is the same truth with as the thinking. Thinker and

thinking are only two aspects of one and the same indivisible facts. It is all contained in Cogito, I existing think. At the same time that we know we think we know that it is we that think. So Descartes defended himself, and his defence so far is valid. I want you to understand this fact fully, that Descartes starting point is not argument but a simple statement of what he regards as indisputable fact, Cogito silicet sum. Such is the great solid foundation which Descartes had already found for his new edifice of mathematically certain philosophy. How he built it up on this foundation we shall see in another lecture.

Lecture IV. Oct. 3rd 79.

In the last lecture on Descartes I gave you briefly an account of the extraordinary condition under which the modern philosophy had its birth in Europe. I showed you that this conditions occasioned a general awakening of reason to the consciousness of its own dignity, the recognition by the thinking man of his own individual rights. I showed you that philosophy for nineteen hundred years had based its principles entirely on the authority of Greek Aristotle and I told you that Descartes was the first great system thinker who consciously broke loose from the influence of any outside authorities and based the certainties of thought in philosophy upon the authority of his own reason. This process

of breaking loose from mere philosophical slavery, I described to you as Descartes' preliminary scepticism, the making of his mind a clean slate on which all knowledge should be written anew. I also told you how Descartes was first enabled to make first writing on this new slate, how he discovered that the existence of his own thought was more certain than any of the contents of his thoughts.

The proposition Cogito ergo sum then is his absolute being the corner stone of all modern philosophy. Let us now see how he on this corner stone succeeded in erecting the edifice of modern philosophy. The principle Cogito ergo sum, I existing think is not a fruitless proposition. It contains within itself the seeds of its own expo-

tematic development. It gives us the nature of our inmost selves. I am a thing which thinks, this is the definition of mind, or soul or self consciousness, a conception hitherto unknown in philosophy. The soul's essence is simply thinking including under this generic term, however, the special process of feeling, desiring & willing. But the initial proposition gives us not only this matter of knowledge It gives us also the rule of evidence the method of procedure of the thinking self. The Ego or self is something which thinks and what it thinks are its ideas. Now the Cogito ergo sum is the idea clearly intuitive certain because irresistable. It is clearly evident that I must exist if I am deceived. Whatever similar ideas therefore have a simi-

lar ideas evidence, that is, are similarly clear and irresistable may be considered to be similarly true. The declaration of consciousness of whose existence we are sure of us are for us final authority. The first principle of Descartes has then already given us two things, the nature of our souls & their rule of evidence. (3)

The next step in Descartes system is a bold one. Upto this point we have been concerned with mind only and with its ideas. Now Descartes makes first attempt to get out the sphere of mind and to demonstrate an ~~extraordinary~~ external existence, namely the existence of god. This astonishing feat he proposes to perform in this manner. The geometer, he says

deduces his proposition neces
sarily from the very ideas of the
figure before him. That the
sum of the angles of a triangle
is equal to two right angles
is drawn directly out of the
idea of the triangle itself. In
the same way Descartes pro-
posed to draw the existence
god out of the very idea of
god. There is no dispute, he
says that our souls contain
this clear idea of god. The
idea of god is of an omnipo-
tent & good creator, whose
existence is not contingent on
anything else but who exist
necessarily. Necessarily existence
therefore contained in the very
idea of god. Consequently he
says, god necessarily exist.
Thus Descartes attempted to
deduce the existence of god out

of his very idea. Descartes has
now left the field of mind and
has attained in his system of
propositions, the realm of outside
existence, God really exist. But
hereby is a new conformation given
to our rule of evidence. We know
now that our clear ideas are
created in us by a good God,
whose nature rendered it im-
possible that he can willfully
deceive us. We can accordingly
be sure of the existence of the ex-
ternal world. Heretofore we have
been sure only of the existence
of minds and ideas. Heretofore
we have only had the irresistable
belief in the external world of
things. But they may have only
been only a delusion of our
senses, but now we know that
God exists and has created in
us this irresistible belief. We

can not then question it but must put it down as a piece of demonstrative knowledge.

Let us now look back and see how far Descartes has progressed in the development of his system. He began with Cojito, that is, his mind and idea. He was then enabled to proceed to the outside existence namely the existence of god. But having once attained this firm footing in this realm of external existence he is able to proceed to all particular external existence to prove the existence of the external world. Descartes then under the guide of Cojito has been enabled to bring back to certain knowledge all that his scepticism originally took away from him, namely,

knowledge of the mind and matter and of the supreme being. What problem now remain for Descartes' system to solve? He has demonstrated our certain knowledge of the three great realms of beings. There only remains for him to demonstrate further their exact relation of one to another. Mind exist, God matter exist and God exist. But the existence of God cannot depend on either mind or matter. The very idea of God is that he is the absolute being, whose existence depends on nothing, but on whom all other existence depend. God is therefore absolute substance. For substance may be defined as that whose existence depend on nothing else. Latin Sub (under) stans (standing)

God then is substance and all created things are merely depending upon him; but all created things are of two kinds, souls on the one hand & bodies of matter on the other. We have already seen the nature of a soul to be only thinking. Extention, that is, occupancy of space, can not belong to souls since I can well imagine
But if we must think my soul to be existing from the very idea of soul does not contain extention. On the contrary, we find the world of bodily qualities to have this in common that they exist in space. There are consequently two well defined kinds of created existences of souls or mind on the one hand whose essence is thought and matter on the other whose essence

is extention.

The world of mind and the world of matter we may now declare to be realities or substances but substances are in the secondary sense, that is, created substances. Their existence depends not upon one another but only upon God. In fact they are absolutely independent of one another and there can be no relation or communication whatever between them. Descartes then defined God as an absolute substance. He defined mind & the external world to be secondary substances independent of one another & dependent on God. The essence of the former he declares is thought, the essence of the latter to be extention. The next step in Descartes system

is naturally to ascertain more definitely the nature of the dependence of mind & matter upon God. God has created them but he did not create them once for all as a mechanic fashions a machine & then let them run alone without his influence, God did not wind the universe up as we do with clock & then let them run down alone; no, created existence always depend on God. If God created the universe at one moment there is no reason why it should persist itself through another moment. On the contrary if God should withdraw his creative power for moment, the universe should cease to exist. God therfore must create the universe anew

at each successive moment. This famous Cartesian doctrine of the continuous creation of the universe enable us to explain the further apparent relation of mind & matter apparent to the senses. Our minds act upon our matter & matter upon our minds. Our body & soul seem to compose a harmonious cooperating whole but reasons have declared to us that it is not so. Body cannot act upon mind nor mind, upon body, for they are substances independent of one another, and possessed of mutually contradictory essences. Extention can have nothing in common with thought. How then can we explain their apparent cooperation? By the doctrine of the continuous

creation. God alw creates anew at every moment both substance and body creates them so that they correspond to one another. I have thus briefly expounded the philosophical system of Descartes in the form in which the various proposition seem naturally to spring from one another. We left the development of this system expounded in several somewhat dissimilar form by combining his various expositions. We can produce this as the best brief exposition which contains the essence of his system. But I have not here entering into the minor details of his system and not touch upon physical philosophy which has little value in history of philosophy. The ground which

I have already covered is sufficient to nourish the whole growth of modern philosophy.

