

Private

No. 18

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Boston, U.S.A. Sept 2d, 1881

Your Excellency: My last letter, (No. 17) was dated Paris, June 25, 1881. Since that date, my time has been so constantly and actively occupied, in matters of considerable interest, that I have had no opportunity of reporting my movements, and have thought it best to wait for a few days of leisure, before laying before Your Excellency the results of my later observations in Europe.

After the return of Mr. Gambetta from his tour in Southern France, I had the pleasure of two interviews with him, in which I laid before him my views of the Japanese situation. These interviews were necessarily very private, for the reason that I was presented by a member of the opposition, who is an earnest political adversary of Mr. Gambetta, although he was, and still is, a personal friend. I may mention that Mr. Suzuké, your envoy in France, had more than once spoken of introducing me to Mr. Gambetta, but I had certain reasons for thinking that, under the circumstances, I had better approach the distinguished French statesman by a more private channel. Any conversation that might have taken place in Mr. Suzuké's presence would perhaps have had some official appearance, and I was desirous to avoid all reasons for constraint. I was with Mr. Gambetta for about three hours, and his interest in our affairs appeared to be vivid, though — perhaps naturally — extremely superficial. The greatest difficulty I experience, in Europe and America, is in inducing public men to give the proper degree of serious and dignified consideration to matters so remote as those of the Far East. But in this case, after the first half hour, Mr. Gambetta appeared to enter sympathetically into my feelings, and while we remained together, I had no reason to complain of any levity. I wish I could say that the results of our conversation was as satisfactory as his manner of conducting his share of it. When I return to Japan, I will, if Your Excellency desires, give you an account of our exact words, from notes which I hastily wrote down as soon as we separated; but for the present you will doubtless be satisfied with an outline of his remarks, — which, I must repeat, were merely interesting, and had unluckily no real importance about them.

When Mr. Gambetta perceived that I was pained at the idea of anybody adopting a light or careless tone in speaking about Japanese politics, he

paused for a moment, and then suddenly changing his manner, said to me, in effect - "I observe you have a deep feeling in the affairs on which we are speaking. I will respect that feeling on your part, if you will promise, like a gentleman and a man of honor, to respect the requirements of my position, and to make no revelation of any frankness I may exhibit to you". Of course I gave the promise he asked for, and he then gave me, at considerable length, the reasons why he feared that neither he nor any person connected with the French Government, could pay any great attention to Japanese subjects. His chief difficulty would be the unsettled state of French politics. Your Excellency is aware of the entanglements which just now embarrass the rulers of France, and can appreciate the truth of what M. Gambetta said. He urged me to remember that the founders of the new Republic could not even yet regard their work as complete, and that it was most imprudent for them to stir up or agitate any matters not immediately connected with the anxious labors they are still engaged upon. He reminded me that he and his colleagues were compelled to give all their energies to vital and essential works, and that it would be an act of imprudence to turn aside and take up concerns of secondary moment in the eyes of France. He asked me what I thought would be said by his supporters if they saw him abandoning, even for a moment, the transcendent interests of his party, for the sake of a distant question which few people know anything about. They would, he said, not only reproach him with charges of neglect, but would utterly fail to understand his motives, and would perhaps withdraw from him their confidence. As he concluded his remarks, he said, very pleasantly and flatteringly, that his first intention had been to converse with me in the ordinary diplomatic way, and allow me to leave him without ^{any} serious utterance on his side; but he believed he could trust my secrecy, and had thought it better to acknowledge candidly the inability which he felt, and which he imagined his colleagues would feel, to occupying any time with discussions of Oriental questions. He offered to give me an introduction to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, but added at the same time that he, personally, would say one or two things to that officer, in a way that might be weightier than my own representations might be. I gladly accepted his generous offer, for it relieved me of a task that would have been unpleasant; inasmuch as my only purpose in visiting the Foreign Minister would have been to warn him against the

unreasoning hostility displayed toward Japan by M. de Balleo, the former Secretary of the French Legation in Tokio. This M. de Balleo has been doing all he could to injure us in diplomatic circles, and I was very anxious to say a few words of warning, in the proper quarter. M. Gambetta listened for a second time to what I had to say on that score, and again gave me his assurance that it should be faithfully repeated to the Minister of Foreign Affairs. Before I left him, I asked him if he saw any objection to my talking freely with the leaders of the Opposition, on the same subjects that we had discussed. He said by no means, and added that possibly the Opposition might see their way to making some "interpellations" on Japanese topics; - and if they did so, he should not be in any degree displeased. We conversed about Clemenceau, the most prominent of Gambetta's antagonists, and Gambetta ^{was} glad to learn all the particulars I could give him, but it was doubtful if he could make any use of them. Finally, when I spoke of the misfortune that France should have no individual policy in the Far East, but should always be blindly following the English course, without examination as to right or wrong, he answered that it might be all true, but many ^{French} statesmen would just now be rather glad than otherwise to find that there is one point in which English and French movements go together, for the very reason that they are separating on many other points - such as the Tunis operations, the new trade regulations, the commercial treaties, etc. In short, M. Gambetta simply repeated, in a very kind and courteous way, the old and (to me) detestable theory that strong nations must look exclusively to their own interests, and cannot allow any consideration for the affairs of such as are less powerful. I thanked him, and sincerely, for his frankness, and indeed I felt obliged to him for not using the vague deceitful language which many statesmen think it necessary to employ on all occasions. At the end, he was very particular in imposing silence upon me, and I am sure Your Excellency will understand that it would not be

desirable to speak too freely of these interviews.

After leaving Mr. Gambetta, I revisited M. Clemenceau, with whom I had an equally long — and I regret to say equally fruitless — colloquy. There was, indeed, nothing to be hoped for, from this latter gentleman unless he could be persuaded to make it part of his opposition policy to attack the Government's method of dealing with Japan, and call for a more independent and liberal system of intercourse. But on reflection, this seemed to be impracticable. The same reason, ^{as that} for the Government's inactivity, applied again here. Mr. Clemenceau and his supporters would have no justification for raising a question, unless they could accomplish something to the injury of the Government. In this case, even supposing they could amply prove that Japan had been badly used, and could ^{show} absolute neglect and impropriety on the part of the Foreign Office, still they could produce no effect. In the midst of the absorbing topics of the day — (Scrutins de liste, and scrutins d'arrondissements, Tunis, the elections, etc.) Japanese relations would command no attention whatever; and the effort would be wasted. So nothing came of that part of my conversation with M. Clemenceau; nor, in truth, did I expect that anything would. But I was glad to see a very intelligent appreciation of our affairs, and a genuine sympathy with them, such as few European statesmen manifest. Clemenceau has travelled much, and studied deeply, and I know, from my old intimacy with him in America that he is a man to be trusted. Consequently I felt gratified when he assured me, in a tone of unusual gravity, that if the time should arrive for him to take the place in the French government to which we all know he aspires, (and to which he feels himself destined) he would call upon me for a full, careful and upright statement of Japanese affairs, and would give such study to my statement as should ever satisfy me. "When the time comes," he said, "wherever you may be, I shall expect from you the clearest possible elucidation of our relations with Japan, with proper suggestions of the duty of France in the matter; and you may rely upon my making such use of your paper ^{document} as shall thoroughly content you." — Mr. Clemenceau offered me the free use of his paper — "La Justice", to discuss Japanese affairs; but the certainty that the subject would be overlooked by all French newspapers

readers, at the present exciting time, made me decide to decline his offer for a while.