Lecture V. Oct. 4th 1879.

Such is that boasted system of Descartes which he succeeded in building upon the corner stone Cogito, ergo, sum. Such Descartes himself supposed to contain all absolute knowledge of men forever. There was no more work, he thought for philosophy to do. Notwithstanding the fact, this system which he thought geometrically correct really contained several serious defect. In serious attempts to correct these defects, subsequent philosophy has found its starting point. The History of modern

Philosophy since Descartes comprises only the systematic series of such attempts. I ought not therefore irreverently to anticipate the History of Philosophy by making here a formal criticism of Descartes system. Yet it may be a valuable lesson for us to see in just how far Descartes succeeded in the noble effort with which he set out.

We started, you remember, by determining to erase from his mind all the elements of his past knowledge, all principles of knowing derived either from authority or education, his mind was to become a blank or tabula-rasa. The system which he was about to commence was to be absolutely anew without any assumption. All this promises very fair. But let us see how steadfastly Descartes did really cling to this most plausible method. We have seen Descartes extricate himself from the flood of universal doubt. He found lastly the piece of absolute certainty that I must exist to think my doubt. This proposition we are sure of, to deny it would be a contradiction, since the very denial of thought would itself be a thought. Such is Descartes' position. We must believe this proposition, according to Descartes, because to deny it would be a contradiction. But what right had Descartes for to fall back upon the principle of non-contradiction? It is, to be sure, a fundamental principle of Logic that no subject can

contradict its predicate, but Descartes has no right to employ it. He has cast away as untrustworthy all the fundamental principles whether of logic or of mathematics. He is going to allow no assumptions however apparently necessary. Descartes then has really violated his rule at his very outset. The apparent cogency of his Cogito, ergo sum rests entirely upon the assumption of non contradiction namely that the contradiction in thought is an absurdity. It is not then Cogito ergo sum which lies at the base of Descartes system. It is the principle of logic on which Cogito ergo sum depends. I need not go on to show that Descartes not only assumed the primary truth, he also assumed with this two otter Hundred principles of

identity and excluded middle. On these three principles all cogencies of thought therefore must necessarily rest, & upon these three principles the accepted principle of Cogito ergo sum necessarily rest also. Therefore Cogito ergo sum is not the first original proposition in Descartes actual thinking. But after all admitting that the Cogito ergo sum really does not rest upon the universal logical assumptions, is it not in itself a true proposition? Is it not necessitated by these very logical principle? Yes, if we admit the logical assumption as every body must, it follows that Cogito is true, but it does not follow that sum is true. Descartes' idea was that the ego (I or self) is already contained in Cogito (I existing thinks)

but we have now found that the real base of Descartes system is not mere intuition but is an argument from the principle of non contradiction. Let us see then how much this argument really proves. It cannot be a content of thought that thought does not exist since such a denial would itself be a thought. To say otherwise is to think a contradiction. This then is necessary true. We must all start with thought as absolute certainty. Cogitatio est (thinking is) that is proved by the principle of logic. So much then certain. This is then indeed indisputable. Yes, the very logical proposition themselves assumes this cogitatio (this thought). It is true then that philosophy must begin with thought. But is

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it also true that along with the Cogitatio, the ego or mind or soul necessarily exists as something which thinks the thought? That is not necessary true for to deny it is not a contradiction? It is a contradiction for thought to deny itself but it is not a contradiction for thought to deny ego since knowledge of ego's existence is only itself a thought. Thought may without logical contradiction deny all its contents but it cannot deny itself as the container. I admit that. It may be true on other ground that ego does exist. What I do deny is that the ego's existence is a part of a primary proposition, the cornerstone of Philosophy. It may be a true intuition but if so thought must first justify

its intuition. Mark then what I have just shown. I have shown that Descartes' Cogito ergo sum rests on logical principle true enough in themselves but invitably assumed. I have shown in the second place that the real cogency derived from these does apply to the existence of thought (cogitatio) but does not apply to the existence of soul (Ego). Where then did Descartes get hold of the ego the soul, mind or consciousness self? He assumed it. It was his second great assumption. In spite of his profession we have found him first assuming his logical principle, now we find him assuming the ego itself. But these two are not Descartes' only assumption. He declares that the nature of the

soul is derived from his initial proposition. Soul he says is an individual, a unit, a person. Now where did this idea of individuality come from? It is not implied by the mere existence of thought and is not contained in the assumption of the ego's existence. It is then the third assumption and whether it be afterwards found true or not it is utterly inconsistent with Descartes Method. No wonder then that Descartes' first proposition was so fruitful a one. No wonder now that out of it Descartes deduced his whole system of philosophy. It is no wonder that Descartes could draw out of a thought what he has already put into it. If we put a hatful of things into a hat it is an

easy matter to take them out again. So if Descartes had put in half dozen principles it is very easy for him to deduce them out again. But let us for the sake of criticism ignore all the assumptions. Let us imagine Descartes as established this system rightly so far. Let us see how he succeeded. The next step with Descartes is his announcement of the rule of certainty. Whatever ideas are indisputably clear these, he says, must be taken as trustworthy. The assumption in this case is virtually the same as the assumption in Copito. Clearness and Certainty are simply the result of logical principle. All necessities of thought is logical necessity. Descartes rule of certainty is however

for this very reason is not derived from Cogito ergo sum but is of pure assumption. If this rule is valid we must accept mathematical truth but this Descartes has denied. The next problem for our author to solve is his proof of God's Existence. In this geometrical proof Descartes did not intend assume anything anew but the argument is a complete non-sequitor that is the conclusion does not followed from the premise. It is true that out of the idea of triangle I can deduce the idea that the sum of its angles is equal to two right angles. Similarly it is true that out of the idea of God I can deduce the idea of his necessary existence but it does not follow that I can deduce the existence

fact of his necessary existence.
In this supposed analogy
Descartes misconceived the
nature of mathematical
proofs. Mathematical propos
are always true about
ideas not about things. A
triangle on a paper before
me is only an approximately
true one. Imagination can
not picture a mathematically
perfect figure. Mathematical
perfection & mathematical
accuracy are grasped only
by reason in the realm of
ideal definition. Mathema-
tical proposition would be
just as true if there were
nothing to apply them to. In
so far however as things
exist conforming to these ideas
in so far as mathematics
is true of things. Now in the
same way a deductive pro-

-position drawn from the idea
of God remains still only an
idea. If there be anything
in existence corresponding to
the idea then accordingly the idea
would be true of the thing.
If there is any God in exis-
tence then it is true that the
idea of necessary existence be-
long to him. But this is just
the very point in question.
Does God really exist? The
proof then of God's real
existence from ideas is utter-
ly futile. Out of ideas you
can never get anything more
than ideas by a proof. You
can only assume God's ex-
istence but cannot thus
prove it. Now Descartes
driven by the argument of
his critics was led to pro-
pound a new argument
for the existence of God.

Beside the geometrical proof he adduced ontological proofs thus: I am imperfect, finite and dependent. I have an idea of God as infinite & absolute. Now how did I get this idea? I did not get it from sensation, for sensations cannot furnish me with the perfect and the infinite. I did not originate it of myself for an imperfect being could not produce the idea from itself. There must be there a really existing a perfect, infinite, & absolute being who alone was able to produce in me such an idea. Such is Descartes another proof of God's existence.

Lecture VI. Oct 18th 1879

Now I am not here going to criticize the cogency of this argument. I wish only to point out that Descartes has evidently left the straight path of deduction from his first principle. This argument is not derived from the Cogito, ergo sum, but from the principle of causality, the necessary law of cause & effect, which has been assumed for the purpose. So difficult it is to manufacture argument without bringing to this support unsuspected presupposition. Descartes then has not proved the existence of God. At this point his system utterly breaks down. He is therefore really incompetent to take his next

steps and prove the existence of the external world of things. He must rest satisfied with his assumption of the external world as the necessary belief. Indeed there is some roundabout reasoning about this point.

Descartes has used the cogency of clear ideas as a foundation for the existence of God, and he has in turn used the cogency of God's existence as a foundation for the certainty of clear ideas. This is something like reasoning in circle. However let us waive all these criticisms of Descartes for the present and mark his progress onward from this point

The next point was the definition of God as a substance. Where did Des-

cartes get this notion of substance? The answer is, I suppose, one of his clear unmistakable ideas. He simply assumed the notion of substance. But I will not examine, since I shall deal with the nature of substance in Spinoza's system. The next point is the assumption of mind and matter as two independent secondary substances. Now, why, did Descartes assert that there were only two such secondary substance? Why they may not be three, or four or great many? Obviously Descartes borrowed this truth solely from experience. If we generalize the phenomena of our experience to highest degree, we shall find by experience, that they may be classified under two heads,

mental phenomena and material phenomena. This proposition, therefore, Descartes did not deduce from his first principle. He borrowed it from that field of exact Experience which he had promissed entirely to discard. Again as to the distinction of mind from matter, it does not follow that as a fact they are independent of one another, because I can think one without the other. Because I can think of thought as existing in the absence of space, it does not follow that thought really could exist in the absence of space. However, why Descartes did not satisfactorily prove all these propositions? Yet, I admit that he did an excellent service to mankind

in calling attention to them. He created a thought which always have some meaning for us.

As to Descartes doctrine of Contenuous Creation and the mechanical adjustment of soul and body, I need only say that they are consistent conclusion following logically from proposition already laid down. If he have given to us the idea of absolute substance and the idea of soul + body as a secondary substance independent of one another, this further doctrine must be accepted necessarily. Such is a sufficient brief account and the criticisms of Descartes' system.

Let us now sum up the result & and see what our final opinion of his system

as a whole must be. As a whole we may say what we might have suspected at the beginning that it is a failure. Descartes thought that it would be accepted as final by all men forever. But it was not accepted for so long; its defects were soon pointed out & the attempts were made to correct them. Still as in some respect we must say, agreeing with Schwegler, that Descartes attempt was not a failure but a gigantic success. In the first place he really succeeded in freeing philosophy from the yoke of mere authority. He won forever for reason, autonomy (self rule). In the second place he gave the certainty of thought as a key note of

all modern philosophy. All thinking must after him take consciousness for its starting point. In the third place, Descartes called the attention of the world for the first time, to the distinction of self consciousness, mind, soul, Ego as a kind of being generically distinct from mere matter. Whatever we may think of his limited application of principle, it is still indisputable that he sowed the seed of great and important truth. Most discoverers talk more wisely than they are aware of. How hard to recognize the ultimate result of the principle which they have established. They are the world's geniuses who go pioneering for us into unknown regions & we com

portably follow after the path which they have laboriously hewn out. Descartes may fairly be ranked among the geniuses of the world. We shall see them as we go on, his is working to their completion & satisfaction Descartes succeeded in founding modern philosophy. His philosophy may fairly be called the system, since it was the systematic attempt of thought to give account to itself of its own content. We have seen that in some point he failed in completion, but we expected that. The attempt was glorious, the failure was glorious too and it has resulted in a glorious philosophy.

Before leaving Descartes philosophy as a system I

ought to mention his two best known disciples

Agreeing with the main principles of Cartesian system, they both sought to give a clearer explanation to the relation of God to created substances & of soul to matter. They only developed what was already implicitly lying in Descartes. G , for. Example, only elaborates the theory of mechanical adjustment of soul & body. His is the doctrine of occasional cause. On the occasion of my volition it is god who moves my arm. On the occasion of the affection of my external sense organs, it is god who creates in me the sensation. Mind & body are like two watches wound up together ticking away together in casual unison in perfect unison without

any casual influence one over another.

The philosophy of Malbranche is another special attempt to account for the same phenomena. God, he says, embraces all existence not only of the world of things but also the world of spirits or ideas. Now the soul cannot know material things since they are unlike them in nature. It can have only ideas of things, but the things themselves as well as the idea of things exist in God. The soul can get at a thing only by mounting to God & seeing them there as they exist in him. Thus the god is the mediator between things and the soul.

Such is the brief statement of a famous doctrine of the vision in God. We

have now had sufficiently complete view of Cartesian movement as a whole for us to understand sufficiently the History of Philosophy. I will say in closing that if we wish more details, you will find the best and most complete historical account in Bouillier's Histoire de Philosophie Cartesienne.— 2 vol.— Paris.

Lecture VII.

Oct. 25th 87.