I have given Your Excellency the above sketch of my conversations with these two prominent men, because they are undoubtedly the leaders of the two contesting parties which now dispute for supremacy in France, & because their remarks, though pointing to no definite results, can hardly be without interest to you. I hesitated about informing Mr. Suzuki of these interviews, ^{and} but finally concluded that nothing could be gained by doing so, and that I had better so far give heed to Mr. Gambetta's request for privacy. It would have had an awkward effect if he (Mr. Gambetta) had learned in any way that I had so soon spoken of our meeting. Of course I think Mr. Suzuki in every way trustworthy, and if anything could have been gained by it, I would have told him the whole. During my last days in Paris, I had many pleasant chats with Mr. Suzuki, who always impressed me favorably. His mildness was remarkable, and I thought that quality might well have been imitated by his European attaché, Mr. Marshall, who seemed, on the only occasion when I saw him, to be inclined to assume rather more authority than properly belonged to him. I understand he is a useful and industrious servant, and he certainly seemed full of energy; but I wished he had taken more pains to find out the wishes and views of his superiors, before asserting his own views too strongly. He more than once presented a supposed "Japanese policy" which I knew to be quite adverse to the best views of Japanese statesmen at home. But I presume the caution and calm discretion of Mr. Suzuki would prevent him from going far enough in a wrong direction to do any damage.

I need not say that I might have extended this letter to four times its size, in describing the incidents of my closing experiences in France; but I wish to avoid wearying Your Excellency; - and in case you should desire further particulars, I can easily supply them on my return to Japan.

I am Your Excellency's obedient servant
E. H. Horn.

To Your Excellency Oshima Shigenobu.

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Private

No. 19.

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Boston, U.S.A. Sept 3d, 1881

Your Excellency: My last previous letter was dated Boston, Sept. 3d, 1881 (yesterday.) That letter was chiefly occupied with a narrative of my experiences in France. I now proceed to lay before Your Excellency some details of my latest visit to and sojourn in England.

I returned to London toward the end of July, and lost no time in putting myself in communication with those members of Parliament who might be useful in forwarding our interests. Among these, Sir E. J. Reed had recently made himself prominent, and I visited him at his country house, where we devoted an evening to discussing the general prospects. It was unfortunately evident that, in his mind, there were obstacles as serious as those which M. Gambetta had discovered in France. In the first place, Parliament was in a state of great irritation, arising from the action of the Irish members, who had managed to prolong the session for many weeks beyond the usual term. The House of Commons, as a body, was extremely indignant, and was wildly impatient to have the session brought to a close. Any person who should, at such a time, undertake to introduce an entirely new topic, and thus detain the House still longer, would make himself an object of general dislike, and would run the risk of destroying his own chances of influence. There is no doubt of the truth of this, and it is unquestionable that if Sir Edward Reed had brought up the full subject of Japanese Relations, he would have met with a most uncomfortable treatment. At the same time, he was willing to make a preliminary step, and call upon the Foreign Office for the Correspondence between Great Britain and Japan;—and from the manner in which that step should be criticized, we could judge of what would be expedient afterward. But the impatience of Parliament was not the only difficulty which Sir Edward apprehended. He told me that until a recent time he had been in pretty free communication with Lord Beaumont and his Charles Dilke, and that they had virtually, though not positively given him always to understand that, whatever else might happen, at least Sir H. Parkes would not be sent back to Tokio. But, Sir Edward

added that within a few weeks, or possibly one or two months, he had noticed a difference with these heads of the Foreign Office, which he could not altogether explain to himself, but which made him feel less certain than he had felt, on that particular point. He then began to question me rather closely, respecting Mr. Mori, and appeared desirous to know my opinion as to that gentleman's plans and methods of conducting the Legation. I did not at that time feel disposed to respond very freely to his inquiries, for I did not know what the relations might be between Sir Edward and Mr. Mori, and moreover, I should always hesitate to say much about a person in Mori's position, unless I could speak with cordial approbation. Nevertheless, Sir Edward's manner of expressing himself gave me some anxiety, and caused ^{me} to make inquiries on my own account, concerning the envoy's actions. What I learned, it will be my duty, to tell you presently.