Spinoza

The philosophy of Descartes had attempted to give to the world a complete and rounded account of all the fundamental principles and relation in existence. Its author supposed that nothing further in that line would ever be sought by human intellect. His solutions were mostly in harmony with the doctrine of Christian religion. He had separated the spiritual world from the material world by an absolute gulf which however he had enabled himself to bridge over by the doctrine of a continuous and harmonious creation by divine substance of these

two world. He had been followed by Geulincx who tried further to explain the mechanism of this apparent unity in profound duality by his doctrine of occasional causes and Descartes disciple Malebranche had given a somewhat Pantheistic solution of the same problem by declaring that there was no possibility even of apparent unity except in the very substance of God. Thus we find the notion of secondary or created substance already fading away in the overshadowing presence of an absolutely real god. It was to give this idea already latent in the premises of Descartes. Greater prominence and absolute logical consistency that

Spinoza found himself obliged to undertake the formation of an entirely new system which should formulate anew the mutual relations of Descartes three substances God, mind and matter. The difference between the first two systems in the history of modern modern philosophy may be stated briefly thus. Descartes declared the relation of God to the world of things to be that of transient cause to its external effect while Spinoza undertook to explain the same relation as that of immanent or indwelling cause. This latter notion leads to absolute Monism or Pantheism in which all the illusory particularity of being is swallowed up in one indeterminate and infinite unknowable. The Pantheistic Philosophy of Spinoza has however a perpetual value for the student of philosophy because it formulates distinctly for him that unity of existence which he finds dimly shadowed forth to him in the very requirement of his mental constitution. The very possibility of thought implies a natural classification of our experience into an ascending series of species & genera dropping one by one the differential intensive characteristic notions, we reach at last that highest notion of being or existence the summum genus whose intension is reduced to unity and whose extension had become in-

finity. This supreme idea of pure undifferentiated being Spinoza elected for us into a reality and called it substance. We see the same mental tendency in those intellectual processes which introduces synthesis into our experience. We cannot think without using concept. In forming concept we abstract from all the idea individuals of a class those particular qualities which make them an individual and combines the remaining qualities common to the class into one general idea. We unite the quality into an idea to which we give a name & individuals into a class. Again we cannot think without employing judgement; for instance, if we are thinking that this

city is large, before thinking city and large are independent concept, but by the thinking, the two are unified into one concept, large city. In reasoning we employ a third process of unification. If I know that the judgements all iron are fusible, and this metal is iron are true I can immediately unite two judgements into one and express the whole thought by saying this metal is fusible. It is thus evident that in all forms of thinking we unify if we consider now no longer the mere form of this unification, but some of the metal which is unified, we shall see already lying in the nature of things, the principles of unity. Each thing which exist in universe

is a particular, a determinate thing, that is, it is distinguishable from all other things through its difference from them. We can only understand what a thing is by distinguishing it from what it is not. All determination is negation. Now if each bit of reality is confined to its own peculiar set of properties there must be some ground or reason in the nature of things why it is that particular thing rather than something else? This determining cause science attempts to trace in reducing the multiplicity of effects in nature to the action of a few simple causes or forces. These simply expressed physical causes such as heat, light electricity, gravitation are

in turn themselves determinate since they are distinguished one from another. We are required inexorably to ask as well of them also, what is the deeper ground of this several determinateness? This scientific man can only answer that they are all manifestations of one and the same universal force which whose mechanical effectiveness can neither be increased nor diminished. If now having reduced physical forces to unity we come upon the last distinction framable between universal mechanical force on one hand & the force or being which manifest itself in thinking on the other, we find ourselves involved in the same problem. Here is the force of consciousness

on the one hand and here is the forces which produce motion on the other. They are both determinate since they are limited, all excluded the one from the other, we are then obliged to ask again our old question what is the ground or cause of this ultimate difference in being for there can be no determinate difference without a determinator of that difference. The only possible answer for reason who put this question is that this ultimate difference is not a self subsistent reality. It do not create itself neither can it exist by itself; for if so where does the difference exist? It cannot exist in each one separately since in one thing there can be no difference, consequently it cannot

exist in the sum of two things since there is no more in the sum collectively than there is in the constituent parts, this duality of different things can not then be real. The difference is not self subsistent but must be referred to the nature of one undifferentiated being lying behind it of which the two separate forces are not substantial effects but merely inherent attributes. This I understand to be the real essence of the argument of Spinoza, translated from his repulsive and to the ordinary reader unintelligible technicality into the language of a more modern and plain common sense. If you understand this argument fully, you understand the full ground upon which Spinoza

declares that substance is one; you understand also that all differences in universe are not differences in reality but have been absorbed into the one undifferentiated substance, it follows that if substance is one it must be also infinite. For if it were finite it would have to be limited by another substance, in but case both limiting substance would be determinate & would require a third and more real substance behind them to account for that differences. This is Spinoza's idea of God which we must carefully distinguish however from the Christian notion of God. The latter is the notion of a particular personality possessed of definite qualities

such as goodness, mercy &c. The substance of Spinoza on the contrary has none of the qualities of personality any more than the qualities of impersonality. If substance is infinite goodness it must also be infinite badness, if it is infinite strength it must also be infinite weakness. All possible predicate & all possible attribute must be included in it for to leave any one out would be to make it determinate and therefore finite. Since that would be to distinguish what it is from what it is not. In the world of ordinary experience we say that contradiction is not possible. This is because, finite things obtain that particularity & determinateness only through

the principle of difference. If we take away this difference or contradictions between things, we have already seen that we destroy these things as things and are dealing abstract concept. Determinateness is the very essence of finite beings but we have now seen that finite beings have no existence in themselves. On the contrary the one only real substance cannot have the quality of determinateness since that would be to make it finite. It is perfectly possible then even necessary that this substance contained in itself all possible conviction. In fact it is the only place in which all contradictory attributes must find their solution This is what Spinoza means

by declaring that substance in order to be infinite, must manifest itself in an infinite number of infinite ways or must have an infinite number of infinite attributes. How now are the two halves of being mind & matter to be related to this strange unknowable contradictory but ever present substance. Evidently only as two of these infinite number of attributes they are the two of which it happens alone that finite minds have any knowledge whatever. We must recognize at the same time that the narrow limits of nature within which we dispute are not the limits of reality but that there may be & must be an infinite number of aspect of this universe which we are unable to recognize

at all. Here is the foundation of the modern doctrine of the relativity of knowledge which Mr. Spencer in quite a Spinozan manner calls the unknowable reality or substance.

Lecture VIII.

Oct. 31st 1879.

Nevertheless we do know the attributes of mind & matter as they are not merely as they appear. For the way in which they are & is the way in which God act through them. Spinoza's theory is thus enabled to account for the parallel evolution and the seeming interaction of thought and matter. My consciousness of this desk on one hand is God in so far as he actually thought.

The desk itself on the other hand is the same god, but in so far as he is actually matter. Most more natural therfore then that complete harmony should reign between the two worlds which are different only as attributes but are identical in substance. They are related to one another like the concavity and convexity of a single curve. Two sets of relations, concavity and convexity are not two subsisting independent realities. They are only two points of view from which may be regarded the only actual thing concerned, namely curve itself. At the same time it is evident that the two attributes of the curve if we may so call them must be perfectly correspondent throughout their whole length and if the curve is the variable

and irregular one, each irregularity on one side will be matched by perfectly identical one on the other. From this point of view let us ask the question what is the difference between a given apple and my consciousness of the apple. All the qualities of the one are distinctly duplicated by my consciousness of these qualities in the other. If you say that the apple is real while my consciousness is only an illusion, I reply that the quality of reality is included in the thing apple, but that my consciousness of reality is as well included in my consciousness of apple. There is no statable difference between them, but this that they are two of ways in which one reality make itself reality,

namely the ways of thought and extension. This theory is natural development of Descartes' doctrine of Harmony through a contemporaneous creation. How now is possible for Spinoza to state the relation of individual particular being in nature to God or one real substance? They are not substantial individuals, for their determinable difference cannot be real. Neither can they be attributes for each attribute must be unlimited in its own nature. The attribute of thought is not limited by any other thought, since it contains in itself all the thoughtful ways in which God manifest itself. Neither is the attribute matter limited by any other matter than itself

contain. Each thing infinite in its own nature although limited in appearance by the nature one another. But one stone is limited in matter by another stone, by water, air and other organic substances. One man's consciousness is limited by the consciousness of surrounding men. They are then not attributes but the mere modes of attribute specially and temporally limited portion of mind & matter, which manifest themselves at this particular place & time, & then pass away into something else. Their differences are not substantial and their determinate individuality is of the nature of the baseless & fluent dream in which the ephemeral images are continually passing into others of the same

nature. The manifold things then of this universe are in their difference, but a continuous dream of god, or we may compare them to the fitful & unsubstantial form of the shifting waves upon an infinite ocean whose passing upheavals are due alone to its own immanent energy. Birth & death therefore are the appointed destiny of modes. The changes of time are of no account to substance which itself changes not. The tears, & joys & blood & dynasties of a thousand ages are but the unreal night mare which troubles its sleep. Nevertheless this fluting modal shadow must like every thing else determinate, must have their own special determinators. There must be a cause why

each individual present itself now & then. But the cause of such trivial distinction can be nothing to substance itself. They must belong to themselves to space & time in order to determine their special and temporal effects. They must then themselves be the modes of the passing phases whose successors they determine in a never ending series of antecedent & consequence. The dance of time contains within itself the rythm of its own music & the rules of its own movement. But the modes of mind can not be the cause of modes of matter, neither can the mode of matter be the cause of minds. Each set of modes must form their an independent developing series

by itself. The nature of the material universe is what it is by the inexcitable laws of cause contained in its own material frame. So each particular manifestation of consciousness is what it is, only through its place in an infinite series of determining consciousness. Man himself is therefore only a mode. For he is but one particular determination in a universe stuffed full with other such insignificant particulars. Alas for the pride of men who declared himself made in the image of God & elevated himself to the heavens & declared the broad boundaries of the world to be laid only for his service. He is a lost atom the shadow of a dream in the sympathetic gulf of unknow-

able substance. Alas for the creative freedom of will each act of his is only inexorably determined modes like the spray of a white ocean driven by the irresistable winds upon a hard rocks. What then remains meet to hope? What is the best for him to do? What is his proper aim in life? No longer to battle with the world in the brave hope of becoming its master & enjoying its prizes, but to renounce his individuality. To curve his passionate impulse of his will to think his particular being back again into the sea of substantial reality from which it came to attain nirwana by pondering so long upon his identity with divine substance that the identity becomes

itself realized in fact. I mention this peculiar consequence of Spinoza's system, because it almost exactly corresponds with that philosophical system of Buddhism which dawned upon the intellectual world of the East more than twenty centuries before. In its original philosophical purity, before it was overlaid with the forms & formulae of religion, it was the system of Pantheism similar to Spinoza in which the unknowable reality engulfed in its individual (?) man who had attained his perishable modal existence only through the accident of space & time. Man therefore could attain only his salvation by ceasing to be man by pondering upon the infinity of his real substantial nature until he had

mustered & destroyed. the disturbing finite interference of his individual will & perception. Such must always be the morality, the mystical question of any system of philosophy which declares men to be only a mode of unknowable substance. We have seen now the essential points in the developement of Spinoza's system. We have seen, it founded in a real mental tendency of our natures towards the recognition of unity. We have seen it account for the universe no longer by an inexplicable act of creation, but by an eternally prolonged act of immanent causation. At the same time we have seen the visible universe reduced to the mere attributive exist

ence. Nevertheless this explanation renders intelligible to us the apparent harmonies between two harmonies of nature which as attributes are absolutely separable & it is merely by a subdivision of those attribute themselves that the universe of particulars has arisen. What then shall we say of this system as a whole? Does it give us an intellectually satisfactory account of the fundamental relation to all thing to each other? Can we be any more be satisfied with it as an ultimate explanation than we can with Descartes? I think we must answer this question in the negative. We shall have to regard Spinoza's system as a step, but an incomplete step in the mo-

dern attempt thought fully to
muster the universe. In the
first place, it is not conceiv-
able why there should be any
attribute or mode at all.
They are not illusion, mere
subjective impressions upon
our minds which God makes.
They are real ways in which
real God exist. Yet if this
god is in his nature one &
infinite, it is impossible
to understand why he should
at the same time be multi-
ple & finite? If he exist in
a variety of ways whence did
the variety come from? How
can that whose essence is
one be out of its own essence
many? If the reality behind
the universe were indeed the
God of Spinoza he would
have to stay wrapped up
in his unity to all eternity.

There is no principle in unity
itself which can force it to
become multiplicity. Spinoza
then leaves us utterly in the
dark as to the real connec-
tion between the God & Uni-
verse. There is missing link
somewhere. We can see well
enough how Spinoza carries
us up from particulars to
the thought of substance.
But once having reached
substance he utterly fails
to show us how or why this
identical absolute ever
created in modal or attri-
butive form any universe
of particulars. The causal
link is absent. The notion of
immanence does not
supply it, for the very ques-
tion is how can there be
any universe in which
God shall be immanent?

The source of this defect is very plain. Spinoza has deified and apotheoliezed an idea. I have shown you how we proceed by a high hierarchy of concept from lowest species up to highest genesis. Many particular trees are thought together under the one concept tree in general, but does not the concept tree or trees really itself exist? Particular animals exist, but can it be said that the concept animal in general exist? Now the concept of existence or reality is the highest concept to which our minds can attain. For under it they it includes all natural particulars or subclasses. If then the concept trees has no reality but is only an abstraction from realities.

Does this concept of reality have itself any the more reality? Evidently not. It is the highest abstraction, but it is no less an abstraction than is tree nor. This curious mistake seems to be at the root of Spinoza's Error. He founds among other concepts the highest, namely the concept of reality & then says to himself, the concept of reality has reality not merely this but much more. Curiously he says no other concept of things have reality. Since all other things & concepts are not the concept of reality therefore they do not have reality. The most real thing is that which has reality alone for its concept. Now this is an error for all things have reality for their concept just as all trees have trees for

their concept, but there is no reality corresponding to the single concept reality any more than any reality corresponding to trueness. We have no right to assume that the concept trueness is a reality. Neither have we the right to assume that the concept reality is a reality. Here then lies the main defect of Spinoza. His substance is only a thought & idea. Let us grant that geometrically he has accurately deduced this concept of the idea from its definition, it by no means follows that there is any such substance in universe corresponding to his idea.