Before proceeding with my narrative, however, I desire to say a few words to Your Excellency upon the general subject of Sir Harry Parkes's relation to Japanese affairs. I have always endeavored to make it clear that I entertain no particular sentiments toward him as an individual, and that but for the official position he holds, I should never think it worth anybody's while to pay attention to him or his deeds. But the strength of that official position is so great, and the misuse he makes of it is so injurious, that I regard it as a mistake to treat him with inattention. Indeed, circumstances have so arranged themselves that Sir H. Parkes is in one sense the very centre and soul of a highly important feature of Japanese ^{Eastern} politics, to wish well to Japan has become identical with wishing destruction to Parkes; and the downfall of that minister is inevitably associated with the relief of Japan from many embarrassments. I am aware that there are some statesmen in Japan who hold a different opinion, and who think it is bestowing too much distinction and honor upon Parkes to identify him so closely with Japanese interests. I can only say that my own conviction is shared by every foreign observer who has had opportunities of forming sound opinions, and that they all agree with me that - much as we may despise the man, it would be dangerous to disregard the

potency which the minister unhappily wields. My reason for speaking on this subject, just now, is that I want to make it clear why a great part of my labor, in America and Europe, has been to discredit and cast shame upon Parkes in his public capacity. It has seemed to me as necessary as any portion of my duty; and in England it has seemed to be one of my most important duties. I can understand that a gentleman like Mr. Inouye, for example, may be personally indifferent to Parkes's movements, and may perhaps not care a great deal whether he goes back to Japan or not. Regarding himself as the equal, and more than the equal of Parkes, in natural ability, integrity and self respect, he may say to himself that to shrink from meeting him in the diplomatic field would be an unworthy sentiment. I can understand that; but still I think that is only one ^{view} feature of a subject that can be regarded in many ways. If Parkes had no power of mischief beyond that which he could exercise when he is brought directly in contact with the present Japanese minister of Foreign Affairs, - or with any other Japanese minister, - I should have nothing to say; but he has an enormous capacity for evil, in ways that no honorable Japanese official can oppose. He has no sense of truth, and no fondness for integrity, and his passion of life is now hatred for Japan. All the harm he can do, he will gladly do, and therefore I struggled against his return to his Legation. Furthermore, as he has always represented the head and front of the organized oppression of Japan, his resumption of office in Tokio would be hailed by all others, who hate Japan, as a triumph of their side. These being my convictions, I should feel both surprised and grieved if the government of Japan were indifferent as to whether he returned or not. Men like Gov. Newberry, Genl. Grant, Sir E. T. Reed, &c., can with difficulty believe that the Dai To Kwan has any other feeling than an intense desire that he be kept away. To learn that they (the Dai To Kwan) or any considerable number of that body, were quite willing that Parkes should go back, would cause them the utmost amazement. And yet, things have happened which produce almost exactly the same feeling of amazement among the true friends of Japan.

In a preceding page, I mentioned that Sir E. T. Reed exhibited a desire to know if I could tell him anything concerning Mr. Mori's course on certain questions. After I had first met Sir Edward, I followed up my acquaintance

with several other members of Parliament, and was somewhat perplexed to find that almost every one of them put a similar question to me. I asked what they meant, but could get no satisfactory reply. One day, however, an old acquaintance demanded of me, in direct terms, if I was sure the Japanese ministers held the same opinions that I did as to Parkes, and whether I believed Mr. Mori had a real objection to Parkes's returning to Japan. I was a little confused, but at once replied that I could not say what Mr. Mori's private feelings were, but if I understood the public feeling in Japan at all, that feeling was greatly against Parkes, and I could not doubt that Mr. Mori knew that, although his position as ~~Min~~ Envoy might make him reluctant to state the fact. "Then," said my friend, "would you be astonished to learn that Mr. Mori declares himself very willing to see Parkes go back to Japan?" I answered that it certainly would astonish me, and pressed him for further information. He was reluctant to give this, but advised me to go at once to Sir Charles Dilke, and confer with him on the subject.