Lecture IX. Nov. 5'79

It is not a sufficient answer to the question, what is the essential duality of our nature to say that we are made up of two parts, mind and body. This may or may not a philosophical view, but the essential duality lies much deeper than this apparent reality and is independent of any philosophical system. It consists in the double relation which we as conscious beings bear to those things which are the objects of our consciousness. It is a duality of a relation, not duality of existence. We find ourselves obliged at once to give two different interpretations to the relation between our conscious being and the objects. In the first

it is true that all objects whatsoever are known and conceived by me only as the contents of my consciousness. Now my body is one of these objects and from the point of view of consciousness it is not coordinate in rank in my mind. Being only one of the mind's object it is therefore subordinate to my mind. But from the other point of view, that is from the point of the view of the object my conscious being or mind is only one thing amid innumbered multiplicity of coordinate objective things. The peculiarity is that I myself conscious that is myself is one of its own objects and as such is completely subordinated to the laws of objects in general; but it still remains true that after all the whole world of

objects, self-included, are only my objects and as such are subject to the laws of my consciousness. From one point of view then the world of objects is contained in my consciousness while from the other point my consciousness is entirely contained in & subordinate to the world of objects. This then is the essential duality of our nature and it is essential because because it is not to be called a contradiction and because it does not depend upon the assumption & proof of any system of philosophy. It is not a contradiction, because the two words, "contained in" are used in different senses in two cases. But it is a fact and it is the fundamental mystery with which we come in contact

in studying the nature of knowledge, and it does not depend upon any peculiarity of any system of philosophy, because it is prior to all systems of philosophy, that is all have to work within its sphere, and the assumption and proofs of all philosophy are themselves conditioned by it. In fact philosophies are only attempts (often unconsciousness to explain it). He who does not see how the fact of this double relation conditions the whole movement of philosophy cannot intelligently understand the history of philosophy. It is clear then that this is far from being the same thing with the statement that we are composed of two parts mind and matter. The latter

statement amount to this, that we are a whole, made up of two coordinate parts, a duality of sides, and the only problem can be to state clearly the simple relation of two sides to one another. But this is an assumption for how do we know that there is any such thing as matter & how can we do know that there be more than two sides? We do know, however, that there is a duality of relation between consciousness and all its objects not merely the body and that this duality is equally a fact whether we are materialists, idealists, supernaturalists, or pantheists. To state the difference once more, the undergraduate answer is that the duality of

my nature refers to the two parts into which I am divided while the real meaning of the duality refers to the relation between the parts, or between one part and the whole objective world to which other part belongs.

Do I mean to assert then that all philosophers have had an idea of this sense of duality, and that they have always been conscious of this ultimate mysterious problem? Not at all. Many of them never do anything about it and yet at the same time all the reasonings are affected by it. While the method of ~~it~~ many of them appear to ignore it, yet the very assumptions and failures of these methods spring from the very impossibility of ig-

noring it. If then I say that we must understand this fact, in order to comprehend the position of any philosopher, I do not thereby say that you will find it expressly mentioned by that philosopher. Nevertheless you will see that he sustains a definite relation toward it. You will be more able to see his own position than the philosopher was himself just as you are better able to see the true proportions of ~~better~~ large building when you stand at some distance from it than you are when close beside it.

Now such being the most fundamental fact in our nature whether recognize it or not. The next question for us is how did this duality

affect particular form of problem in modern philosophy? We must look to Descartes and the movement he originated for our answer. I think it is an error to suppose that Descartes was himself fully aware of this ultimate fact of duality. He did not bring it consciously before him in its entirety. If he had so done he would have pronounced the problem in his latter form "what is the nature of this consciousness which bears such a dual relation to its object?" But he did not do this being unconscious of it then. How was he affected unconsciously by it? Of course in answering this question I am giving our interpretation of Descartes thought and not the one which he

himself gives out us.

Well then we find him starting with something apparently unrelated to the duality namely the question of the certainty of knowledge. His was simply an altitude of negativity towards the old scholastic philosophy and characterized by the search for a principle of sureness in knowing but the special direction from which he finally got his first principle of certainty seems to take us back at once to the real fact of the duality. He finds that whatever else is uncertain it is at least certain that consciousness itself exist. Thought is at least more certain than any of its objects but this Cogito ergo sum is only an assertion of the most striking side of the

duality namely that thought is surer and more fundamental than any of its objects or as I before expressed it that these objects are subordinated to it. I do not of course assert that Descartes saw that this was the full scope of his principle. He propounded it only as the method of getting rid of doubt. Nevertheless we can see

Leibnitz.

The lecture on the system of Leibnitz, by Prof. Tenellosa, I able on main points to what is contained in Bowen's "Modern Philosophy" and for this simplicity sake I have made the following extracts. (Chap. VII P. 99)

With the single exception of Aristotle, I suppose that Leibnitz was the most comprehensive genius that ever lived. Other men have been as industrious, and have become as learned as he; they have also aimed at original speculation on as great a variety of topics. But they have sacrificed success in any one department to this dream of universal empire, they might have accomplished more, had they attempted less.

Leibnitz, alone, in modern times attempted everything, and left his mark on all that he undertook. Even at the present day there is hardly a science, hardly a field for study, research or speculation, which does not bear the impress of his labors, or the history of which could be fully written without frequent mention of his name. As some of the ancient charioteers, said Fontenelle, "could guide eight horses yoked side by side, so Leibnitz drove forward all the sciences abreast." Historian, jurisprudent, philologist, mathematician, physicist, theologian, moralist, and philosopher, even those who began by censuring the multiplicity of his pursuits, after recovering what he actually accomplished, the new problems that he started and the many pregnant hints of future discoveries for which science is indebted to him have been compelled at last to doubt, as Dugald Stewart says, "whether he could have accelerated the advancement of knowledge by the concentration of his studies more than he has actually done by the immensity of his aims, and whether he does not afford one of the few instances to which the words of the poet may literally be applied: Si non errasset, fecerat ille minus." He shares equally with Sir Isaac Newton the glory of inventing the Differential & Integral Calculus; his doctrine, that the force is not simply as the velocity, but as the square of the velocity, after raising a controversy that lasted over a century after his time, is now

admitted as a first principle in science; his announcement of the Law of Continuity, that nature never proceeds by saltum, and its corollary, of the existence of a scale of beings varying by imperceptible gradations, accepted almost at once in a large department of research was adopted as late as 1866 by Mr. W. R. Grove, the president of the British Association, as the latest and broadest generalization of all the science of our own day: the doctrines, first proclaimed by him, of the sameness of indiscernibles, and of the need of a Sufficient Reason for all things, are among the most comprehensive and fruitful principles ever introduced into the field of purely speculative philosophy. ---

The difficulty is great of rendering any connected account of the opinions of Leibnitz; for he published no one work of any length or method, giving a connective view of his doctrines systems as a whole, probably from a consciousness that all his doctrines could not be forced into complete harmony with each other. His writings consist of a huge mass of correspondence with nearly all the literary & scientific men in Europe; of short papers communicated to philosophical societies; and of a few occasional & hasty publications of greater length, which are so carelessly executed that they may be termed ephemeral were it not for the importance & novelty of some of the theories therein set forth.

He was by no means a mere student of science & philosophy, he was also a diplomatist, a statesman with all the cares of office, a courtier, and a man of the world, he stood high in the favor of princes, and was connected with some of the most important negotiations of his time. In a large sense, his career belongs to the history of Europe.

The logic and method of Leibnitz differ considerably from those of Descartes, though both are Rationalists, rejecting empiricism, as affording no sure foundation for science; in other words, they place the intuition of reason and the deductive conclusions of the understanding far above the generalizations of experience. Facts obtained by observation may be used to verify, but never to originate or suppress the primary truths of philosophy and science, which can be evolved only by meditation and the rigorous precepts of logic; that is to say, mathematical reasoning affords the only type of certainty and precision.

Leibnitz begins an exposition by saying that ideas are clear or obscure, according as they do, or do not, enable us to distinguish objects as wholes from each other; they are distinct or confused according as we can, or cannot, discern the marks or attributes whereby one object is distinguished from another; they are adequate or inadequate in so far as we have, or have not a clear & distinct notion of each of their marks or attributes, as

well as of the substances in which they inhere. Now the senses often give us clear notions, less frequently distinct ones, and never adequate ideas of the objects perceived. Thus even a child clearly distinguishes a circle from a triangle, such figure being roughly considered as a whole, but he has no distinct notion of the many geometrical properties or attributes, which are peculiar to each of these forms; and still less can he adequately conceive all the consequences, which the mathematician perceives to flow necessarily from each of these properties and attributes. Only the intuitions of pure reason, guided or restricted by the dialectical principles of the understanding, can attain to perfectly clear, distinct, and adequate ideas; and attain to these alone are perfect, and never can be derived from sense. A number, in the abstract, is perhaps the only instance that can be given of an idea perfect and pure. A given object, such as a piece of iron, may have been observed by the senses for an indefinite time, and at last only accident makes us aware that it is magnetic. We can never be sure that it does not possess many other, as yet unknown, properties; and still less can we trace all the consequences that might follow from its attributes, so far even as already known. An infinitude of experiments would have to be tried before these could all be determined.

sensible ideas, as they are never adequate, admit only of a Nominal definition, which does not express their essence at all, and enumerates but few of their marks. A Real definition is possible only of adequate & intuitive ideas, such as the geometer frames of his various figures and which, through establishing the compatibility with each other of the various elements of the idea, give us to know a priori, or antecedently to experience, the possibility of the idea as a whole. Thus the geometer knows at once, by intuition, that a triangle, or a three sided figure including space, is a possible conception; and that a bilinear, or two-sided, figure, thus enclosing space, is impossible.

The monadology of Leibnitz, which includes most of what is original and peculiar in his system of philosophy, is, in the main, a deduction from his doctrine of innate ideas, & from his three fundamental axioms, the Principle of Sufficient Reason, the Sameness of Indiscernibles, and the Law of Continuity. Indeed these three may properly be called considered as one, since it can be easily shown, that the second & third are necessary corollaries from the first. The full announcement of this single axiom is, that no phenomenon can exist or take place, and no judgement be valid, without a sufficient reason why it is so rather than otherwise. Then the Law of Continuity necessarily follows, since there is no

Suffecient Reason why a series
should be broken at one point
rather than another, or why two
places should be filled, while
the intermediate one is vacant.
We are also compelled to admit
the remaining axiom, that there
are not in the universe two
perfectly similar — that is,
absolutely indiscernible — things
or objects; if there were, God
would act without Reason
in assigning them to different
places & times, as must be
done if they are numerically
distinct, since two things
cannot occupy the same
place at the same time.
Hence we are justified in
assuming that nature does
nothing per saltum, or by
abrupt transitions; but
all events, all objects, pro-
ceed from infinitesimal
germs, develop by successive &
extremely minute steps, and
pass into each other by imper-
ceptible gradations, the process
being all the while checked by the
counter principle of the Same-
ness of Indiscernibles, so that,
however near each other, no two
are ever absolutely indistinguishable
for then they would coalesce,
and become one and the same
thing. In the whole realm of
nature there cannot be found
two portions of matter, two
minds, two events, two any-
things, that are perfectly equal
and similar. No two leaves
of the same tree, no two faces
or two characters in however
vast a multitude of persons,
no two roses on one stalk, no
two drops of water, ever are
perfectly counterpart of each
other. This is a fact of

experience, which confirmes and justifies the *a priori* principle. History — experience — never exactly repeats itself. God puts his individual mark upon each particular thing & incident; and yet each one slides & shades into that which is nearest to it without shock or leap, but with a delicacy surpassing the nicest discrimination.

Here at once is the germinal principle of the Infinitesimal Calculus, — either that which put Leibnitz upon the track of this grand invention, or what is perhaps more probable, which he deduced or generalized from it, after the mathematical contrivance was perfected. The infinitesimal element of every curve may be regarded without error as a straight line, into which it passes by imperceptible gradations; and yet it is not straight, for if it were, integrating it would not reproduce the curve, but would generate a straight line. In like manner, a body never passes from rest to motion, or from motion to rest, except by imperceptibly fine degrees, though an infinitude of these may take place in a moment of time. Even when a bullet is propelled by the explosion of gunpowder, the velocity rises from the minimum to the maximum by uniform increase. Leibnitz indeed, maintains, what I believe is now universally admitted, that there is no ab-

solute rest in the universe;
and he is also the author of
what has been claimed as a
very recent discovery in science,
the conservation of the same
amount of force forever, no-
ever being properly generated,
& none really destroyed.
"Thought is to the soul," he says,
"what motion is to body. A
soul absolutely without thought
and a body absolutely with-
out motion, appear to me
equally contrary to nature
and without example in the
world". This follows, indeed,
from his Law of Continuity;
as the transition from one
to the other would be a
positive saltus, or shock
of entire change from one
thing to its opposite & con-
tradictory. "A substance
once in action," he argues,
"will be always in action; for
all impressions on it, all or
impulses of it, continue and
are only mingled with new
ones, as in the parallelogram
of forces. By striking a body,
we excite in it an infinity
of little whirlpools, as in a
liquid; for in fact, every
solid has a degree of liquidity
and every liquid a degree
of solidity, and these internal
whirlings can never be entire-
ly stopped.