I had, however, sufficient reasons for not wishing to approach Sir Charles Dilke at that time. I happened to know that he, personally, had a great dislike for Parkes, and that he was fairly well, if not thoroughly well, acquainted with the misbehavior of Parkes in Japan, but still I was disinclined to speak with him about the matter. Your Excellency is doubtless aware of the rigid restraints which the possession of a high office puts upon an English statesman. He is often obliged to sacrifice his own cherished principles for the sake of the party in politics which he ~~is~~ undertakes to represent. I may mention that it is for this reason that John Bright refused for so many years to join any ministry in England. So, although Dilke knows the worthlessness of Parkes, and would have readily joined in any attack upon him three or four years ago, he must now do in that matter, as in others, what the government dictates. And it is a recognized and traditional usage in England for the government always to defend a servant of the Foreign Office, even if he is notoriously guilty of evil acts, and never to acknowledge his guilt, so long as there is the slightest chance of protecting him. I was therefore sure that it would

unwise for me to speak directly with Dilke, I thought that if he were let alone, he might make no strong exertion in Parkes's favor, but if he were called upon to say anything, he would be obliged by the conventional rule, to befriend him. I had a plan of approaching Dilke in another way, but not in that way.

Nevertheless, I was extremely anxious to learn what all these allusions to Mr. Mori meant, and I again saw Sir Edmund Reed, and spoke a little more openly than before. He then told me that he had heard that Mori talked favorably about Parkes's return to Japan; that he (Reed) could hardly believe it to be true, but that it was important for him to know, for if Mori really did speak in such a way, he (Reed) would simply make himself ridiculous by trying to keep Parkes back. It would be the act of an idiot for him (Reed) to proclaim that Parkes was a bad enemy to Japan, while the enemy from that country was saying he would like to see him (Parkes) go back to his post. Your Excellency can well believe that I was made very uncomfortable by all this, particularly as I learned, on my next visit to Parliament, from Messrs. ^{Justice} the Cairney (of the House) Labouchere, Mundella, Lord Dunsford and others, that I was getting into a false position, and some persons were saying it was difficult for them to believe that I really knew what were the best interests of Japan, because the things I wished to see carried out were different from the things which the Japanese enemy advocated. The next day, I took measures to discover if Mr. Mori really could so express himself, and I then learned that he stated, in plain words that he thought it was for the welfare of Japan that Parkes should return. This was told to me by a person of absolute veracity, to whom Mori made the remark. I leave Your Excellency to imagine the annoyance - I may almost say the consternation which this intelligence caused me. For the first time

since I left Japan, I began to feel that I was engaged in a task which no energy, devotion or ability on my part could bring to a successful conclusion. I was not allowed any room for doubt as to Mr. Mori's words. The person who heard them is beyond ~~any~~ all suspicion, and he was explicit in his statement that the Envoy openly declared he thought it would be best for Japan to have Parkes return. He even gave his reasons for that opinion. I look upon those reasons as very disrespectful to the Japanese Government, and I therefore shall not repeat them here, - although Your Excellency shall hear them, if you wish, when I return to Tokio.

Upon learning this extraordinary fact, I was not a little disturbed about the course of action I ought to pursue. If I continued to agitate the question of calling Parkes to a reckoning, through friendly members of Parliament, I was liable to be met with the assertion, from the Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs, that the accredited diplomatic agent of Japan expressed himself perfectly satisfied with Parkes, and it was therefore useless for any member of the House of Commons to allege that Parkes was unworthy to occupy his post. Of course such a reply from the Foreign Secretary could admit of no response. An army of orators could do Parkes no injury while the Japanese Envoy defended him. To add to my anxieties, I just then received a letter from Sir Edward Reed, stating that he was reflecting about what he should do, but was in doubt, for the same reasons which made me uneasy. I had better quote directly from Sir Edward's letter, so that Your Excellency may see his exact words: -

"My dear Sir: - I am much obliged to you for the Report, etc. I am carefully considering how I shall further act in the Parkes matter. The great difficulty in the way is, of course, the probable absence of any real backing up at the Japanese Embassy in London - etc etc."

I again visited Sir Edward, and this time thought it expedient to speak with less reserve; for it would have been wrong for me to let him commence a Parliamentary attack on Parkes, in complete ignorance of what I knew. So I told him enough to put him on his guard, and it was decided he should confine himself to inquiring for the "papers relating to Japan" - as previously arranged. He did put that question in the House, on the following day, and the answer he received from Dilke was very curt and unsatisfactory. Your Excellency has probably seen the brief allusions to this motion in the House. The fact it amounted to nothing definite, and the only conclusion we could draw from it was that Parkes was too secure in the protection of Mr. Mori, to be affected by anything we could immediately do. A few evenings later, I again looked in at the House of Parliament, and was informed

by no less than three members of the House of Commons, and one member of the House of Lords, that they were ready and willing, if I requested it, to bring forward a motion for investigation of Japanese diplomatic relations. I thanked them heartily, but said I thought the present was not an advantageous time for commencing such proceedings. They then observed they thought I was right, and that I did wisely in not accepting their offers - although they made them in good faith, and would do their very best to carry out my ideas, if I requested them to do so.

From that period, during the brief remainder of my stay in London, I confined myself to mere general efforts toward explaining Japanese affairs to influential persons; and abandoned all attempts to execute any particular plan. Your Excellency undoubtedly sees plainly how useless it would ~~have~~ been for me to persist, in the face of the formidable obstacles I now knew to exist. I had the good fortune to gather about me, at a little dinner party, nearly a dozen gentlemen, members of both Houses of Parliament, and editors of newspapers which had lately discussed Japanese topics in rather an ignorant spirit. It was of course entirely private, but nevertheless, one or two paragraphs about it were printed, which Your Excellency may have seen. We had a few pleasant little speeches, the health of the Emperor and his Ministers was drunk, and I have the satisfaction of believing that, to a certain extent, some sound and advantageous opinions were planted in the minds of those who did me the honor to join me. Before I left, I visited the leading newspaper offices, and spoke cautiously to those of their editors with whom I was acquainted. It was obvious that hostile hands had been at work with some of them - notably with the Telegraph and the Spectator; and I did what I could to remedy the evil they had sought to create.

I left England on the 10th of August, having been occupied very diligently for about three weeks, and arrived at Boston on the 24th of the same month. Being rather fatigued, I am resting here a little, before going to New York, where I wish to confer again with General Grant and some others upon subjects of interest to us in the East. If I could follow my own inclination, I would start immediately for Japan, for I am greatly wearied by my long journeying, and I long for the repose and tranquillity I hope to find in my home at Tokio. But I think there are certain things about which I ought to gain information for Your Excellency, before I leave America. I have already received a letter from Mr. T. R. Young, who is in constant attendance upon General Grant at Long Branch - (a watering place near New York) - and who laments, as everybody does, the events which keep the politics of Washington in a continually unsettled state, and leave us all in the dark as to how soon the diplomatic and consular appointments will be made out. It is intimated to me that if I choose to change my decision, I may still have the office in Japan that was spoken of six months ago; but I feel,

more strongly than ever, that if I have any faculty of work in me, I wish that work to be in behalf of Japan, rather than in a branch of the American Service for which I have no fancy or sympathy. — It seems certain, now, that I can carry through all that needs to be done in about two months, or thereabout; and I hope to be able, before the end of the year, to see your Excellency in Japan, and lay before all that may be valuable of my experiences during the past twelve months.

Your Excellency's Obedient Servant

E. H. House.

To His Excellency

Okuma Shigenobu -

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書状目録左の目上

ロンドンをパリエントの議員ト面談。ロンドンをセーリード君
トノ議論。パリエント院に付テ付論。日本國に付テ外國公
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To
His Excellency

Suma Shigenobu

Tokyo

Japan




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