The purpose of Leibnitz
in the Monadology is to as-
certain the existence, & determine
the nature, of the first or sim-
plest elements of substance,
the primal units of being,
into which all things may be
resolved. There must be
such units, he argues, as
otherwise there could be no

compound or aggregate, since the very idea of a compound is that it consists of an aggregation of what is simple. These primary elements of being, which in themselves are absolutely simple & indivisible, he calls Monads. They are metaphysical units, or the units both of matter and mind, both of organic and inorganic substance. They are not only the seeds or germs of all things, but they constitute all things, as all composite being is made up of them, & can be resolved into them. Life is inherent in them, since, in the ordinary course of nature, they never really begin or cease to be. Originating only in the primitive act of creation, & incapable of dissolution because they do not consist of parts, they cannot perish except by annihilation. Thus the action of all of them is harmonious, each conspiring so to speak, with all the others, so as to keep up not only the individual harmony of each seperate living organism that is constituted by them, but also the general harmony of the universe, yet no one monad ever directly acts upon another, so as to produce any change in it, or in any way to affect its mode of existence. Each is an independent creation, the whole series of its modes & acts throughout its history being determined solely from within, being only the development of those inherent energies and propensities

with which God endowed it at the moment of its emanation from him. Each would run through its whole appointed cycle of acts & developments precisely as it now does, though it were alone in the universe. Innate force, incessant activity, is its essence; its nature, it always acts, it is never acted upon. It is never passive. One Monad cannot act on any other by impact, argues Leibnitz, because being absolutely indivisible, no such transposition or alteration of parts can take place within it as is possible in a composite body. No change, then, can be produced in its internal state, and as perfectly simple, "it has no windows," through which any foreign agency could enter or go out, so as to affect its internal condition. No two monads are perfectly alike, this being forbidden by the Law of Indiscernibles, the only difference between them consists in the greater or less development of their internal and innate energies. Inorganic nature is an aggregate of undeveloped or sleeping Monads; an animal's life is a dreaming Monad; man is a Monad that has been waked up. These are not distinguishable in kind, but only in degree; the difference between them, immense as it appears, consists only in the widely separated stages of development which they have respectively attained.

The doctrine of Pre-established Harmony is pithily

xpressed by Leibnitz, when he says, "every body acts as if there was no soul, and every soul acts as if there was no body, and yet both act as if each was influenced by the other." And in like manner every part of the universe harmonizes with every other part, though without the slightest mutual dependence or interaction.

According to Descartes, the universe is made up of matter and matter mind, which have nothing in common, the essence of the former consisting in extension, and of the latter in thought. Between these two there is an unfathomable abyss, which can be bridged over only by the incessant action of God, as in Malebranche's doctrine of Occasional Causes, since otherwise there would be no possible communication between them. But according to the Law of Continuity, argues Leibnitz, there cannot be such a gulf, or saltus, between unthinking matter and unextended thought. Moreover, as extension is only limited space, the unity and infinity of space lead directly to the doctrine of One infinite substance, whose immanent action produces the world of phenomena, — that is, to the pantheism of Spinoza, who takes away the necessity of a bridge by maintaining that thought and extension are both attributes of One Substance. We must, then, says Leibnitz, by reforming the Cartesian

nation of Substance. It is not true that all the attributes of matter can be derived from motion and Extension. The latter, indeterminate in itself, receives figure or shape only from motion; and space itself, being immovable, cannot be the principle of motion. There must be something apart from mere extension, which can be moved, and also which can have either in itself or ab extra, a cause or principle of motion. Beside extension, then, Substance must contain force — an active power — an indwelling cause, not susceptible of corruption or exhaustion, but enduring forever, — a true vital force, with which God endowed it at creation. According to Leibnitz, the essence of corporal substance is energizing force. ..... In like manner, according to Leibnitz, it has a susceptibility, or rather an original stock, of sensations, perceptions, and appetitions, which exist however, only in a confused and latent state, and never rise to consciousness, except in advanced stages of corporeal existence. All the knowledge which the soul ever obtains originate in it from the beginning, and education, as the etymological meaning of the word imports is not putting information into the mind, but only drawing out its latent stores. This mental evolution is constantly going on; the appetitions, as Leibnitz calls them, are the primitive desires and inclinations, which are

the springs of our mental activity, keeping up the series of our intellectual states by constantly hurrying the mind from one perception or thought to another. Many familiar facts evince the presence the action of a multitude of these unconscious perceptions. Thus, when at some distance from the shore, we hear only one uniform murmur or roar from the dashing of the sea upon the rocks, / but cannot distinguish the sound made by any one wave. Yet this general effect could not be produced, if each particular wave did not contribute to it its own portion of sound. Thus, also, a forest at a distance appears only as an indistinct mass of green, to which each leaf, however, though separately invisible, must impart its own share of color.

Berkeley.

The doctrine of Berkeley may be easily summed up in one short statement. Berkely says that there is no resemblance whatever between the visible and the tangible qualities of material things; that colors are the only objects of sight, while the distances, figures, and magnitudes of external objects are not seen, but only inferred, or estimated, from qualities which are really visible, — that is, from variations of color, and from a gradation of tints and of light and shade. Prior to experience, without the aid of the other senses, our eyes could not inform us that anything existed out of ourselves. We do not see the outward world. The visible landscape

exists only in imagination, being constructed or put together there by the intellect, out of materials furnished to the memory by the sense of touch, and by experience of resistance to muscular motion. The mind invests the colors and gradations of light & shade, which are all that are pictured by sight, with the various modifications of size, shape, and position, disposes them at appropriate distances, and literally.

"Gives to airy nothing
A local habitation and a name".

At no period of life do we gain, by one step, so great an accession of knowledge, as when, in infancy, we <u>learn to see</u>, — a process of education just as necessary, as gradually acquired, and as clearly the result of experience, as that whereby we <u>learn to walk</u>.

Perceptions by the other senses, also, are frequently altered and enlarged by the judgment & imagination, though the process of thus enlarging them, through long habit, is made so quick and easy that we do not remember it. All the information is then attributed directly to the sense through, in fact, it is a joint result, (1) of perception by sense (2) of remembered experience & (3) of reasoning. Thus, we speak of hearing a bell, the crying of a child, or the rattling of a cart in the street. In truth, we hear only certain sounds, at first unmeaning but which experience has

now enabled us to recognize as proceeding from those causes. Without such experience, we certainly could not tell even the direction whence the sounds come, for direction also is, not a direct perception, but an inference, based chiefly on the sound being a little more distinct to one ear than the other.

Returning to vision, it is plain that the utmost which we could expect to see of any object is its length and breadth. We must infer the thickness from slight differences of shading, or degrees of tint. Hence, when this shading and tinting are skilfully imitated by an artist, we are deceived, and think that the visible object

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
Philo
Descartes
Spinoza
Locke
Hume
Kant
Fichte
Schelling
Hegel